Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Clark) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us,² and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a political fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The basics, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the sustainability of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain and, indeed, does not seem likely. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, has probably not consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations—particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual “opening” of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate—both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public—that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes.

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, whether or not there is a Soviet response. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

—Human Rights: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we can aim realistically to obtain the emigration of the Pentecostalists, the release and emigration of Shcharansky, at least some improvement in Sakharov’s position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We should continue to use the Kampelman channel for most of this, and are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and—as appropriate—support from allied and other governments (e.g., the Stoessel mission).³ We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

—Third Areas: These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. (For example, they promise to ease off arms supplies to Central America in return for a free hand in Poland.) We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. “Linkage” in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should have credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor.

—Arms Reduction and CBM’s: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on at least some of the key issues. Presumably both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area.

—Bilateral issues: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, and possibly a cessation of jamming of VOA, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If the Pope’s spectacular success in rallying the Polish people and humiliating Jaruzelski results in heavy-handed Soviet interference in Poland, it would, to put it mildly, make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope’s would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a “Bulgarian connection,” since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes—rightly or wrongly—to have taken out a contract on the Pope.⁴

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature—at home and in the rest of the world—to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko’s June 21 statement accusing us of having “no constructive goals” and implying that we must change our policies to make a summit possible.⁵

How to Proceed

While we must be prepared to handle the matter in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should do what we can in diplomatic and private channels to probe Soviet flexibility. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

I believe that Secretary Shultz’s testimony on the Hill last week and his recent approach to Dobrynin,⁶ coupled with Kampelman’s conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and—whenever appropriate and potentially useful—special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.

B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.

C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy’s comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)⁷

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special “close hold” procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (06/25/83–06/28/83). Secret. Printed from an unitialed copy. A stamp on the memorandum reads: “Received 83 Jun 25.” On June 16 in a note to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: “For many reasons—some good and some not so good—we owe the President a thoughtful treatment of whether, and if so, why and how a Summit meeting should be held. We have already given him two solid papers which treat the historical record, and emphasizing the damage which can be done to our long term interests by creating a false euphoria in the minds of Americans which makes it difficult to contend with the continued misbehavior by the Soviets in the wake of a summit. In short, we have stressed that for a summit to be worthwhile, it must involve the resolution of problems, not atmospherics.” McFarlane requested a paper from Matlock addressing a possible agenda and topics for discussion. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File—Summitry—USSR (2/2)) While no drafting information was found on Clark’s memorandum, it seems likely it originated with McFarlane’s request to Matlock.
2. See Document 52.
3. For documentation on the Stoessel mission, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Documents 60–65.

4. In his book, Matlock commented: “One cloud hung over thoughts of a Reagan-Andropov meeting. During the Italian investigation of possible accomplices in the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in May 1981, evidence had come to light suggesting that Bulgarian intelligence—and, therefore, the KGB—might have been involved. What if it turned out the KGB had been behind the shooting? How could any American president meet with the former director of the KGB if that organization had tried to kill the pope?

   “We asked the CIA to examine what was known and make a judgment. Forensic specialists went through the evidence meticulously and advised that it was not conclusive. Mehmet Ali Agça, the would-be assassin, had indeed testified early in the investigation that an officer of the Bulgarian security service had been involved, but he later changed his story, and many of his early allegations had proven false. The analysts concluded he was a pathological liar. However, none of this proved that the KGB had not been involved. Soviet officials were obviously upset when a Polish prelate was elected pope, and they feared his influence on the political situation in Poland. But this was not proof of their involvement in the shooting.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev p. 66) Documentation on the Bulgarian connection to the Papal assassination attempt is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. X, Eastern Europe.

5. Gromyko made the statement in an interview with TASS. (Dusko Doder, “U.S.-Soviet Summit Is Doubtful,” Washington Post, June 22, 1983, p. A17)
6. Shultz testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15. See Document 61. For his meeting with Dobrynin, see Document 64.

7. In his memoir, Shultz recounted Percy’s questions during his June 15 appearance before the SFRC: “Senator Percy led off the questioning by asking about the prospect of a summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Andropov and urged that there be one:

   “SENATOR PERCY: I would like to see us issue an invitation in the reasonable near future. . . . When can we look forward to a summit meeting with a properly prepared agenda but no high expectations and the world put on notice, that its purpose is just to gauge each other to be sure there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding, and to try to better understand each others policies

   “SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President’s view is that a summit meeting could be a good thing. He is ready to have one if the meeting is well prepared and if there is a high probability of some significant outcome from it, so that it is substantive in nature. He fears that a meeting for the sake of a meeting would raise expectations very high, and if all that happened was that there was a meeting, it would do more harm than good.

   “So there is in principle a readiness to have that meeting, but an operational requirement, that it have a substantive content that is prepared and on which we can move forward

   “Negotiations were on everyone’s mind. ‘What is certain is that we will not find ourselves in the position in which we found ourselves in the aftermath of détente. We have not staked so much on the prospect of a successful negotiating outcome that we have neglected to secure ourselves against the possibility of failure,’ I said. ‘Our parallel pursuit of strength and negotiation prepares us both to resist continued Soviet aggrandizement and to recognize and respond to positive Soviet moves.’ I said further: ‘The direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership. President Brezhnev’s successors will have to weigh the increased costs and risks of relentless competition against the benefits of a less tense international environment in which they could more adequately address the rising expectations of their own citizens. While we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, [the Soviet Union] in this respect remains a secret.’ I went on, ‘Its history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not.’” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 278–279; brackets are in the original)