191. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Washington, March 7, 1984
SUBJECT
We have reviewed Chernenko’s most
significant statements since he was elected General Secretary February
14—his remarks to the Vice President that day, his letter to the
President February 23, and his “election” speech March 2—to identify the
issues in U.S.-Soviet relations he is presently concentrating on.2 His letter
to the President adopted the agenda set forth by Andropov in his January 28 letter by
stating this was the Soviet position and calling for U.S.
responses.3 A review of the results is
attached.
Briefly, the “Chernenko agenda” is
as follows: START/INF, a non-use-of-force treaty, U.S.
matching the Soviet pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, a CTB, U.S. ratification of the TTBT, an ASAT ban, Western response to Eastern moves in MBFR, and “resolving regional conflicts.”
In his March 2 speech, i.e. the “public” version, Chernenko laid special stress on:
—Ratification of TTBT/PNET and resumption of CTB talks.
—Adoption of nuclear no-first-use, nuclear free zones, etc.
—No militarization of outer space.
Chernenko did not specifically
cite ASAT, nor did he raise the
non-use of force treaty or MBFR. He
dusted off the old Soviet nuclear freeze proposal which had not been
given much stress earlier.
The only really new twists were on START/INF and CW:
—In describing US
INF deployments, Chernenko said that the US had “created obstacles” to negotiations,
and that “it is the removal of these obstacles (which would also remove
the need for our countermeasures) that offers the way to working out a
mutually acceptable accord.” It is not clear from the context whether
Chernenko is implying any new
flexibility on resuming negotiations. Like the earlier “display a
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readiness” formula, there is
sufficient ambiguity regarding the precise conditions under which the
Soviets might agree to return to Geneva.
—Chernenko was upbeat on CW. He said that the prerequisites “are
beginning to ripen” for a resolution of the question of a complete
CW ban, and alluded to the new
Soviet proposal for continuous inspection of stockpile destruction.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State4
THE SOVIET AGENDA
In his February 23 letter to the President, Chernenko emphasized the continuity
of Soviet policy toward the United States, stating that the
positions set forth in Andropov’s letter of January 28 remain in force.
Below we set out the Soviet agenda for relations with us as given in
the two letters and in Chernenko’s remarks to the Vice President. Included
are areas in which we might be responsive and which we cannot, with
problems and timing for our position:
START/INF:
Chernenko listed arms
limitation and reduction first as one of the “most important and
pressing problems” in the meeting with the Vice President. The
Andropov letter
characterized U.S. efforts to upset “the regional and global
balance” through P–II/GLCM deployments as “disrupting
dialogue on the most important questions.” It stated the U.S. needed
to take “practical, positive steps” to return to the fundamentals of
equality and equal security in nuclear arms negotiations, but
carefully refrained from offering any specifics in this regard.
—Soviets are indicating the priority they attach to START and INF but argue the U.S. is not
serious about exploring mutually acceptable solutions. East
Europeans say Soviets will return to talks if they believe we
are interested in substantive discussions. Presentation of our
START Framework could be
the crucial element to move back to START negotiations into which the Soviets will
probably want to merge INF.
Non-Use-of-Force Treaty: In Andropov’s final Pravda interview,5
Chernenko’s exchanges with
the Vice President and other Western
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leaders,6 and Gromyko’s eulogy at Red Square,7 special priority and emphasis has been
given to the Soviet offer of a non-use-of-force agreement of the
sort the Eastern bloc is pushing at the CDE in Stockholm. U.S. acceptance would, the Soviets
assert, be a major positive gesture.
—We have traditionally resisted political declaratory measures
of this sort because they do not make a real contribution to
increased confidence and security. In addition, the Soviets have
yet to show any seriousness in considering our own more concrete
CBMs at Stockholm. However,
it might be possible to work out a bilateral framework for
onward multilateral negotiation at Stockholm in which we agree
to some form of new non-use-of-force statement (essentially
keyed to language already in the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act) in exchange for
explicit Soviet acceptance of the sort of
notification/observance CBMs we
are seeking. There could be some objections to this in the
bureaucracy if it appeared we were not getting enough in return.
I will have a separate memorandum for you on this
possibility.
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons:
Chernenko told the Vice
President the Soviets see no reason the U.S. cannot follow their
example and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear
weapons.
—The U.S. position of not giving up the option to use nuclear
weapons to counter a massive Soviet conventional attack has been
a consistent part of NATO
strategy for decades. There is no possibility for a change in
our position on this issue.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB): As part of his case
that U.S. is not serious in curbing the arms race, Andropov in his January 25 [28] letter cited U.S. reluctance to seek a
CTB agreement.
—We cannot be responsive on this one. There is USG agreement that it is not in
our interests to enter a CTB
regime at this time because of verification uncertainties and
testing requirements to maintain our deterrent
forces.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT):
Andropov stated Moscow could
not see “any convincing reason” for continued U.S. failure to ratify
the TTBT/PNET.
—Considerably more chance for movement than on CTB. EUR is looking at a new option that would move the
treaties toward ratification conditional on Soviet agreement to
on-site measurement of the calibration shots already called for
in the TTBT. Unlike our
current position (which the Soviets have rejected several
times), this would not require reopening the treaty for
negotiations, but would give us some improvement in verification
of Soviet nuclear testing. There will be some resist
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ance in the Executive
Branch and in the Senate to such a move in light of past
compliance ambiguities.
Anti-Satellite Weapons (ASAT) Ban:
Andropov urged a favorable
U.S. response to the Soviet call for an ASAT moratorium and ban.
—The Soviets will make this a major propaganda theme and are
likely to find considerable resonance among the Allies and on
the Hill. There are
major verification problems involved and strong institutional
resistance within the USG to
any ASAT-related moves. An
interagency group is currently studying outer space CBMs (of much less interest to
Moscow). To avoid leaving the field entirely to the Soviets, we
will need to push the bureaucracy hard to come up with some
concrete proposals—whether forms of ASAT limitations, confidence-building measures or
both—that may be put forward to the Soviets for new negotiations
in this area.
MBFR:
Andropov prodded for a
positive U.S. response to the Eastern proposals tabled in Vienna
last summer.
—We hope to indicate to the Soviets during the upcoming MBFR session our readiness to
exchange data if Eastern figures fall within an acceptable
range. We have yet, however, to bring the allies completely
onboard this position or to flesh out within the USG the precise parameters of the
Soviet data we are prepared to accept. It is too early to
predict if the Soviets will consider this position, when tabled,
sufficiently flexible to move the process forward.
Regional Issues:
Chernenko listed “resolving
regional conflicts” as one of the most important problems for us to
discuss. Andropov called for
the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the territory and waters of
Lebanon.
—Regional issues are a prime agenda item of ours and will be
discussed regularly in high-level meetings between us. Chernenko’s inclusion of this
point is actually a nod to our standard agenda. The MNF
withdrawal satisfies part of Andropov’s Lebanon
demand, although the Soviets will continue their pressure
against the presence and activities of Sixth Fleet units in the
area.8 While we need to
ensure through more periodic exchanges that the Soviets do not
misperceive our intentions, the opportunity and desirability of
more constructive engagement with the Soviets on the Mideast
remains extremely limited.
U.S.-Soviet Atmospherics:
Andropov made a
point—explicitly reaffirmed by Chernenko—of the need to avoid the “unhelpful
inciting of animosities.”
—The President’s January 16 speech demonstrated our own
interest in toning down the rhetoric on both sides.9 We need to continue to
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display special sensitivity on
this point. While some of Gromyko and Ustinov’s recent comments have carried some
familiar tough talk, Chernenko’s own statements to us have been
markedly free of the sharp tone so characteristic of Andropov.
