Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985

212. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 17, 1984

SUBJECT

• My Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, April 16, 1984

I met with Dobrynin for a little over an hour this afternoon. I gave him your letter to Chernenko,² made a few points about your thinking in sending it, and touched on some of the doubts we have concerning Soviet willingness to move forward with us. I also suggested a number of concrete forward steps we could take in the near future. I noted that discussions could continue with Ken Dam and Rick Burt in my absence between Wednesday and May 3.³

In presenting the letter, I told Dobrynin that you value your private exchanges with Chernenko. You were disappointed with the tone of some recent Soviet statements, including Chernenko’s April 9 interview with Pravda,⁴ but you want to use this correspondence to move things forward.

I said that you had been giving thought to the Soviet charge that our programs threaten them, and therefore went into some detail in your letter about the legitimate grounds we have for seeing a threat in Soviet actions and programs. Nevertheless, I said, the most important thing is that both sides take into account the concerns of the other.

I drew special attention to your hand-written postscript as evidence of your thinking and testimony to how deeply you feel.

Going over the highlights of the letter, I pointed to your treatment of the Stockholm negotiations as a direct response to points Chernenko had made: we are prepared to discuss reciprocal assurances on non-use of force if they are prepared to negotiate seriously the confidence-and-security-building measures we have proposed. Chernenko had referred to this in his Pravda interview and called for a concrete signal in arms control; you had now provided this signal. In this connection, I said that we accepted their invitation to Ambassador Goodby to come to Moscow for further discussions.

On START and INF, I said you had reiterated that we are ready to move forward in private discussions and have some ideas, and that we fail to understand why they will not engage us confidentially on these central issues. They must realize, I said, that making removal of our missiles a precondition for further talks is a non-starter.

On MBFR, I noted you had said we hope to present some new ideas before the end of the current round in Vienna.

On chemical weapons, I pointed out that the Vice President would be tabling our draft treaty in Geneva Wednesday, and gave him a copy of the text.⁵ I said we considered our draft to be a constructive proposal, although we know it will be hard to negotiate, since verification is a very serious problem. On the other hand, the issue itself is serious. Since World War I, use of these weapons had stopped until very recently, and although the Soviets disagree with us about use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, we should both recognize the danger that use in the Iran-Iraq war presents. In addition to discussions in the Geneva conference, therefore, I said we had some thoughts to present on a bilateral basis if the Soviets were ready for such an exchange.

At that point, speaking personally, I said I had encouraged efforts to move US-Soviet relations forward, but had to say frankly that I was not sure the Soviets were ready. We had seen polemics out of Moscow, a “deep freeze” in their language, which made me wonder about Soviet readiness to move. I told Dobrynin there were plenty of people who were ready to offer their analysis of current Soviet behavior; but in government discussions I stressed that we should not speculate, and that we should make an effort to improve things. This was especially true in the area of nuclear weapons, where neither side should lay down preconditions.

Moving to outer space arms control, I recalled that during our last discussion I had given Dobrynin our report to the Congress on this subject, and had thought he had agreed to beginning private discussion with me on this topic.⁶ However, Art Hartman’s conversation with Gromyko April 3 had suggested otherwise.⁷ Dobrynin objected that I had been very negative, and that he had come away with the impression that we would only listen in any confidential discussions. I replied that we were not predisposed to be negative, but that verification would remain a very difficult problem in this area; we were willing to talk without preconditions, but the verification problem would not go away. This exchange left me unsure whether the Soviets are prepared to accept discussions on this basis.

I then raised a subject I told Dobrynin he wouldn’t like: human rights. Your letter expressed disappointment that Chernenko did not respond to the appeal in your March 6 letter concerning humanitarian issues, and this was a real concern. We were pleased with reports that scientist David Goldfarb may soon be allowed to leave, and that binational spouse Yuri Balovlenkov has been asked to submit his papers. We hope he and others like him will be permitted to join their American spouses. But the Shcharanskiy case remains unresolved, and we have concerns about both Sakharov and his wife.

Referring to the language in your letter on regional issues, I then turned to them, and said I had two proposals to make:

—On southern Africa, Gromyko had suggested to Hartman that another round of discussions would be useful, and I said Assistant Secretary Crocker would be prepared to meet with a Soviet counterpart in a third country in late April or early May.

—On the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I suggested that Dobrynin and I meet for a special session accompanied by experts, and that he might wish to have someone come from Moscow for this purpose. In response to his question, I said I would be ready after my return from Asia, and reiterated the importance of talking about the Iran-Iraq situation in light of chemical weapons use there.

I then raised a number of bilateral issues:

—On new consulates, I said we would be ready to begin discussing details as soon as Rick Burt returned from Europe at the end of this week.

—On minor consular issues, I said we expect to have ideas for another round next week.

—On an exchanges agreement, I said I hoped Art Hartman would be able to table a draft text in Moscow next week.

At our last meeting, Dobrynin had asked about bilateral agreements expiring this year, and I gave him a status report:

—On fisheries, I noted that we had agreed this week to extend our agreement for eighteen months, and that we are looking at what else might be done in this area.

—On the Long-Term Economic Cooperation Agreement, I said we expected to have a response for the Soviets soon, and I was optimistic about the possibility of an extension.

—On the Incidents-at-Sea Agreement, I said the Navy expected to propose renewal during the regular talks scheduled for May in Moscow.

—On the World Oceans Agreement expiring in December, I said we would be reviewing it in our normal process.

We touched briefly on our hotline upgrade talks, and here I pressed for a Soviet response to our proposal for another round at the end of the month. Dobrynin said he expected no problems, but it is being reviewed “in our White House,” so it is impossible to predict with certainty.

Dobrynin asked if I had checked with you about our position concerning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. I said I had, and the position remains unchanged.

Finally, after reading your letter, Dobrynin asked what the language about Soviet unwillingness to take advantage of opportunities for discussion on START and INF referred to. I said it referred to discussion in our private channel.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (04/13–04/18/84). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan’s initials appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. In an April 16 memorandum to Shultz, Burt wrote: “We have prepared the attached memorandum to the President on your meeting with Dobrynin.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, April 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) The State Department copy indicates Burt drafted the memorandum.
2. See Document 211.
3. Shultz accompanied Reagan on visits to China from April 26 to May 1, then South Korea from May 1 to 2.
4. In an information memorandum to Shultz dated April 9, Burt provided analysis of Chernenko’s Pravda interview, noting that the “thrust of Chernenko’s remarks on the possibilities of improved U.S.-Soviet relations can only be considered as unhelpful. They reflect a special Soviet sensitivity to and fixation with the possibility that the Administration might win public relations benefits from a supposed U.S.-Soviet thaw without paying Moscow an appropriate price. We will doubtless continue to hear this theme in one form or another throughout the year. At the same time, however, Chernenko also makes a special point of denying that the Soviets are in any way trying to wait out the 1984 U.S. elections. His reply that the situation can improve whenever the American leadership shows ‘realism and a responsible approach to relations with the USSR’ may have been generated to deflect such Western criticism, but also has the effect of leaving open the door to such improvement—even with the current U.S. administration still in office. Not surprisingly, Chernenko reaffirmed a Soviet hardline on START/INF, putting the onus on the U.S. and NATO to ‘take measures to restore the situation.’” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 9–May 10, 1984 ES Sensitive Documents) For the text of the April 9 interview, see Documents on Disarmament, 1984, pp. 234–238.
5. For a record of the Vice President’s statement, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1984, pp. 40–43.
6. See footnote 4, Document 209.
7. See footnote 5, Document 209.