Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 17, 1984

SUBJECT

• My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Looking toward our upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin today. I told him you are looking forward to your meeting with Gromyko in order to discuss your views of the US-Soviet relationship and your hopes for the future. I said you would also probably want to discuss arms control issues, particularly those raised in conjunction with the Vienna talks proposal, some regional questions, human rights, and bilateral topics.

Dobrynin reported that following his vacation, Gromyko was also eager to talk with us. He essentially accepted my agenda, but did ask if you really needed to raise human rights. I responded that you did and that you would want to explain to Gromyko why they were important to us. Dobrynin said Gromyko would want to give you his appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship and to address the issues raised in your correspondence with Chernenko.

In discussing plans for my meeting with Gromyko in New York, I told Dobrynin we would want to go through our agenda in some detail, as Gromyko and I had usefully done in Stockholm.² I also told him that we believed their Vienna Talks proposal had held some promise as a way of organizing discussions on the issues involved, and offered some hope of reenergizing our negotiations;³ we should therefore pick up on these discussions again, this time in private.⁴ Dobrynin replied that they were interested in talking about the demilitarization of outer space and he probed for further indications of our thinking.

We discussed modalities of both meetings. I confirmed that you would meet with Gromyko from 10:00 to 12:00 on Friday⁵ and then host a lunch for him. Dobrynin said that he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko would sit in on the meeting (and, of course, lunch). He asked if I was considering a second session with Gromyko before he left, noting that Gromyko would be available Friday afternoon and until late afternoon on Saturday, when he had to leave Washington for return to Moscow. I confirmed I would be available in that period, and we agreed that an additional meeting could be arranged if needed.

Finally, I raised the question of the five Americans detained several days ago on the Siberian coast. I emphasized the men should be released right away so that their detention does not become an irritant in our relationship.⁶ Dobrynin noted that our Embassy had been in telephone contact with the captain of the vessel earlier today,⁷ but he clearly registered my point, saying that he also hoped the issue would be resolved quickly.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/01/84); NLR–748–25A–26–3–8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer according to the forwarding memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July–December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents). Reagan initialed Shultz’s memorandum on September 18, indicating he saw it.
2. See Document 159.
3. See Document 233.
4. For discussion of establishing a private channel, with the goal of bypassing Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, see Document 269.
5. September 28.
6. On September 12, a U.S. barge, the Frieda K, based in Alaska, accidentally entered Soviet territorial waters and was seized by Soviet forces. On September 14, Kapralov delivered a Soviet oral statement to the Embassy, which noted that on September 12, the Soviets seized the Frieda K and its five crew members. After drifting into Soviet territorial waters, the barge was intercepted by a Soviet vessel and escorted into the Bay of Providence. The crew was being housed at a local hotel. An investigation was underway. (Telegram 11751 from Moscow, September 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840585–0280) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: the “U.S. embassy in Moscow managed to get a phone call through to the captain of the barge, Tabb Thoms, and heard that all were safe and well. Then the phone ‘inexplicably’ went dead when Thoms was asked whether he had been allowed to contact the embassy. Soviet authorities were handling the manner in a tough and uncooperative manner.” He also recalled telling Dobrynin that “it was ‘ridiculous for an incident of this type to become an issue right now,’ that we should ‘get rid of it—solve it—right away.’ By September 20, I was able to report to the president that the five crewmen of the Frieda K. had been safely escorted by the Coast Guard cutter Sherman en route home.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 481)
7. In telegram 11945 from Moscow, September 18, the Embassy commented on the short conversation with Thoms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840592–0586)