Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

350. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, January 3, 1985

SUBJECT

• Gorbachev Accepts Invitation to Visit U.S.

The attached report from Clair George (TAB II)² indicates that Gorbachev has accepted an invitation from a U.S. business executive to visit the U.S. during March–April, 1985.³ It states further that the business executive was informed indirectly that during his trip he would like to meet privately with U.S. officials, but would not request such meetings through official channels because of the private nature of his trip. Finally, it specifies how the message should be answered: by Shultz indicating to Gromyko that he understands Gorbachev is planning a private trip to the U.S. and that he and other U.S. officials would like to invite him for discussions in Washington.

Though the report is not specific on this score, the business executive involved is obviously Dwayne O. Andreas, President of Archer Daniels Midland Co. and U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC). According to Jim Giffen, President of USTEC—who contacted me when they returned from their trip to Moscow—Andreas extended the invitation to Gorbachev during their meeting with him in early December, at which time Gorbachev refused to commit himself, joking about American impatience when he was pressed for a reply.⁴

Comments:

1. The message conveyed appears authentic, and the manner of its conveyence is typical of the way the Soviets go about these things.

2. It would appear that, buoyed by the “success” of his visit to London,⁵ Gorbachev moved quickly to pick up an invitation to the U.S., but did so in a way which permits us to propose whatever official level we desire. At the same time, it relieves us of the concern that a direct invitation to Gorbachev could be construed as an attempt to bypass either Chernenko or Gromyko.

3. It should also be noted that, in handling the invitation in this fashion, Gorbachev still retains some options. He could, for example, pull out if something goes wrong from the Soviet point of view, without having anything regarding the trip on the official record.

4. Nevertheless, his acceptance of the invitation is a signal that the Soviets expect some sort of agreement to negotiate arms control issues to emerge from the Geneva meetings. The Soviets are probably also aware that a visit at that time could affect Congressional consideration of MX and SDI funding—not to speak of scheduled ASAT testing. Given his performance in London, we can expect a much more articulate presentation of the Soviet point of view to the American public than we have had to face from senior Soviet officials in the past.

5. From an internal political point of view, this message is a solid indication that Gorbachev is at the moment riding high as heir apparent, and the leadership is willing to tolerate his taking on an increasingly high profile in foreign travel. (Nothing could be higher profile than a trip to the U.S.)

6. Although we must be aware of the way the Soviets can use a Gorbachev visit to “humanize” and rationalize their policies with the American public, I believe that we really have no choice but to put out the welcome mat. (If word got out that we had turned off a desired visit, the impact could be devastating.) For that reason, I believe that you and Secretary Shultz should pass a message through Gromyko indicating that the President and other officials would be pleased to receive him when he visits. In fact, it would probably be desirable to indicate that if Gorbachev prefers to visit the U.S. officially, we would be pleased to arrange an official invitation. The advantage of an official invitation would be that it would act as some constraint on critical public statements.

There are potential problems with an official invitation, however. Gorbachev’s closest formal counterpart on the governmental side is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. In order to head off a possible move to invite him to address a joint session of Congress (crazier ideas than this repeatedly emanate from the Hill!), it would be preferable to have the Vice President invite him. Still, the President should see him, and probably should give him treatment at least on a par with that accorded Gromyko last November.⁶ Purists will object to according quasi chief-of-government treatment to a person who is, aside from his thin “parliamentary” cover, merely a senior Communist Party official. Nevertheless, the public and media will not see it this way—indeed, they will play it as virtually a summit meeting—and for this reason I believe we should not allow ourselves to be excessively hung up by protocolary considerations.

7. Finally, I would observe that, until we have worked out all the details with the Soviets, it will be imperative to keep this matter on the closest possible hold. Andreas, and perhaps Giffen, are already involved, outside the USG, but I believe we should not communicate our intentions to them until we have worked out the arrangements with the Soviets. The last thing we need is a lot of media speculation in advance.

Recommendation:

That the matter be discussed very privately with the President, the Vice President and Secretary Shultz, and if they concur, that the Secretary and you discuss the matter privately with Gromyko at Geneva, using the talking points at TAB I.⁷

1. Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400005. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1984. In a handwritten cover note to Poindexter dated January 3, Matlock wrote: “John—this report reached me only this afternoon. I am not sure that either you or Bud have seen it. It is of sufficient importance and sensitivity that I think Bud should discuss it with the President—privately if possible—tomorrow. I believe that it should not be disseminated to members of the SACG at this point since it requires the most delicate—and confidential—handling—Jack.”
2. Dated December 21, 1984; attached but not printed.
3. Andreas had written to Gorbachev on November 18, suggesting that he visit the United States to tour various agricultural operations and facilities in the spring of 1985. See Document 364.
4. Giffen met with Gorbachev on December 3 and gave him the letter from Andreas.
5. See Documents 337 and 341.
6. On another copy of this memorandum, Matlock crossed out November and wrote “September” in the margin. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (1/4))
7. Tab I is not attached. McFarlane did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation. No record was found of a discussion with Reagan, Bush, or Shultz. Shultz, however, raised the issue with Gromyko in Geneva. See Document 362.