I have compiled some thoughts on the whys and hows of a private channel
which may be useful to you in further discussions with Secretary
Shultz and the President.
They are at TAB 1. Also, I have made an initial stab at describing what
I would recommend discussing in a private meeting, if it is decided to
arrange one (TAB 2).2 The latter is very preliminary and
is meant to be indicative of the way the issues
would be discussed. Some of the talking points need to be elaborated in
more detail (particularly those for contingency use), and some key
points are subject to decision and guidance. (The more important of
these are underlined.)
Even if the Soviets accept a request for a meeting, we should not expect
immediate results. They will doubtless wish to feel their way a bit and
to gain some experience before they rely totally on the pledges of
confidentiality. But even in the early stages, it would provide them a
vehicle for conveying messages if they choose to send some. The most
useful thing we are likely to obtain initially, however, will be
comments which will improve our ability to assess Soviet priorities
among the various proposals they have made, as well as hints as to how
some of our proposals could be framed to make them more palatable.
If it would be helpful for me to be present when the matter is discussed
(to answer questions about how it could be done and the way the Soviets
look at the various issues involved), I of course will be glad to join
you.
Tab 1
Paper Prepared by Jack Matlock of the National Security Council
Staff3
A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP:
Some Basic Considerations
Reasons for Channel:
—Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the
official record.
—Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet
decision-making.
—Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the
Foreign Ministry filter.
—Need for total confidentiality, the best
insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be
unaware that the channel exists.
Possible Modes:
—Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.
[While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is
not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic
hang-ups. It would, additionally, require an Ambassador who is
and is believed by the Soviets to be an “insider” in the
decision-making process and who can deal with all the issues
comfortably in Russian—some important Soviet interlocutors are
not comfortable in English and introducing interpreters
undermines the informality necessary and discourages
candor.]
—Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President’s thinking and
the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal
structure for diplomatic contact.
[The first qualification is necessary to ensure the
reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of
feed-back; the second to get around Soviet “turf”
considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact
appears to be “counterpart to counterpart.”]
—Use of a “special negotiator” from outside the USG.
[Potentially useful for discussions in a particular,
well-defined area, but less so for broader discussions since a
person not a part of the policy-making machinery would be
hampered in interpreting and reacting to comments on the whole
range of problems. It also runs a greater risk of becoming
public knowledge.]
—Use of intermediaries for specific messages.
[Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one
or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange), but of limited
utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide
direct contact with persons active in the decision-making
process.]
Soviet Attitudes
—They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation
and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving
problems.
—They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor, since this would
serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making
process but denying the same to us.
—Since we have made it clear that an exclusive
role for Dobrynin is not
acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets will probably
accept informal contacts in another form.
—“Knowledgeable” officials have been suggesting such since the
beginning of the Reagan
Administration (several approaches in 1981).
—Central Committee officials have periodically sent “messages”
via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a
dialogue.
—We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central
Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including
Gromyko.4
—The Soviets doubtless feel “burned” by some of the earlier efforts
to communicate unofficially by other means.
—The contact with Kampelman backfired for reasons which are
unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a
role,
[Page 1082]
since
knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their
home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.5
—Publicity given the “walk in the woods” and the subsequent
informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets
hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S.
negotiators on the private level.6
—The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and
that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to
senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to
reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep
any contact completely private.7
—Once the election is over, the Soviet suspicion that we seek
contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to claim that we are negotiating for a public impact) will be
attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to
us, it would be a good time to try again.
Basic Operating Principles
—A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other
mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help
both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.
—Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and
knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously
confidential.
[On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel
to be limited to a very small number of
the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with
a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the
list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively,
such a list might include, in addition to the President, the
Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy,
the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary for Political
Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.]
—It should be used for tactical policy guidance, not concrete
negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be
in contingent form (e.g., “if you do x, we will respond with y”).
Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation
and detailed negotiation in formal channels.
—All positions taken in the “channel”—including general guidelines
for “personal remarks”—should be cleared in advance by the Assistant
to the President for National Security and the Secretary of State,
and as regards the more important issues, by the President
personally.
[Page 1083]
—A clear understanding should be reached on these matters (except
those relating to internal USG
procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that
establishing the “channel” does not imply an
effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.
Steps Necessary to Activate
If we decide that we wish to explore whether the Soviets are willing
to allow private contacts between the White House staff and the
Central Committee staff, we can initiate the matter as follows:
—Request Ambassador Hartman,
by secure telephone, to pass a message to
Zagladin that we do not
fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently
to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.
—If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably
and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not
ripe from their point of view.
—If Zagladin accepts,
arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with
the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops).
—If he prefers to meet here or somewhere in Western Europe, that also
could be arranged.
—After setting a date, the talking points could be developed,
discussed, and cleared in detail.
