51. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]
A good deal of time was spent this afternoon with Secretary Shultz in an internal meeting with Eagleburger, Seitz, and Hill (as well as Burt and Palmer for part of the meeting), discussing how we can work out a better working arrangement with the NSC. One aspect of the problem has to do with the Soviet Union, where there is a Presidential decision to probe the Soviet Union across a number of fronts to see whether there is any prospect of making progress with them, particularly the kind of progress that might permit a well-prepared summit. However, in practice, because of the reluctance of the NSC staff and the opposition of Cap Weinberger, it is almost impossible to get decisions to move forward on individual items. What we need to do is to work out some sort of a system where each item does not have to be fully staffed by the entire bureaucracy. Particularly because of the way Defense proceeds, by essentially taking a position and then sticking to it with no compromise, it is extremely difficult to move forward. I personally fear that the President will be under enormous pressure for a summit meeting, particularly with the election coming up, and it will be one in which we will not be prepared and expectations will be dashed because nothing can be agreed upon at the summit. I also fear that pressure for an arms control agreement before the election will [Page 172] become very great, and again we will not be prepared to move forward because we cannot make decisions within the executive branch.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam’s Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1982–Sept. 1983. Secret. Dictated on May 17.↩