Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

140. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 6, 1985, 1700Z

15988. For S/S Only. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Shevardnadze, November 5, 1985.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is uncleared memcon being cabled to you for clearance. Do not distribute outside S/S.

3. Place: Foreign Ministry Mansion

Date: November 5, 1985

Time: 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Participants:

Soviet Side: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko; Ambassador Dobrynin; Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov; Chief MFA USA Division Bessmertnykh; Senior Assistant to Foreign Minister Chernyshev; Arms Control Negotiator Kvitsinsky; Deputy Chief MFA USA Division Tarasenko; Soviet Interpreter

American Side: Secretary Shultz; National Security Advisor McFarlane; Ambassador Hartman; Ambassador Nitze; Ambassador Ridgway; Ambassador Matlock; Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer; NSC Staffer Linhard; DCM Combs (Notetaker); Interpreter Hopkins

4. Shevardnadze opened the meeting by reading from a lengthy typewritten document. We believe, he said, that today’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev was useful. We have reached the decisive stage in preparing for the summit, and there is no need for me to make a further statement about that. However, there are some specific issues that I would like to mention. Yesterday you set forth your views on many important issues in the area of national security. The most important of these deals with space strike weapons and nuclear weapons. The fact that you have presented us with a counter-proposal is viewed as a positive development. We do not as yet have a complete picture of your position. As we learn more about it, we hope your proposal will look better than it now does. Yesterday you must have realized that what you have said so far in Geneva has been disappointing to us. Our assessment rests upon fundamental principles which are absolutely unchanged. First we are negotiating on the basis of the clear mandate of January 8. We worked out a fair understanding, a formula whereby nuclear weapons would be reduced if the arms race in space were halted. This is not a theological argument. Playing with words will not change reality. As Gorbachev has made clear, it seems to us that the United States has designed a new way to continue the arms race and gain superiority over the Soviet Union.

5. We made a number of critical observations yesterday, Shevardnadze continued, and we will continue to discuss the inequality of your proposals. We are not interested in polemics. We want you to have a clear idea of our own position, which is to draw a line at banning space strike weapons. Beyond that line (i.e., if space weapons are not banned) nothing is possible. But by banning space strike weapons various compromises become possible. We believe the concept of strategic defense is fundamentally flawed. You propose to let the genie out of the bottle; then you will decide what to do about it. You argue that so long as there are no space arms, there is no need for a ban in this area. This is analogous to the situation with submarine launched cruise missiles: since they are not verifiable, they should have been banned prior to their development and deployment.

6. The second fundamental flaw in your thinking about space strike weapons stems from the fact that they are more offensive than defensive. In fact, they are another class of offensive weapons, and the militarization of space would have a highly destabilizing effect.

7. A third problem, Shevardnadze continued, stems from your claim that deployment of space strike weapons will make possible reduction of nuclear weapons. But space strike weapons cannot be tested under realistic circumstances. Can the United States base its entire defense upon an untested system? Would a future Secretary of State or National Security Advisor advise the President to scrap all nuclear weapons and rely upon an untested defensive system? It would be much better for the two sides to agree to have no space strike weapons and then to commence immediately the elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. Shevardnadze said he would like to bring up another important aspect of the Soviet proposal, in the spirit of a realistic approach to the overall problem. The fifty percent radical reduction put forward by the Soviet Union is based upon defining strategic weapons as those capable of reaching the territory of the other side. This definition most fully embodies the principle of equal security. Given the existence of rough parity in nuclear weapons, the situation of the two countries is not equal. The Soviet Union faces a double threat: from weapons situated on the territory of the United States, and from U.S. forces located elsewhere. This question is vital to us: it is not a matter of theory. We would like the U.S. side to leave Moscow convinced that the Soviet leadership genuinely desires to eliminate nuclear weapons.

9. We are, of course, aware that the negotiation of an agreement in Geneva will take time. The Soviet side has put forward not only radical proposals involving space arms, but also a series of less sweeping measures. As yet we have received no response to them. The most important of these is our proposal to suspend all work on the testing, development and deployment of space strike arms. This would be accompanied by other steps to achieve stability and confidence. For example, while the United States proposes installing a new kind of telephone and raises other such secondary questions, the Soviet side offers to remove 200–300 ICBMs from alert status. There is no answer from you. There is no answer to our proposal to ban new types of nuclear weapons and to freeze existing nuclear weapons at current levels. We have also proposed a ban on deploying nuclear weapons in countries not presently possessing them, and on increasing the stocks of nuclear weapons in those countries which currently have them.

10. Shevardnadze said he wished to discuss the question of ASAT, a very important issue which remains on the agenda. The Soviet side views this both in the broad context of a ban on space strike weapons and as a specific arms control issue. The Soviet Union has made clear in formal negotiations and in bilateral contacts that it is prepared to resolve this question. We note that U.S. specialists say control over ASAT systems is necessary to protect space-based weapons. What is involved here is a test of the genuine intention of each side to abide by the January 8, 1985 undertaking not to allow the arms race to spread to outer space. We propose agreement on a separate accord for the complete banning—including testing, development and deployment—of such systems, as well as the elimination of existing systems. Until now we have not received a positive answer.

11. The next question, Shevardnadze said, involves nuclear testing. It has been three months since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium on such testing, effective until January 1, 1986. This moratorium is still in force. If the United States follows our example, it can be extended beyond January 1. The United States has often said it favors in principle a complete ban on nuclear testing. Clearly, a mutual suspension of such testing would be a major step in this direction. The Soviet side is no less interested than the United States in strict compliance with a test ban. We both know such a ban can be verified. We have had adequate practical experience, on the basis of existing technical means, to be convinced of this. The U.S. administration still has time to ponder our position and take the right decision.

12. The Soviet side has repeatedly raised the issue of radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom. U.S. explanations that these radars are only being modernized is entirely unconvincing. This is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. There is not enough time today to discuss fully U.S. concern about the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is designed to track space objects. The U.S. side was the first to suggest informally a way to resolve this issue. The Soviet Union, pondering this opportunity, proposed removal of this irritant to our bilateral relations by an agreement to stop construction on all three radars. We are trying to understand why the United States is not interested in this proposal. I will not name the persons responsible for this. Those here at the table know who they are. Perhaps these persons are interested in preserving the irritant rather than eliminating it.

13. You raised the question of chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said. We favor inclusion of this problem in our final document. But if one is interested in eliminating this inhumane weapon, then one should not propose production of a new type of chemical weapon—and I refer here to binary weapons. It seems to us artificial to raise the issue of chemical weapons in the context of the Iran/Iraq conflict. Our efforts are better directed at working out an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons. It is not possible for us to accomplish anything regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq conflict.

14. Shevardnadze next wanted to say several words about the impermissibility of nuclear war. This was particularly important for any general statement regarding the international responsibility of our two countries. A statement on this issue would show that our respective leaders were concerned to eliminate the threat of war and to establish a more stable foundation for our bilateral relations. The language on this issue we have conveyed to the U.S. side takes into account statements by President Reagan. Such language could be put into a separate document or be made part of an overall document in connection with the Geneva summit.

15. On regional issues, said Shevardnadze, you have spoken broadly about geographical regions and about the bilateral consultations we have conducted. You have spoken favorably about continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on this matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last night. It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on individual regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in every part of the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on a more systematic basis.

16. Shevardnadze then turned to bilateral questions. We are near agreement on a number of issues, he said. While only final steps remain, we understand that such steps are often the most difficult. However, we have had to conclude that in certain respects the U.S. position on these issues has of late hardened. The Soviet negotiating groups—and I say this with all responsibility—have been instructed to conduct businesslike discussion of these issues. Regarding North Pacific air safety, in its most recent discussions with us the United States has gone beyond the framework of the July 29, 1985 memorandum.³ In effect, we see a plan to place responsibility on the Soviet Union for insuring the safety of the entire Pacific Ocean international air corridor, even though Soviet civilian aircraft do not use this corridor. No specific decisions have been reached on civil air negotiations, and you seem to want to place us in a disadvantageous position. These talks resumed on November 4. It would be good to finish them before the Geneva meeting.

17. Yesterday you spoke about an exchanges agreement. The text of that agreement is in principle agreed. The document could be prepared for final signature if the U.S. were not insisting upon inclusion of a new issue, namely, access to television. This would be contrary to standard practice in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union. The United States is also interested in the number of exhibits and such issues as the number of cities. There is now no misunderstanding on these matters, provided, of course, the United States withdraws its position on television. Should this happen, the text could be prepared for signature. In any case, this does not appear to be an important question of principle.

18. On consulates we are prepared to receive a U.S. group which would go to Kiev to look at the properties earlier chosen by the U.S. side for the consulate office and for staff housing. We are also prepared to show the U.S. group certain additional options—and such options do exist. The Soviet side intends to send a similar group to New York. Following these visits we could meet to discuss and resolve all questions concerning the Kiev and New York consulates. This should be done promptly.

19. The United States has recently proposed an expansion of bilateral exchanges in various fields. We can now say that relevant Soviet agencies have been instructed to look carefully at these proposals. Some deserve attention, others require further study and examination. Our agencies will provide their views at an early date; we will be in touch with you through our embassies after we have given this matter appropriate study.

20. Shevardnadze next turned to the issue of the agenda for Geneva. The basic issues are clear, he said. The agenda items and their sequence have largely been determined and, of course, our leaders will be free to raise any issue they wish. You have provided your ideas on the sequence of topics for discussion at Geneva. A preliminary agenda would, in our view, be as follows:

—November 19 morning—tete-a-tete, general discussion of current and future U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations in their global setting.

—November 19 afternoon—questions of space arms and nuclear weapons, plus other disarmament issues as time allows.

—November 20 morning—remaining disarmament issues, regional and bilateral issues as time allows.

—November 20 afternoon—continuation of bilateral relations; discussion of the future agenda, including instructions to our Geneva arms control delegations; and agreement regarding future meetings.

—November 21—possible joint press conference; possible signature of documents; private meeting for final exchange of views.

This is how we see the structure of the overall summit, Shevardnadze said. We would welcome your thoughts, but we believe this agenda would achieve the maximum results eagerly awaited by our two peoples as well as the world at large.

21. The Secretary said he would like to comment on the proposed agenda as well as on some of the other matters Shevardnadze had raised. We agree on the subjects to be covered in Geneva and on the order in which they are raised. We caution, however, against the danger of spending so much time on arms control that no time is left for other issues. We therefore think an effort should be made to conclude the discussion of arms control on November 19, as the Soviet side had just indicated. We understand that the November 20 meeting will be at your Mission. Protocol would have it that the visitor is invited to speak first. So, while agreeing to your listing of topics, I have one reservation. The President might wish to comment on regional issues at the beginning of his November 20 morning presentation. At the same time, we do want to see that all arms control issues are adequately covered. We agree with your description of November 21. Let’s leave that day’s agenda open for now.

22. Regarding a joint document, or communique, we have both worked at this. We have discussed a list of topics and some of their content. When you first suggested a document, we agreed it could be worthwhile, if we could produce one with genuine substance to it. On the basis of the experts meeting last night, plus your comments today, I would say it is not yet clear whether we can find the necessary content to justify such a document. We could go either way—either an overall document that is justifiable in terms of its content, or perhaps several individual items that could be read or signed. We don’t think it would be particularly useful to produce a document which focused on areas about which we could not agree. What we are prepared to do—and we trust you to join us in this—is to energize our negotiators to complete their work if possible. On certain issues like terrorism we have provided you with draft language. Our Ambassador is here and will be prepared to receive your comments.

23. We have listed 26 topics that might be included in a final document, the Secretary continued. Based upon the small working session last night, we judge that four of these are agreed or likely to be agreed, 17 perhaps could be agreed, and five are unlikely to be agreed. It is worth noting that these 26 issues have different time horizons. At one end of the spectrum is the question of ship visits. The Soviet side has suggested reciprocal visits, we agreed and now the Soviet side seems to have second thoughts. But there is no particular timing issue associated with this topic; it can be agreed without delay. At the other end of the spectrum is your proposal for a joint project on nuclear fusion. We are interested in this idea but considerable time will be needed before it can be profitably considered by our two leaders. In short, we need a rational plan of work that takes into consideration the time required to work out these various issues.

24. I can pledge this, the Secretary said. Our team here at the table, as well as others who are not present, will be prepared to work to the maximum to prepare this very important meeting as well as is possible in the time remaining. We should consider each of these 26 topics to see what we can piece together into an overall concept. We have exchanged draft documents, and we will certainly give your documents careful consideration. Ambassador Hartman will be here continuously until he departs for the Geneva meeting. I will be available at any time. Ambassador Ridgway and her staff as well as Bud McFarlane and Paul Nitze will also be engaged. So we’ll all be working on it. Our approach will be to work out problems, not debate them. We will concentrate on those areas which promise a specific result.

25. The Secretary said that Mr. McFarlane and he worked for the President as a very close team. The Secretary would ask Mr. McFarlane if he would like to comment at this point. Mr. McFarlane said the general conclusion he would draw from our exchanges would be that the gap remains very broad in our respective understanding of fundamental as well as specific bilateral issues. Perhaps this was a consequence of the lengthy period that has transpired since the last U.S.-Soviet summit. If so, there is all the more reason for the upcoming meeting to be held. It is also possible that we have been too ambitious. Perhaps this new beginning does not lend itself to agreements in specific areas. There is no point, however, in regarding the glass as one-half empty. We remain, as President Reagan surely does, hopeful, that we are at the beginning of a new effort at problem-solving. We have come to Moscow in that spirit. We leave in that spirit and we all look forward to the Geneva meeting.

26. The Secretary said with a smile that (given the lateness of the hour) Ambassador Hartman and Ambassador Nitze—who is the wisest and most experienced person on our team—have nothing to add to the discussion. Ambassador Nitze said he did want to make one point. The Soviet side had earlier suggested that SLCM’s did not exist prior to discussion of them at the negotiating table. In fact they were tested much earlier, abandoned by the United States, but developed and indeed supplied to many countries by the Soviet Union.

27. Shevardnadze said he would like to add a few words. Of course the agenda at Geneva will depend upon our two leaders. Secretary Shultz is right to say that we do not need a document reflecting our differences. It would not be worthwhile, and it would be too long. Despite all disagreements and differences, our two drafts provide a basis for work, and that work should continue. Individual proposals are important, but one cannot avoid general principles and provisions. One such general principle is the January 9, 1985 Geneva undertaking which provides a mandate for the Geneva arms talks. It illustrates the Soviet side’s understanding of the relationship between general guidelines and specific proposals. We agree that our two sides have much serious work to do in fashioning a summit document. The Soviet side is prepared to cooperate to this end actively and constructively.

28. Gorbachev pointed out earlier today that we were optimists regarding the outcome of the summit, Shevardnadze continued. Our government and our people have great hopes for this meeting. The Soviet Government and its leaders are very serious in their approach to it. Our exchanges have been frank and have amounted to an important stage in summit preparation. I agree with Mr. McFarlane that many difficulties and problems remain before us but if this were not the case, a summit would not be necessary. And so, in the time remaining we must do our utmost to prepare our leaders for a successful meeting. We understand that after Geneva we will have numerous occasions to meet and to exchange views.

29. Shevardnadze added that he wanted to take this occasion to thank Secretary Shultz for the warm hospitality the Secretary provided during Shevardnadze’s recent visit to the United States. This was highly valued. (At this point for the third or fourth time waiters appeared with large trays of coffee and tea; Shevardnadze looked at them with a weary smile and said “please give that liquid to somebody else.”)

30. The Secretary said he appreciated Shevardnadze’s comments. He wanted to clarify his own comments about differences being reflected at the summit. We would have no objection to reflecting some differences—this would probably add to the credibility of the meeting. Yet it would not be good if only differences were registered there. The Foreign Minister spoke of our forthcoming agenda items as guidelines, citing the example of the January 1985 NST understanding. This could be a promising approach, and perhaps we can supply new guidelines at the forthcoming meeting.

31. The Secretary noted that he would be meeting American newsmen shortly and did not intend to provide them with details of the discussion.⁴ He would propose to say, as Shevardnadze himself had said, that the current visit marked an important stage in preparing for the Geneva meeting; that the discussions were frank; that we had identified our respective positions and had encountered some serious differences, which of course provided one basic reason for a summit meeting. The Secretary would say that the two sides both hoped for a successful meeting in Geneva and pledged to work to that end.

32. Shevardnadze commented that how the Secretary characterized the visit to the press was certainly up to the Secretary. Perhaps the terms “useful” and “productive” could also be employed, as General Secretary Gorbachev had done, but again that was up to the Secretary. It might also be said that we were at an important and decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

Hartman

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. On November 5, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “Geo. S. called from Moscow on scramble phone—6 more hours of talks—4 of them with Gorbachev. Apparently not much progress. Gorbachev is adamant we must cave in on S.D.I.—well this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an unmovable object.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 536)
3. See footnote 9, Document 122.
4. Shultz held a news conference in Moscow on November 5; see the Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, pp. 57–60.