245. Memorandum From Walter
Raymond of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
Washington, July 17, 1984
SUBJECT
- Soviet Covert Action Program
My understanding from former colleagues is that the Soviet/East European
Covert Action Program was budgeted at $8.3 million for FY 84. The
program managers projected funding needs at $9.1 million for FY 85,
however the “bureaucracy” (probably including John McMahon) has cut the figure to
$7.6. Some of my figures may not be totally accurate but the bottom line is that there is a projected cut in
this program. I do not believe that this issue has been brought to
Bill Casey’s attention. I
have a personal interest in this program, not only because I was
responsible for it before, but also because I worked very closely with
the Agency on this activity. I have been trying to generate a parallel
non-covert dimension in the field of political action toward the target.
I think it is vital that funding be continued. Indeed, more could and
should be more meaningfully spent on this program.
I would urge you to raise this with Bill
Casey privately and insure that he sees the program is
continued without reductions.
Attached at Tab I is a bootleg copy of a recent letter from Secretary
Shultz to Bill Casey underscoring the importance
of the program and the need for it to be expanded.2 Ken
and I and others share this view.
FYI: [2 lines not declassified] This is a second
item I believe you should raise with Bill
Casey in order to develop a Congressional strategy
designed to reverse this HPSCI
position.
Recommendation
That you underscore to Bill Casey
your commitment that the Soviet/East Europe Covert Action Program
continue at equal or greater funding levels in FY 85.3
[Page 873]
That you raise [less than 1 line not declassified]
funding with Bill Casey to
develop strategy for use with HPSCI.4
Ken deGraffenreid concurs.5
Tab I
Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to Director of Central
Intelligence Casey6
Washington, undated
Dear Bill:
I know that you see the US-Soviet
relationship as a long-term struggle. Some of our most important
allies in that struggle ultimately may prove to be the various
peoples of the Soviet Union. For that reason, this Administration’s
basic policy document on the Soviet Union (NSDD–75)7 set
out as a major objective encouraging the internal liberation of that
society and penetrating the controls set up by the system.
We have limited means to pursue this process. The CIA’s programs designed to get
materials to the Soviet and East European peoples and to support
groups there and in exile are among the most important. I have in
mind such programs as the dissemination of books and other
publications within the Soviet empire, letters by Soviet emigres to
their contacts in the Soviet Union, [1 line not
declassified].
It is sometimes difficult to measure results in our penetration
efforts, to know precisely what materials get through. But at a time
when the KGB has managed
temporarily to stifle most organized dissent inside the USSR, keeping the struggle going
outside is even more significant as it preserves hope.
Similar programs directed at Eastern Europe are also important.
Poland is only the latest demonstration of the fundamental
instability of these systems, of the strong desire of Eastern
Europeans for the lifestyles and basic freedoms of the West. Also,
dissent in Eastern Europe has some spill-over influence inside the
Soviet Union.
[Page 874]
Recognizing the difficulty of measuring results but also emphasizing
the long term benefits, I urge that you sustain the existing
programs designed to increase Soviet and East European preoccupation
with the aspiration of their own peoples. For a variety of reasons I
do not advocate an immediate expansion of these programs, and I
understand and agree with your desire to avoid additional
controversy now with such pressing priorities as Nicaragua facing
us. But looking towards the future, I believe that we should be
thinking about a new and more ambitious finding in this field. I
suggest that our staffs get together as soon as possible to develop
plans for additional and increased activities over the next four to
five years that might usefully be undertaken vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.
Sincerely,
Attachment
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence
Casey to Secretary
of State Shultz8
SUBJECT
- Suggested Response to Letter dated 19 April 1984 Regarding
US-Soviet
Relationship
I very much appreciate the interest and support you express for our
covert action programs directed at the Soviet Union and its East
European allies. You can be sure that I take a personal interest in
preserving the momentum they have developed over the past many years
and will continue to give high priority to finding ways in which
these programs can be sharpened and eventually expanded, within our
current overall budgetary constraints.
I find your idea of beginning staff planning in this field now for
the next four to five years an excellent one and have initiated
action through our International Activities Division to pursue this
proposal from our side. [name not
declassified] who heads the [less than 1
line not declassified] within IAD, will start the process
with your European Bureau. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer knows both [name not declassified] and our existing
programs well and will be our initial point of contact.
