Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

141. Draft National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–18–85

Washington, undated

Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Gorbachev regime faces a complex of social maladies rooted in economic stagnation and the decline of the Soviet political system’s capacity to motivate constructive behavior in the elite, the work force, and the population at large. Alleviating or at least stabilizing these maladies in the context of accelerated economic growth and revitalization of the ruling elite is clearly the top priority and the most difficult challenge now facing the new Soviet leadership. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviet political system will not confront a serious challenge to central control, nor is the economy in danger of collapse, during the next five years or for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the highly interconnected domestic problems of the USSR, embracing almost all areas of Soviet life, present major obstacles to the economic growth and technological modernization goals of the regime, the attainment of which is vital to the alleviation of the problems themselves. Our overall assessment is that Gorbachev will not make significant progress in improving the welfare and general social state of the USSR during the next five years. [portion marking not declassified]

System-wide internal problems became particularly acute in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although most have been abuilding for many years:

—Protected by Brezhnev’s relatively passive policies and solicitude, the ruling elite became stagnant, cynical, corrupt, and ineffective in driving the economy and governing the society. It also became demoralized by paralysis at the top from Brezhnev’s last years through Chernenko. [portion marking not declassified]

—The stagnating economy of the late 1970s brought consumption growth to a virtual standstill. The production morale of an already poorly motivated work force turned down as a result. The quality of life for most ordinary Soviets stagnated after years of steady improvement, and actually deteriorated in some areas. The early 1980s saw a food crisis and some rationing. Health standards have continued a long-term decline, with adverse demographic effects on the pinched labor force. [portion marking not declassified]

—Rampant materialism and escape from social responsibility into private pursuit of often illegal gain spread throughout the elite and the population. Respect for positive social values and even the authority of the party suffered. Under lax central leadership, subcultures of corruption and private activity proliferated, tending to escape any real control. Ideology further lost its grip on leaders and led alike. [portion marking not declassified]

—Specific social pathologies increased, among them alcoholism, drug use, crime, and family instability. [portion marking not declassified]

—Although the regime effectively suppressed dissident activity during this period, dissenting attitudes in the population and some elites appear to have expanded; the most vivid have been anti-Russian nationalism, adherence to religion, and general alienation from the system, especially by youth. Our evidence indicates that the incidence of strikes and other spontaneous protesting activity increased during the 1970s and early 1980s. [portion marking not declassified]

—Information from and about foreign societies and about events abroad, especially in Poland, contributed to the disgruntlement of the Soviet people. [portion marking not declassified]

These phenomena represented a steady decay of the implicit social contract of the Soviet system in which the regime provides a modicum of welfare and security in return for obedience and a modicum of work from the population sufficient to sustain growth. [portion marking not declassified]

Especially under the influence of Polish developments, the top Soviet leadership became increasingly alarmed from the late 1970s on. The Brezhnev regime took little or only half-hearted action to stem adverse social and economic trends, resting hope in the power of exhortation and fearing the destabilizing effects on the elite of bold action. Andropov set the tone for a more activist policy line. He began leadership cadre renewal and a social discipline campaign, especially against elite corruption, which persisted somewhat under Chernenko and emerged as the launching points for Gorbachev when he became General Secretary. [portion marking not declassified]

By consolidating his personal power rapidly, continuing the replacement of aging and incompetent leaders, and punctuating the discipline campaign with draconian measures against alcohol abuse, Gorbachev has revived a degree of optimism and self-confidence in the Soviet ruling establishment, and some hope for the future in the Soviet population. He has begun to define an economic revival strategy that initially rests a great deal on “human factors” to boost productivity, i.e., increased labor discipline and more competent, demanding management. He intends to sustain future growth by a sharp acceleration of technological modernization in industry, underwritten by a shift of investment emphasis into machinebuilding. He promises to achieve further progress by reforming economic management in ways—yet to be specified—that make central planning more effective and give more room for much needed enterprise initiative. [portion marking not declassified]

We expect Gorbachev’s domestic policies for the next several years to be relatively cautious and conservative. He will not go very far in adopting market mechanisms for the economy or in legalizing private activity. Beyond disciplinary measures, he will concentrate on streamlining central planning and accelerating technology advance in industry through centralized levers. [portion marking not declassified]

Although we believe it likely that Gorbachev can achieve improved growth rates over the next five years (2.5–3.0 per cent per annum), he will probably fall short of his announced aims (4.0–5.0 per cent). Consumption levels overall will probably remain virtually stagnant, and the economy faces a number of crisis-prone prospects, such as a turndown in oil production and the perennial vagaries of weather in agriculture.² For economic reasons as well as the fact that many of the USSR’s social problems are caused by the repressive nature of the system itself, the prospect that social stresses within the Soviet system can be significantly alleviated in the next five years is not good. In some respects Gorbachev’s policies are likely to increase, not decrease, social stresses: [portion marking not declassified]

—Cadre renewal policies will produce unfamiliar insecurity and turbulence in the elite. This will probably incite political opposition to Gorbachev’s programs. [portion marking not declassified]

—Increased labor discipline and other measures to increase productivity, without immediate material returns for the population at large, are likely to produce disappointments following the recent upswing in popular expections. Wage differentiation and, more generally, policies that reward strong performers and penalize the weak will increase tensions in the Soviet working class. [portion marking not declassified]

—As the regime experiments with new policy lines, however cautiously, elements of the intelligentsia are likely to press the uncertain boundaries of permissiveness and engender unfamiliar political disputes. [portion marking not declassified]

We believe dissenting attitudes in the Soviet population, particularly anti-Russian nationalism and religion, are likely to increase. We also expect episodic strikes and other forms of worker protest to continue, although the regime is likely to be able to keep them from being prolonged or combining into nationwide disorder. [portion marking not declassified]

Soviet internal problems do not make the USSR other than a powerful international actor seeking to aggrandize its power at the expense of the West and through control over others. But they do pose constraints on ideological appeal, military modernization, and diplomatic flexibility that might open Soviet society to foreign influences. [portion marking not declassified]

The immediate impact of these problems on Soviet foreign policy has been to set the Gorbachev regime in quest of a low or no-cost restoration of a detente atmosphere in East-West relations.³ This would allow him to balance his growth strategy with modest defense increases and stable consumption in a predictable environment while improving access to Western technology and giving up nothing in Soviet aspirations to expanded influence in the Third World. [portion marking not declassified]

The essential dilemma of the Soviet system is that it tends by its nature toward stagnation, while it depends on growth which requires technological and social modernization, which in turn require systemic liberalization. But liberalization cannot be undertaken without endangering system stability. [portion marking not declassified]

How well the Soviet leadership will manage this dilemma in the long term is unclear to us and to the Soviets themselves. The inadequacy of palliative measures of the sort we expect to be taken in the near future will raise the pressure for further experiments in liberalization, could precipitate reversion to repressive measures to contain the effects, and gradually increase the tension between social aspirations and regime control. We cannot foresee the time, but we can see the tendency for this tension eventually to confront the regime with challenges to its political control that it cannot effectively contain. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the NIE.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, Subject File, U.S.-Soviet Union (21); NLR–324–10–21–2–5. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In a November 6 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Gates explained: “1. The DCI has instructed that I make available to you the uncoordinated draft of the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate 11–18–85, ‘Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System,’ so that its themes can be of use in preparations for the meeting between the President and Gorbachev.” He continued: “2. Please be reminded that this draft does not represent coordinated national intelligence. So far it is only the product of the National Intelligence Officer/USSR and select analysts of CIA/SOVA. Since we have not previously tackled this range of internal Soviet problems, it is more than usually difficult to anticipate final agency positions. I anticipate that some will take the position that this draft exaggerates the depth of Soviet internal difficulties and their constraining impact on Soviet foreign and military behavior. Others may feel that these Soviet problems make it more likely than this draft judges that the Gorbachev regime will compromise on security issues to achieve a relaxed and predictable course for East-West relations. Nevertheless, while dissents may be vigorous, I doubt they will be radically at variance with this draft.” The final version of NIE 11–18–85, “Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System,” dated November 13, is available in the Electronic Reading Room of the CIA FOIA website. A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. The draft NIE’s “Key Judgments” section was rewritten for the final version; however, the content and message remain similar. The “Discussion” section of the draft and final NIE are almost identical.
2. An unknown hand underlined “perennial vagaries of weather in agriculture” and wrote an exclamation mark in the left-hand margin.
3. In the final version of the NIE (see footnote 1, above), a footnote provided a dissenting view on Gorbachev’s reforms, stating: “There is an alternative view—held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force—which holds that the Gorbachev regime regards the advancement of its foreign and strategic goals as the primary determinant of, and motivating factor behind, Soviet behavior in the international arena, not Soviet internal problems.” (NIE 11–18–85, Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files)