202. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Arms Control in 1984
This is a critical year for arms control. In the United States, voters will choose between two very different visions of how to conduct the process. In the Soviet Union a new leadership faces a choice between continuing to stress propaganda aspects of arms control or returning to the more serious and confidential discussions of an earlier period. It will be an important year for our European Allies, who are just emerging from the trauma of INF deployment, who face major uncertainties about the future policies of both Moscow and Washington, and who must respond to strong demands from their own publics to revitalize the East-West dialogue.
Thus far, the Soviets have maintained a tough line on the central nuclear arms control issues, continuing to assert that a resumption of START and INF negotiations is impossible without major U.S. concessions. They have expressed skepticism over your call for a more constructive dialogue. Their reaction is dictated by a number of factors. First, they have taken a self-acknowledged political defeat on INF, which will take time to absorb. Second, their leadership situation, uncertain for half a decade as Brezhnev weakened, only to be replaced by an ill Andropov and now by Chernenko, still seems to be evolving. Finally, the Soviets must balance their probable preference for a Democratic victory in November against their clear incentives to negotiate seriously before the elections in view of the likelihood that they will be dealing with you for four more years.
Suspicious of our motives, Chernenko in his letters to you has nonetheless expressed a cautious interest in testing our seriousness about arms control dialogue. Thus, while stonewalling on START/ [Page 736] INF, the Soviets have indicated a willingness to move ahead bilaterally on several lesser matters, underscoring their interest in MBFR, CW, TTBT, ASAT and hinting at a compromise between our respective positions at the Stockholm CDE conference. They have stressed various possible declaratory measures as well. In doing so, they have suggested that progress on these issues could lead them to initiate a substantive dialogue on the more basic problems, including nuclear arms control.
Some of these Soviet offers (such as a no-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge) would clearly be to our disadvantage and are non-starters. In other areas, the development of new Western proposals are already underway; we should be in a position to present initiatives to the Soviets in the Vienna MBFR talks and the Geneva CW negotiations in the coming weeks. We have interagency groups examining questions related to outer space arms control and the limited nuclear testing bans and expect to continue our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on the fringes of the CDE in Stockholm. Specific opportunities for progress in some of the fields may become possible.
We should clearly recognize the difficulties involved and not put ourselves in the position of rewarding Soviet intransigence. We do not see the likelihood of a major breakthrough in either START or INF in the near future. Nonetheless, as Art Hartman has noted, the leadership situation in Moscow and accompanying Soviet policy decisions has not yet been finalized. It is possible, for instance, that we may see a more activist Chernenko if he is elected to the Chairmanship of the Presidium later this spring. Because we cannot predict the course of Soviet action with any certainty, it would be a mistake to build our strategy solely on the likelihood of the Soviets adopting a more positive approach. It would be equally self-defeating for us to assume in the current situation that the Soviets will make no move at all this year. We need to be prepared to deal quickly and effectively with either prospect.
If we find that the Soviets are not disposed to take more than minor steps forward with us this year, you ultimately may want to move beyond our current emphasis on confidential diplomacy to enunciate publicly a vision of U.S. arms control policy for your second term. Such a declaration, which might contain new initiatives, would be an effective response to the political pressures which inactivity on nuclear arms control will inevitably engender as the year progresses. At the same time, such a statement would set the Western agenda for 1985 and could pave the way for a resumption of nuclear negotiations in the new year, both in perception and reality.
In sum, we must be ready to engage in serious, substantive arms control discussions whenever—and indeed whether—the Soviets signal they are ready to resume business. I know there are those who feel that our best tactic with the Soviets, with our Allies, and with our [Page 737] public is to rest upon our arms control record of the past three years, call upon the Soviets to return to Geneva, and emphasize non-compliance and the difficulties of verification. They would argue we should refrain from putting forward, or even looking internally at, any new steps until the Soviets do so. There is logic to this approach—why should we negotiate with ourselves when our arms control objectives are correct and our arms control principles are sound? There is also a certain emotional appeal—the Soviets walked out; why should we make concessions to bring them back? I subscribe to the logic and reject any notion that we should—or need to—compromise any of our basic goals. At the same time, however, one must examine the effect of this approach upon the three audiences we must seek to influence.
For the Soviets, this is the most convenient U.S. strategy, the one that plays best to the strengths of their own position, and which puts the least pressure upon them for change. Under such an approach the Soviets would not be forced to react to new U.S. initiatives, their inflexibility would not be revealed anew, and their accusations of U.S. inflexibility would, over time, be given added weight by some.
For our Allies, this approach creates the greatest incentive for uncoordinated initiatives on their part to build bridges to the USSR, and to suggest ways to get the nuclear negotiations back on track. Europe’s Foreign Ministers (UK, FRG and Portugal) and heads of state (France) are already booking their reservations in Moscow. The flurry of such visits throughout 1984 will create its own momentum for new initiatives.
Finally, such a stand pat approach, if it is to work, requires that we persuade our public throughout the balance of this year that the Soviets will accept in this Administration’s second four-year term those arms control arrangements which they refused to adopt in the first. This will be a difficult case to make. The Soviets will not give us any help.
The evolution through 1984 of our arms control strategy obviously must depend upon a number of factors, including Congressional pressures on the defense budget and strategic modernization program, Allied actions, and the Soviet response to our current overtures. It will require that our approach retain a degree of flexibility, that we continue our quiet exploration of possible new steps in START/INF, and that we look closely at possible areas for movement on selected secondary issues as well.
We need not make a decision on the details of any new approach at this time. I feel strongly, however, that we should not, by ceasing our preparations now, rob you of the ability to make such a decision at some appropriate moment in the future.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1–30, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. In a March 26 covering memorandum to Shultz, Howe and Kelly wrote: “In accordance with your instructions, we have reworked both versions of the memorandum to the President on arms control. The major difference between them is that the first version at Tab A addresses START/INF alone, while the version at Tab B briefly mentions other areas of arms control as well. The argument for the latter is that the Soviets have indicated that movement in other areas could help with resumption of nuclear arms control talks.” Shultz signed the memorandum at Tab B, which was sent by special courier to the White House on March 27 at 7:30 a.m. in preparation for the NSC meeting that afternoon.↩