We have been looking into the pros and cons of taking action in two areas
of our relationship with the Soviets:
We believe there are some clear benefits to be gained by U.S. initiatives
in these areas, but each also has some public relations or foreign
policy drawbacks. Attached are our analyses of the options available to
us on these issues and the pros and cons of each.
Attachment 1
Options Paper Prepared in the Department of
State3
ISSUE: Consulates General in Kiev and New York City: Options
Option 1. Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to establish
Consulates General in Kiev and New York City and propose a public
announcement and the resumption of technical discussions toward this
end.
Pros and Cons
In terms of assets, we would gain substantially from the opening of a
Consulate in Kiev; by comparison, the Soviet presence in New York
City would increase only marginally. As matters stand, because of
the UN presence, the Soviets have
free run of New York and we have nothing comparable in the USSR. A [less than
1 line not declassified] presence in the heart of the
Ukraine, expanded contacts with important minority nationality and
religious groups, and consular access for our citizens would prove
most advantageous to the U.S. Government. It would also respond to
the wishes of the U.S. Ukrainian community and many in the U.S.
Jewish community who have long stressed the need for a consulate in
the area.
On the down side, the lifting of an Afghan sanction will evoke some
criticism. While this move may effectively show the American public,
the Allies and the Soviets that confrontation is not the only arrow
in our quiver, it may at the same time raise unrealistic
expectations both here and abroad about overall improvements in our
relations.
Practical Steps
Even if we were to agree in principle to open Consulates General, the
timing and cost of our actions would be determined by decisions on
several subsidiary issues. The first decision involves the type of
establishment we wish to open in Kiev. We have the choice of a
simple, unclassified operation which would constitute an American
presence and give some consular protection to American visitors, or
a full-scale post, with [less than 1 line not
declassified] advantages in a key non-Russian area.
Devolving from this decision will be the question of timing. An
unclassified establishment in Kiev could be organized fairly easily
and quickly in terms of personnel and money, whereas full-scale
establishment would take years.
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Establishing a full-scale post would entail a great deal of effort to
secure the necessary personnel and funding, and to resolve numerous
technical and logistical difficulties. However, depending upon how
rapidly we would wish to implement this, several approaches are
available. If quick results are crucial, we could immediately start
the process of securing preliminary funding, TDY personnel for an
advance team, and logistical support in order to have the consulates
operational (though with a skeleton staff) within approximately a
year. At the other end of the spectrum, we could do a limited amount
of initial planning until Congressional support was assured and all
funding requirements approved. A third approach would involve
sending a temporary advance team as soon as possible and then
developing an overall strategy for the selection of long-term
personnel, the briefing of Congressional committees, the acquisition
of funding, and the fulfillment of all the technical requirements of
the facility. The implementation of this strategy would follow as
soon afterwards as considered desirable or feasible.
Option 2: Propose to the Soviets that we resume discussions on the possibility of establishing Consulates
in Kiev and New York, but not move quickly actually to open the
Consulates and make no announcement at this time.
Pros and Cons
This approach would enable us to do the preliminary work both with
the Soviets and within the U.S. Government necessary for the opening
of the Consulates General at some future date. At the same time, it
does not obligate us to take the more visible steps of actually
putting an Advance Team in place now or allowing the Soviets to
resume construction work on the building that will eventually house
our Consulate General. The decision on whether or when to undertake
these steps could depend on progress in the technical discussions
and the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the
discussions would be technical, no formal announcement would be
required at this time. Similarly, no final decision would have to be
made regarding the lifting of an Afghanistan sanction. On the other
hand, the Soviets would regard this as a positive decision and it
would allow us to begin allocating personnel and resources and
setting up a logistical support system.
However, if Congress or the public becomes aware that we are
identifying positions and earmarking funds for Kiev, we would
probably be asked what this meant for our sanctions policy. Other
disadvantages of this option are limited.
Option 3. Tell the Soviets that we are actively considering the
resumption of negotiations for the establishment of Consulates
General.
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Pros and Cons
The main advantage of this option is that it simply allows us to
await a more favorable moment. It also enables us to avoid any
criticism, except from the Ukrainian-American community which is
pushing us to open in Kiev. Its primary drawback is that it
accomplishes little. In terms of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is devoid
of benefits, since the Soviets would see it as a do-nothing
statement. After the suspension of our agreement to establish these
Consulates General in 1980,4 a weak consensus emerged
on the policy level that on balance the suspension was an
ill-advised move.
Option 4. Say nothing to the Soviets and adhere to the status
quo.
Pros and Cons
The one advantage inherent in this position is that we are spared
from justifying the lifting of an Afghan sanction. The costs of our
current practices are high. Financially, we bear the burden of three
apartments in Kiev for which we pay rent but have no use. (We have
kept the apartments because we previously spent substantial money on
reconfiguring them for U.S. use, and because if we gave them up, we
would have a lot of trouble obtaining other adequate apartments
later.) We also risk the loss of the office building which the
Soviets have, to date, kept open for us. The cost of reconstructing
an alternate building will be considerably higher in the future.
Finally, we face criticism from U.S. visitors to Kiev, especially
Jewish groups, whom we are unable to assist.
Attachment 2
Options Paper Prepared in the Department of
State5
Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options
As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to
American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to
penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and
the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet
citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We
are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send
performing artists here;
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otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major
groups could be touring the US
annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the
Soviets are rethinking this policy, and may start sending performers
again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this
area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to
conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking
Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most
effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the
American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he
became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.
To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural
exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see
three basic options:
1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that
expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.
PROS: The exact form of an agreement would
have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that
all USG interests would be
considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which
reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We
should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet
circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would
be an important part of an agreement, as would all other
legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also
require access to Soviet television.
CONS: This would involve negotiating a
highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it
conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation
whether we are returning to a policy of detente.
2. Combine negotiation of an exchanges agreement with a stricter
visa regime, through legislation restoring our ability to refuse
visas for foreign policy reasons or by invoking the “Baker Amendment.” Such draft
legislation is now at OMB for review and decision. The Baker Amendment involves an
official determination, which can be made by the Secretary of
State, that the USSR is not in
substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.
PROS: This would permit us to generate
greater leverage to get the kind of truly reciprocal exchanges
agreement we want. It has the additional virtue of allowing us
to refuse visas for policy reasons and not have to justify
refusals on national security grounds. We could choose which
Soviets we would admit or exclude.
CONS: This has the same problems as Option
1, somewhat mitigated by combining it with instituting tougher
visa controls. In addition, visa refusals are a crude tool,
subject to easy retaliation not necessarily confined to the visa
field. American sponsors of Soviet visits would criticize
arbitrary refusals, and those who invested money in long-term
planning to bring Soviet performers here might have a legal
claim. Invoking the Baker Amendment raises issues of foreign policy
and long-term US-USSR relations that require
careful study.
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3. Continue current practice.
PROS: This involves no change and is easy
to administer, with few decisions having to be referred to
senior levels for political decision.
CONS: This does nothing to ensure
reciprocity and leaves the Soviets with easy access to US society.
