69. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark)1
SUBJECT
- Summitry: Casey’s Memo of June 27
My reaction to Bill Casey’s thoughtful comments are as follows:2
(1) Meeting on fringes of UN: I think this has its dangers, but we must recognize that if Andropov decides to come to the UN, the President will have no alternative to meeting him. I doubt if Andropov would come without our encouragement, but if he should, we can minimize the negative fallout by making clear that (a) such a meeting is not a summit in the sense we have been using the term, but simply a courtesy due a major foreign chief of state coming to the U.S. on other business; and (b) such a meeting need not foreclose a proper, full-fledged summit if conditions make that desirable.
Whether we should encourage Andropov to come is a separate question, and at this point I would be inclined to advise against it since it would probably raise too many hopes and might well get in the way of INF deployments. However, we should keep the possibility of such [Page 229] a meeting in mind over coming weeks and say nothing publicly which would make it more difficult to manage it if future developments should increase the desirability. If at any point we decide for any reason that we want such a meeting, we should try to arrange it privately before issuing a public invitation.
(2) Soviet willingness to arrange Summit next year: I do not agree with Casey that there is “no way” the Soviets will agree to a summit in mid-1984. They, in fact, may be eager for one if Andropov’s health holds. Their assessment of the likelihood of the President’s reelection will be important, of course. Almost as important will be their assessment of the possibility of concluding any deal with the Reagan Administration, and one task of our diplomacy (public and private) over the coming months will be to make clear that we are willing to conclude mutually advantageous agreements.
Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President’s reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter’s vacillations—which they found maddening—they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President’s re-election as the lesser of two “evils.”
(3) Third Areas: Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with “third area” questions. The fact is that they do not feel that they have “their” spheres of influence “nailed down.” They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, legitimizing their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a “trade off” session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.
(4) Linkage: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have acted as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration [Page 230] consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, “How were we to know it made any difference to you?”) Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Summitry—USSR (2/2). Secret. Sent for information.↩
- See Document 68.↩