207. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- Social Contact with Soviet Citizens: Current Attitudes
I had an interesting and lengthy conversation with two Soviet “Americanologists,” during dinner the evening of April 2. The two Soviets, Georgy Skorov (one of Arbatov’s deputies) and Stanislav Filippov (a specialist in U.S. law, now with the Soviet patent agency) are [Page 753] not at the policy-making level by a long shot, but are members of the politically aware and relatively well-informed upper intellectual class.
My wife and I invited them to dinner because we had gotten to know them well in Moscow, and they had been socially accessible and occasionally helpful (as for example with advice on how to deal with Arbatov, for whom there is no love lost on their part).
They seemed mainly interested in hearing my views on U.S. perceptions of U.S.-Soviet relations at present—not so much on our concrete positions, as on our motivations. But in the course of our long conversation, they expressed several views of possible interest. Those that struck me in particular were the following:
—Soviet specialists on the U.S. believe that the President will probably be reelected, and are convinced that the Soviets can do nothing to damage his reelection chances. They believe, however, that if they cooperate—particularly in resuming negotiations on INF and START—this will help him. They are unwilling to do this, and will probably wait until November.
—Chernenko’s leadership is relatively weak in security areas, and it is more difficult to get decisions now than it was before Andropov fell seriously ill. Chernenko is, however, “not a crazy,” and won’t do anything dangerous.
—Soviet decision making is plagued by a number of “really primitive people” in key positions. They don’t understand the West or the U.S., are convinced we are out to get them in every way we can, and are capable of reacting in truly stupid ways.
—Even relatively well informed Soviet citizens are confused about the facts. Filippov questioned me closely about whether we really had evidence that the Soviets had used chemical weapons in Afghanistan, and when I assured him we had, the distress was evident on his face. He observed, in what can only be described as personal agony, “I didn’t know that. I really didn’t. But I know you are an honest man and wouldn’t lie.” He then turned to Skorov (his brother-in-law), and said, “How could those idiots of ours do a thing like that.”
—Access to Soviet media—even if greatly circumscribed—can have a deep effect if used wisely. Filippov recounted how he had attended many meetings of Soviet citizens to discuss relations with the U.S. (Though he did not say so, these were obviously organized by the regime to whip up anti-American sentiment.) The theme of the meetings usually centered on describing various U.S. “iniquities,” but Filippov said that he was struck by how often someone could comment on my July 4 TV speech of 1981, saying something like, “Well, it sounds pretty bad, but I remember a couple of years ago the American ‘Ambassador’ was on TV, and he said . . .” The citizen would go on to para [Page 754] phrase a couple of lines and observe, “Now he seemed an honest man, and a serious man, and he wanted peace. So maybe it’s not as bad as you say. We shouldn’t forget that side of America.”2 The point Filippov was trying to make was that we need more communication with the Soviets which is not perceived as threatening or demeaning. Implicitly—and doubtless inadvertently—his observation also explained why the Soviet regime resists our access to their media—it does, in fact, undermine their propaganda when it runs counter to the stereotypes they are purveying.
As they were leaving, Skorov and Filippov remarked that they had not reported to the Soviet Embassy that they would be seeing me. If they had done so, they said, the Embassy might have ordered them not to, and at the very least they would have been subjected to lengthy briefings regarding what they should say, and required to submit detailed reports later. (They presumably pointed this out to ensure that I should not mention our dinner to anyone in the Soviet Embassy.)
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, US-USSR Relations (April 1984). Confidential. Sent for information. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it.↩
- Matlock served in Moscow as Chargé d’Affaires from January to September 1981. As he recalled later in his book, he “was offered five minutes of prime time on Soviet television to deliver a message to the Soviet people on our national day. It was normal Soviet practice to offer foreign ambassadors such an opportunity once a year, but U.S. Ambassador Thomas Watson had been refused the year before because his planned address contained a reference to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.” Matlock concluded: “The impact of this brief presentation surpassed all expectations. For years, Soviet citizens would quote back things to me I said on television that day. It was so unusual for them to hear a foreign representative challenge Soviet propaganda stereotypes—even with cautious indirection—that people noticed and remembered.” (Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, pp. 20–21)↩