Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

33. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 2, 1983

SUBJECT

• Gromyko’s Press Conference

As expected, the focus of Gromyko’s press conference—both his one-hour, essentially ad-libbed opening statement and the follow-up questions and answers—was the INF negotiations.² He said explicitly that our interim proposal was “unacceptable,” characterizing it as a step backward in the negotiations and inconsistent with the principles of “equality and equal security.” However, in his tone Gromyko was restrained by Soviet standards, according to Embassy Moscow; while lamenting that the U.S. does not want improved US-Soviet relations, he was careful to avoid ad hominem attacks on you or other U.S. officials.³

Gromyko cited three reasons why agreement on the basis of our proposal was impossible:

—Our refusal to limit U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe and on aircraft carriers;

—Our refusal to take British and French nuclear forces into account in calculating the level of INF on the U.S. side; and

—Our insistence on limiting SS–20s in the Asian part of the USSR.

At the same time, he did not exclude the possibility of continued Soviet participation in the INF negotiations after U.S. deployments were initiated.

Judging by Gromyko’s approach, it is evident Moscow is still determined to hinder our INF deployments and undermine our negotiating position by political means. By throwing cold water on the new U.S. proposal and by seeking to occupy the high ground in the ongoing war of words between Washington and Moscow, the Soviets calculate that the renewed West European support for our position will quickly dissipate—leading to pressures on us even before the next round to make more substantial concessions.

Highlights of the Press Conference

The conference lasted about two hours, the first half of which was taken up by Gromyko’s opening statement. In those remarks, Gromyko said that the U.S. was “erroneously” asserting that serious negotiations were taking place in Geneva, and declared that your new INF proposal was “not a road to peace.” He called “absurd” the U.S. position on exclusion of nuclear-capable aircraft from the negotiations, and went on at length on the need to take British and French forces into account. Citing data showing that NATO’s advantage in intermediate-range warheads would increase from 50% to 250% under the U.S. proposal, Gromyko suggested that the U.S. designed the proposal so as to ensure Soviet rejection, since our sole aim was to deploy new U.S. missiles.

In the follow-up questions, Gromyko stated explicitly that the Soviet Union would not dismantle SS–20s reduced in the European USSR, but insisted on the right to transfer the missiles to Asia to offset U.S. nuclear capabilities in the Far East, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf. (Given the growing Japanese and Chinese concerns, it is surprising Gromyko was so explicit on this point.) He also insisted that the USSR was keeping its word on its moratorium on European SS–20 deployments.

Gromyko was evasive in response to questions about Soviet policy in the event U.S. deployments actually went forward. He refused to state that the Soviets would suspend negotiations, or that they would not accept an agreement under which some U.S. deployments were permitted. He side-stepped a question on counterdeployments in Cuba, stressing only that the USSR would not accept a position of “inequality.”

Gromyko gave a lengthy and obviously well-prepared response to several questions on US-Soviet relations. With reference to your Orlando speech, Gromyko said that insults against the USSR were “unbecoming” to the U.S., and that the Soviets do not seek to impose their ideology on anyone. He asked rhetorically whether a country proposing the renunciation of nuclear first-use and the elimination of all nuclear weapons could be described as the “focus of evil.” To a follow-up question, he declared that the Soviet Union seeks better relations with the U.S., that such relations would be in both sides’ interests, but that the U.S. was insisting on fundamental concessions detrimental to legitimate Soviet interests. He called on the U.S. to be more “objective.” (Gromyko avoided any comment on your speech proposing accelerated ballistic missile defense research.)

We will be releasing a statement shortly that refutes Gromyko’s main points, and sustains the momentum of your new initiative.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13/83–04/15/83); NLR–748–24–10–2–8. Secret. Reagan initialed the attached FBIS press report, which summarized U.K. Foreign Minister Pym’s rebuttal to Gromyko’s press conference. (FBIS 58, April 2, 1983; “Pym Attacks Gromyko’s Rejection of Reagan’s Proposals”)
2. Gromyko held a press conference in Moscow on April 2. His remarks were largely responding to Reagan’s March 30 remarks proposing an interim agreement on INF forces. See footnote 4, Document 22.
3. In telegram 3952 from Moscow, April 2, the Embassy reported: “During a two hour April 2 press conference, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko conveyed an image of firm restraint in responding to U.S. proposals for an interim INF agreement and commenting on a range of international issues. Gromyko’s tone seemed deliberately calculated to prevent further escalation in U.S.-Soviet rhetoric, and as to avoid frightening European and U.S. public opinion.” The Embassy continued: “Gromyko was equally cautious in response to questions on U.S.-Soviet relations and international issues. Asked to comment on the President’s characterization of the USSR as the ‘focus of evil,’ Gromyko praised Moscow’s international role rather than attacking the U.S.” and “reasserted Soviet interest in improved relations with the United States. In short, we read Gromyko’s performance as an effort to impress the U.S. and other audiences with Soviet seriousness and responsibility as it moves into the next, crucial stage of the year of the missiles.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183–0773) For extracts of Gromyko’s statement before a question-and-answer session, see Documents on Disarmament, 1983, pp. 253–261.
4. The Department’s statement was transmitted in telegram 90889 to all NATO capitals, Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo, April 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830183–0840)