Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

78. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)¹

Washington, August 10, 1983

SUBJECT

• Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

In the memorandum attached at Tab A to the President, Secretary Shultz suggests that the appended speech on U.S.-Soviet relations be delivered by either the President or himself in the near future.² The Secretary’s apparent rationale for this speech is that it would help gain public support for the Administration’s policy toward the USSR and might profitably set the stage for his upcoming meetings with Gromyko or for the impending INF deployments. Since he is not clear on either the timing or the precise context of events in which the speech would be given, the implication he seems to be making is that the contents of this particular draft so skillfully present the Administration’s not-easily-reconcilable objectives of resistance to Soviet expansionism and intensified dialogue that the speech is worth making for purposes of general public support.

The Secretary does have a point. His Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony on our Soviet policy was reported in considerably divergent ways by the press.³ The Washington Post described it as outlining a policy of “opposition” to the USSR. The New York Times described it as focusing on “dialogue” with the Soviets. Other commentators described it as a mixed bag. In other words, there is a strong case to be made to explain more clearly that the President not only wants to restore our strength and meet Soviet challenges, but is prepared to engage in genuine good-faith negotiations with them and explore avenues to secure a more peaceful, stable relationship.

My only problem with the message outlined in this draft is that it embodies some of the very inconsistencies detected by the press in the SFRC testimony. The first third of the speech describes the history of disappointments in U.S. dealings with Moscow and states that we have no illusions that Moscow will readily abandon its aggressive course. But the last part of the speech entertains precisely some of those illusions. What is the public to understand by such passages as this on page 12: “If we could eliminate some of the most important points of conflict, it would prove much easier to solve the remaining problems that divide us. On this basis we could begin to develop a relationship of very broad mutual benefit indeed.”? Is this not the very kind of illusion and wishful thinking that has yielded us so many of the disappointments of the past? And do not such illusions erode our efforts to secure an adequate defense budget, not to mention public support for our efforts to resist communism in Central America?

I recognize that it is not an easy political task to resist the Soviets while simultaneously trying to negotiate with them and play the role of peacemaker. Perhaps if this draft were fixed up a bit it could help explain the complexities of our policy. Even as it stands, I think it makes a better explanation than the SFRC testimony did. Nevertheless, I think an undiluted message of “peace through strength” will be much more comprehensible to the public and capable of winning its support than the message in this draft.

Because the specific context for the speech has not been specified, I believe (as does Jack Matlock) that to decide on its tone and perhaps even its timing may be premature. A good case can be made that we should wait and see how the first Shultz-Gromyko meeting turns out and perhaps even how the INF situation develops in the early fall before we decide on the formal contents of the speech.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President forwarding Secretary Shultz’s memorandum and recommending that the three of you discuss a strategy for the speech.⁴

Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims and Sommer concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.⁵

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan⁶

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Speech on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I believe that the attached draft speech⁷ on U.S.-Soviet relations contains an important message to the Soviets and would be effective in shaping European and American public opinion on East-West issues. In my opinion it manages to reconcile three key objectives that are not always easily combined:

—to provide a hard-hitting description of the character of the Soviet system and the disappointing experience of U.S.-Soviet relations;

—to highlight the post-Brezhnev succession as a possible (though not probable) turning point and to encourage a Soviet policy reassessment; and

—to emphasize U.S. negotiating flexibility as well as firmness.

The structure and tone are designed to convey a clear sense of political realism and moral purpose, while dispelling any suspicion of zealotry or intransigence. It thus continues and extends the strategic approach you approved for my SFRC testimony on U.S.-Soviet relations in June.

To maximize the anticipated benefits of the speech, I strongly recommend that you yourself deliver it on an appropriate occasion in the near future. There are several possibilities. I will be meeting with Gromyko in Madrid in early September, and the speech could be a useful scene-setter for these discussions, or for discussions with him later in the month at the UNGA. Alternatively, giving it in October might maximize its impact on domestic and allied opinion as the date of INF deployments approached. If you prefer, I could arrange to deliver the speech myself.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/05/83–08/09/83). Confidential. Sent for action. Fortier, Kraemer, Raymond, Sims, and Sommer concurred with this memorandum. Lenczowski initialed for Fortier, Kraemer, and Sims.
2. The memorandum at Tab A is attached and printed below. The draft of the speech was not found.
3. See Document 61.
4. See Document 80.
5. Clark checked the Approve option.
6. Confidential.
7. See footnote 2, above.