The main substantive point that emerges from the letter is the centrality
of space arms control for making headway on arms control generally.
Chernenko says that the
“emergence and deployment of strike space systems would make it
impossible to conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and
reduction of strategic arms.” I noted to Dobrynin that both you and Chernenko now have talked about the desirability of
eliminating nuclear weapons. I added that you take this issue seriously
and said that if both sides agreed on this as their goal, this would
create a new setting for arms control negotiations. Then I asked if
Chernenko is serious about
taking “radical steps” to eliminate nuclear weapons.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President
Reagan2
Moscow, December 20, 1984
Dear Mr. President:
First of all I would like to express gratification with regard to the
agreement reached between the USSR
and USA to enter into negotiation
on nuclear and outer space arms.
The meeting between Andrei A.
Gromyko and George
Shultz set for January 7–8 is to play an important
role in putting these negotiations on track as a practical
matter.
An opportunity is opening now both for the straightening out of
Soviet-American relations and the improving of the international
situation as a whole. This opportunity should not be lost.
Recently you have spoken on more than one occasion, also in your
letters of November 16 and December 73 and earlier in your
conversation with Andrei A.
Gromyko,4 in favor of moving along the road leading
eventually to the liquidation of nuclear weapons, completely and
everywhere. We, of course, welcome that. The Soviet Union, as is
known, as far back as the dawn of the nuclear age came out for
prohibiting and liquidating such weapons. We also made specific
proposals as to how it could be achieved. At that time, given the
goodwill on the part of the US, it
would have been, of course, much easier, than it is now, to resolve
the task of liquidating nuclear weapons. But even today it is not
yet too late to start practical movement toward this noble
objective.
To continue the accumulation of nuclear weapons, to multiply their
types and kinds, to expand the arms race to new spheres—means moving
away from the said objective rather than nearing it. What is
required is different—to reduce on a mutual basis the nuclear
weapons, to block securely all the channels of the arms race and to
forego forever futile attempts to seek unilateral advantages.
The forthcoming new negotiations which will encompass both the issue
of the non-militarization of outer space and the questions of the
strategic arms and medium range nuclear systems in Europe, can and,
[Page 1198]
we are convinced,
must become a major step along this road. There exists between those
weapons an organic relationship which requires to have a
comprehensive approach to discussing and resolving the relevant
issues.
In my letter to you of November 175 I noted the
objective fact that the key link in this whole chain is the question
of strike space weapons, and to be more precise, the question of
neither side having such weapons. To be quite frank: emergence and
deployment of strike space systems would make it impossible to
conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and reduction of
strategic arms.
What is involved here is precisely this kind of relationship between
these issues. And I must say clearly that the statements coming from
the White House, and in the most recent days, too, with respect to
the intention to continue the implementation of the earlier
announced space plans regardless of the negotiations, are not
encouraging at all. Quite to the contrary.
It depends on the outcome of the Geneva meeting of the Ministers
whether from the outset a constructive orientation will be given to
the negotiations on nuclear and outer space arms. In other words,
whether they will be given correct guidelines in the form of an
agreed understanding of the subject and objectives of those
negotiations.
Andrei A. Gromyko will be
prepared to conduct a substantive discussion with Secretary of State
George Shultz of all the
questions pertaining to the task set before them. That will require,
of course, addressing also the content, in principle, of those
questions, while their detailed consideration will, naturally, be
the task of the negotiations that will follow.
It is important that such negotiations begin without unjustified
delays and without unnecessary intermediate stages, and the main
thing is that both sides have constructive positions at the
negotiations themselves. This is precisely our approach.
In connection with the thought contained in your letters, Mr.
President, regarding the desirability of a more intensive dialogue
between our two countries on regional problems, I would like to
reaffirm that the Soviet Union is in favor of looking jointly for
peaceful ways to a just resolution of the existing international,
including regional, problems. Our countries can—we are convinced of
that—interact with benefit for themselves and for other peoples, in
the interests of removing the dangerous hotbeds of tension and of
preventing the emergence of such new hotbeds in various regions of
the world. In such context we
[Page 1199]
are prepared to exchange views at various
levels both on the Middle East and other regional problems.
Quite consonant with our intentions is also your statement in favor
of revitalizing bilateral Soviet-American relations, including the
resumption of the work of the joint commissions on cooperation in
various economic scientific and cultural fields, which were set up
some time ago. So far only the first steps in this direction have
been taken, but if the artificial obstacles which were put on this
road are removed, such cooperation would be of practical benefit to
both countries, and, which is no less important, would facilitate
the improvement of the relations between them in the political field
as well.
In conclusion I would like once again to express the confidence that
there exist opportunities for a turn for the better in the relations
between the USSR and the USA. To translate those opportunities
into reality all that is necessary is to have the political will and
realistic approach, the willingness to resolve all the issues in the
spirit of equality and mutual account of the legitimate interests of
the sides. It is all the more so when it comes to the building of
confidence, lowering of the level of military confrontation, also in
Europe, and, generally, cessation of the arms race and joint steps
aimed at strengthening the peace.
Sincerely,
