Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 14, 1984

SUBJECT

• Chernenko’s June 6 Letter and Dobrynin’s Talking Points: Analysis

I would like to share with you my analysis of Chernenko’s reply to your last letter and to the points Dobrynin handed over in my meeting last Tuesday.²

These communications basically contain nothing new, and confirm my impression that the Soviets are currently uncertain about how to handle us. Since the letter was signed June 6, it does not respond to your Dublin speech.³ But your last letter already contained your offer to negotiate on non-use of force if they would negotiate on confidence-building measures at Stockholm.⁴ Meanwhile, we have put down two other new arms control negotiating proposals, on chemical weapons and in MBFR. The Soviet reaction has been to pull out of the Olympics and to ratchet up their propaganda campaign,⁵ while claiming privately that they are willing to move forward (and agreeing to another round of talks on minor consular issues). In this letter and these points, Chernenko repeats the general argument that they want to move forward and we do not, but offers practically nothing to back it up.

Chernenko’s language is correct and non-polemical. In response to your effort to explain why we see a threat in many Soviet actions, he goes on at length with a familiar rendition of Soviet complaints about us (encirclement with bases, INF missiles at their doorstep, etc.). The core theme is that we refuse to treat the USSR as an “equal.”

On the security side, Chernenko basically reiterates the same tired agenda of one-sided arms control proposals as the solution to the problems in the relationship. On regional issues, he calls for restraint and says Dobrynin will present some “specific considerations” on our proposals for talks, but all Dobrynin had to say was that they are willing to listen to our views on southern Africa and the Middle East/Persian Gulf before deciding whether they will sit down for actual exchanges of views.

As in previous letters, Chernenko leaves bilateral issues to others, i.e. Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, but even here Dobrynin had mainly complaints that we are not moving on the things they care about, like fishing allocations and Aeroflot flights to the U.S. However, he also promised to get back to us soon on our proposals for new rounds of talks on hotline upgrade and the Pacific maritime boundary and for talks on search and rescue operations in the northern Pacific.

Finally, Chernenko closes with a complaint that you keep injecting Soviet internal affairs—meaning human rights—into your letters.

On the arms control side, there are a few items of detail worth pointing out:

—In terms of the emphasis given to various arms control items, the “Chernenko agenda” as it now stands is: negotiations on outer space arms control; renouncing construction of large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense systems; limitations on naval activities and naval armaments (a recent Gromyko “initiative”); non-use of force; and nuclear testing.

—On non-use of force, Chernenko is careful: he touts their proposal for a Warsaw Pact-NATO treaty on non-use of force, which they propose to discuss separately from the Stockholm conference; he next talks about chemical weapons and MBFR, and only then turns to Stockholm, where he expresses the hope that “the United States will take a position that would make possible agreement on mutually acceptable solutions.” Dobrynin’s points do not mention non-use of force at all. This suggests there may be some unresolved differences between Chernenko and Gromyko on how to handle your offer to discuss non-use of force together with our confidence-building measures in Stockholm. (Their negotiator in Stockholm is being almost totally non-committal at this point.)

—Finally, both communications promise to negotiate on chemical weapons in Geneva and MBFR in Vienna, even though they are very skeptical of our offers, but Dobrynin’s points turn down our offer of private discussions here on either issue “in view of the character of the latest American proposals.” In other words, they accept bilateral discussions, but only at the negotiating sites.

In sum, then, the Soviets have given us a mixed but, on balance, a poor showing. The tone is defensive, and so is the content. This is not surprising: they are on the defensive because we have the initiative in most aspects of our relationship. I found it interesting that Dobrynin—in his remarks—insisted so strongly that they “are not afraid to be seen negotiating with this Administration,” and that they can do business even this year. But there may be some daylight between him and Moscow, where they continue to appear unwilling to negotiate on the basis of the substantial agenda you have put forward. So, despite Dobrynin’s complaint about accusations that they are “hibernating,” I think that remains a fairly accurate description of what they are doing.

To sustain our initiative, I think you should respond fairly quickly to Chernenko’s message, and I will be sending you a draft in the next week or so. Overall, our response should be to keep pressing them both privately and publicly, as you did so successfully in your Dublin speech.⁶

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, Chernenko, Konstantin Ustinovich (elected 02/13/1984) died 03/10/1985 8:30pm (3 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt on June 13. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: “Attached are a Memorandum for the President analyzing the communications you received from Dobrynin June 12 and talking points based on this analysis for your use with the President today. You may wish to give the President the Memorandum when you see him.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, June 1–June 30, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) In a covering note to Shultz attached to another copy of both memoranda, Armacost, who replaced Eagleburger in May as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, commented: “Mr. Secretary, A good set of talkers. I suspect the Soviets are mainly in a quandary due to unresolved issues within their own leadership. Keeping the pressure on makes eminently good sense. I believe a proposal on ASAT along the lines we discussed yesterday would further confound their attempts to regain some initiative.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, June 1984)
2. See Document 223. For the June 12 meeting, see Document 225.

3. Reagan traveled to Ireland from June 1 to 4, addressing the Irish Parliament in Dublin on June 4. After examining the major issues facing the United States and Soviet Union, he stated: “In summary then, we’re seeking increased discussion and negotiation to reduce armaments, solve regional problems, and improve bilateral relations. Progress on these fronts would enhance peace and security for people everywhere.

   “I’m afraid the Soviet response has been disappointing. Rather than join us in our efforts to calm tensions and achieve agreements, the Soviets appear to have chosen to withdraw and to try to achieve their objectives through propaganda, rather than negotiations.

   “The Soviets seek to place the blame on the Americans for this self-imposed isolation. But they have not taken these steps by our choice. We remain ready for them to join with us and the rest of the world community to build a more peaceful world. In solidarity with our allies, confident of our strength, we threaten no nation. Peace and prosperity are in the Soviet interest as well as in ours.” For the full text of this speech, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book I, pp. 804–811.

4. See Document 211.
5. See Document 217.
6. In his diary entry on June 14, Reagan wrote: “then a meeting with Geo. S. & Bud. We dug into the subject of a meeting with Chernenko. I have a gut feeling we should do this. His reply to my letter is in hand and it lends support to my idea that while we go on believing, & with some good reason, that the Soviets are plotting against us & mean us harm, maybe they are scared of us & think we are a threat. I’d like to go face to face & explore this with them.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 357)