185. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz1
Washington, February 28, 1984
SUBJECT
- U.S.-Soviet Relations: Your Meeting with the President, March 2,
1984, 2:15 p.m.
Your meeting with the President is designed to set the framework for our
policy towards the Soviet Union for the rest of this year.2 You will want to get the
President’s blessing on moving forward with the Soviets in your next
talk with Dobrynin and in
Art Hartman’s next
conversations with Gromyko. It is
also important that Brent
Scowcroft have substantive things to say during his
meetings in Moscow in ten days if he is to have credibility as a channel
on nuclear arms negotiations.3 At this point, content
is the key to whether we can move forward.
The material you sent the President for the meeting was changed quite
substantively by Jack Matlock
and Ron Lehman before Bud
[Page 648]
McFarlane sent it on to the President.4
Some of the NSC’s updating of the first
paper is quite good. However, they also saw fit to gut the substance on
START,5 eliminating
the Framework paper in toto, and introduced some dubious conceptual
comments, e.g. Chernenko “needs
you more than you need him, and he knows it.”
The paper now reflects the better tone we have been hearing from the
Soviets since Chernenko took over
and the slight widening of opportunities Chernenko may represent. In a nutshell, the Soviets are
reticent about helping the President this year, but they are keeping
their options open, and under Chernenko the signs are multiplying that they could well
decide to get something serious going with us before the election. It
argues we should recognize that major breakthroughs are not in the cards
and keep public expectations—including expectations of a summit—low at
the outset.
But the paper states that we should also begin to put serious content
into the dialogue all along the line, and be willing to go to the summit
if the Soviets are willing to respond with concrete steps that take our
concerns into account. If they are not, the fault will demonstrably be
theirs, and not ours. If they are, we may get some agreements this year,
and should lay a solid basis for some serious forward movement beginning
in 1985.
On substance, the paper divides the issues and sets forward proposals in
the four normal agenda areas. It also talks about channels and timing,
noting that we need to organize ourselves for confidential, leak-proof
substantive dialogue, through Dobrynin and Hartman, through Brent
Scowcroft (when he goes to Moscow with the Dartmouth
Group beginning March 8) and possibly through a visit to Moscow by you.
And we need the kind of bureaucratic streamlining here that will
“pre-position” us for movement on a whole range of issues. Your task in
[Page 649]
the meeting will be to
obtain agreement for movement forward in all areas.
The fundamental flaw in the rewrite is that it eliminates any real
substance on START and drops the
separate paper on the Framework. As it stands now, there is little left
to talk with the Soviets on nuclear arms control issues other than the
vague suggestions of tradeoffs that we have offered in the past. The
Soviets will not take such an approach as a serious one. During the
meeting tomorrow or following it in a separate meeting, it will be
important to get the President’s blessing on a more substantive
approach.
The problem will be a critical one for your dialogue with Dobrynin and Scowcroft’s talks in Moscow. If
Brent is sent to Moscow with
no more than what is proposed in this paper, the Soviets will be
confirmed in their suspicion that our talk of dialogue is no more than
an election-year ploy. What he has to say will be a test case of “U.S.
seriousness” for the Soviets. If there is nothing new, Brent will be discredited; even worse,
you and the President will be discredited and the possibility of getting
something serious going with the Soviets this year—including a
summit—will not be realized.
Specifically, we believe that Brent should be authorized to convey to the Soviets just
what sort of trade-offs we envision and how they might come together in
a START package. At the very least,
he will have to be able to say explicitly that we are prepared to trade
our agreement to limit missiles and bombers together, as the Soviet
Union has suggested, in exchange for Soviet agreement to sufficient
limits on the ballistic missile capabilities that are important to us.
He should be able to describe how such an arrangement could involve two
parallel networks of limits and sublimits, one on delivery vehicles (as
emphasized by the Soviet side), the other on warheads (as emphasized by
the U.S.); and explain how such an approach would not require that we
build identical forces. His pitch would be keyed to the need to find
agreement on the principles of such a reductions scheme, which could
then allow the two delegations in Geneva to hammer out the actual
numbers and other details.
The attached suggested talking points (Tab A)6 are
designed to allow you to shape the conversation to get the President’s
blessing on putting substance, particularly on START, into the dialogue with the
Soviets, obtaining a consensus on the bilateral, regional, and human
rights steps discussed in the paper, and securing agreement on the ideas
on timing and channels included in it. They include both the ideas of
sending Brent to Moscow and a
discussion of the framework.
[Page 650]
I
leave it you whether you want to do this with others present or only
with the President. A copy of the paper as it was sent to the President
is also attached. (Tab B)
Tab B
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State7
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE
FUTURE
What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984? What should
be our approach?
I. Premise
Chernenko’s selection as
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party may provide an
opportunity to put our relations on a more positive track. Even
before Andropov died, there
were signs that the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an
intensified dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their
hostile rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine
privately proposals for solving some problems.
As a Soviet leader, Chernenko
has many initial weaknesses. He may have come to power as the head
of a relatively weak coalition, and his freedom to maneuver may be
severely circumscribed. His public image is not strong, and he may
well turn out to be only a brief transitional figure. Nevertheless,
he probably does not view himself in that light, and we can assume
that he will attempt to consolidate his power and put his own stamp
on history. In that effort, an ability to improve relations with the
United States would be an important asset to him, and to be seen
publicly dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image
greatly in the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you
need him, and he knows it.
This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic
decisions will continue to be made by a collective—essentially the
same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is likely that this collective had
already begun to recognize the need for the Soviet Union
[Page 651]
to adjust some of its
policies before Andropov
died, and Chernenko’s
accession could hasten that process. The change of the face at the
top could make it easier to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past
failures on the “previous administration.”
To say that these things could happen is, of
course, not the same as saying that they will, or even that the odds favor them happening—The Soviets
still harbor a deep and fundamental hostility to your
Administration, are tough and cynical bargainers, and will be
reluctant to do anything that they believe would facilitate your
reelection and vindicate your policy of strength.
Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States in
establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the
Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call
for dialogue and your desire to reduce tensions and solve problems.
Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive results could
be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their
policies sufficiently to make this possible. But if they continue to
resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a position by late
summer or fall to make clear that this is their fault, not
yours.
For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid raising
public expectations for a summit or any specific accords with the
Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating leverage with
the Soviets, and leave a public impression of failure if they refuse
to deal with us realistically. In private, however, we should
promptly begin to explore the possibilities for moving ahead in some
important areas, and to test Chernenko’s willingness and ability to meet at least
some of our legitimate concerns. If we play our cards right, we may
well be able to induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the
improvement in relations and summit which would be very helpful to
him personally.
On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our
concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy is
so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt to
negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions without
a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it clear that we
will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing to meet our
legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only maximize whatever
chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but would provide a
sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the Soviets are unable to
get their act together until then, or if they hold back for fear of
helping you get reelected. We should not, of course, attempt to
stimulate their interest by making prior concessions of substance.
This would only encourage them to continue on their track of trying
to get concessions from us without making any of their own. Indeed,
our aim should be to obtain some prior concessions from
[Page 652]
them, particularly if you
are to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that
there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can hardly pull Soviet
troops out of Afghanistan or make major decisions of strategic
significance. But he can deliver on such matters as human rights
cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.
All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more content
into the dialogue; and to search for more efficient modalities. We
should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your January speech,
but need to concentrate particular attention on issues where the
Soviets can find a direct interest in responding. Regarding
modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record frankness
and which are isolated from leaks.
While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever
that may be at a given moment), we should also expand opportunities
for more broad and effective contacts with a wider public,
particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the successor
generation).
II. The Substance
It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress
might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human
rights field by releasing the Pentecostalists; this year it could be
somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while
keeping public expectations low unless and until something concrete
materializes.
A. Regional Issues
In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will be
difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our near-term
objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange regarding
the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion would massage
Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of sorts). It might
also serve to alert us and them to particularly delicate aspects
which should be taken into account in policy making. Being seen in
consultation with the Soviets on these issues helps allay public
anxieties and can increase leverage with other parties. Conceivably,
the process could lead to reciprocal unilateral actions which might
defuse particularly dangerous aspects of regional conflicts,
although this is likely to occur only if relations in other respects
improve.
The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest is
the Middle East—Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we should steer
away from tactical discussions and asking them to do favors, i.e.,
UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger strategic discussion
to stress the danger of events spiraling out of control of either of
us and producing an Israeli-Syrian confrontation which would have
serious dangers for both of us.
[Page 653]
There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues, where
we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of their
present “splitting” tactics. And in general we believe our emphasis
on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates more
routine, substantive exchanges among experts on various regions.
B. Arms Control
Strategic arms limitations represent the central arms negotiations
between the US and the USSR. However, for the last three
years, INF issues have set the mood
for a number of negotiations. Having threatened to walk out of
negotiations and to deploy “countermeasures,” the Soviet Union is
now following through.
Sufficient face-saving formulas exist for the Soviet Union to return
when they wish, although they will be very reluctant to return to
INF. We should not make
concessions to bring them back to START and INF, nor
should we create obstacles to their return. Resumption of talks will
be accelerated if our allies are firm, major defense programs
proceed, walkout is not rewarded, and domestic pressures are
controlled.
Nevertheless, the United States can and should take steps designed to
enhance the prospects for arms control “windows of opportunity.”
Resumption of more normal negotiations is most likely in
multilateral fora or in low key bilateral negotiations such as the
“Hotline” upgrade talks, especially if the United States is not
perceived as gaining significant public diplomacy advantages. This
is consistent with the current Soviet effort to keep political
pressure on the Alliance and this Administration.
If, however, the new leadership in Moscow should decide that a major
US/USSR arms control initiative might be in their
interest, then START is the most
likely arena for movement. Prior to the Soviet walkout from START we had indicated that we had
some flexibility in basic approaches to trade-offs between areas of
US and Soviet interest.
Clarification of approaches to these trade-offs could play an
important role in creating the climate for agreement in principle or
a resumption of negotiations.
Although the Alliance is adamant that we should not make concessions
in order to get the USSR to return
to the INF talks, Moscow’s
unwillingness to discuss Soviet LRINF systems presents it with a political
vulnerability. The United States and its allies should continue to
press on this issue. As long as the Soviet Union believes that it
can put the West on the defensive with the public in areas such as
INF deployments and space arms
control, it will see less incentive to negotiate on other
issues.
MBFR is important not because an
agreement is likely this year or next, but because we have an
opportunity to demonstrate that we are
[Page 654]
serious in our negotiating intent. Our opening
position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the overall
message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously. The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM’s such as the hot line will have a
higher profile than hitherto.
C. Human Rights
While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on human
rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the Soviets did
move on the Pentecostalists in the context of improving relations,
and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that they see
some improvement. We should continue to focus on major cases like
Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need
to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be
possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record
contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would be
useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a
precondition.
D. Bilateral
In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz’ meeting with Gromyko opened up a number of possibilities.
Gromyko responded
positively to the need to examine specific measures to prevent
another KAL. Since then, the Soviet
representative at ICAO has
proposed a US-Japan-USSR group to look at such
measures.8 We have
developed a set of specific measures. Our objective should be to
reach agreement on these measures this year.
We also should take steps which improve our direct communication and
contact with the people in the Soviet Union—to give practical effect
to your own stress on talking directly to the people in your January
16th speech and again in the State of the Union. That is the
objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly supported in recent
letters to the Congress and the Administration by Ukrainian-American
organizations) and a cultural exchanges agreement.
By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to
channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the
country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit exploitation
by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups dominating this area, we
should try to establish a mechanism for better guidance and
coordination of private efforts. This could be used to encourage
those with a tougher-
[Page 655]
minded
track record in dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council
of Young Political Leaders.
Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of Supreme
Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to meet
possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev. However, we will want to weigh carefully
the risks of negative exploitation.
In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have
not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal
indications are not promising. There are a variety of other areas of
cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.
III. Channels
There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.
We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but recognize that it is
unlikely that he will be candid, both out of fear his letters will
be leaked and in order to protect his negotiating positions.
Nonetheless, it is one means of being certain that our views are
getting through to the leadership without distortion. And it could
help to provide some momentum. (At the moment the ball is in
Chernenko’s court, since
you sent him a letter with the Vice President.)9
We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary
Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full range of our
concerns.
On the critical START issue, in
the absence of negotiations in Geneva, the Secretary’s talks with
Dobrynin will be the main
channel. As a parallel process we should consider intensifying
unofficial informal discussions. Brent
Scowcroft is going to Moscow in March and would be
able to set forth our views more fully and directly than passing
through Dobrynin.
If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another Shultz-Gromyko meeting.
Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As noted
earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our specialists
should meet. In addition, we should consider sending a group of
middle-level policy officials to Moscow to cover a broad range of
subjects and touch base with key Soviet organizations, including the
Central Committee. And military-to-military discussions are a
possibility: discussion of such matters as strategic doctrine or
comparison of each other’s threat assessments might be useful
topics.
[Page 656]
IV. Timetable
The following timetable is possible:
—Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days:
further on START framework and
propose some of other consultations.
—Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East
discussion by specialists and/or discussions by policy planners.
—Scowcroft: Brief him on our
approach to use privately during his planned trip to Moscow
beginning March 8.
—Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push
for this yet but wait and see how other issues develop. If the
Soviets seem interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or
early June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to Washington to see you
when he is here in September for the UNGA.
V. Bureaucratic
Preparation
If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of interest
to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to sustain momentum.
This may require some adjustment of our bureaucratic procedures to
make quick decisions possible. It would be useful to clarify as many
immediate issues as we can, and to “pre-position” approved
negotiating plans, to be used as developments warrant. A list of the
more important U.S.-Soviet issues with summaries of their status is
attached.
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State10
Washington, February 18, 1984
CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET
ISSUES: STATUS AND PROSPECTS
I. ARMS CONTROL
START:
Status. Soviet deferral of resumption
reaffirmed by Gromyko in
Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for
positive US-Soviet discussion.
Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday).
Prospects. If Framework presented to
Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential
[Page 657]
discussion underway over
next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on
INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).
INF:
Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S.
INF, and refuse resumption
without some expression of U.S. “willingness to return to the
situation that existed before deployments;” in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet
discussions in restricted channels. Prospects. Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of
U.S. INF systems in any resumed
START talks, was informed
that any negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P–IIs must
also deal with SS–20s.
MBFR:
Status. Talks to resume March 16. President’s
letter to Chernenko said we
are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data
if Soviets flexible on verification. Prospects. Difficult to be too optimistic on these
long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by
summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us
to respond to Soviets soon.
US-SOVIET CBMs:
Status. January session moved us forward on
upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more
ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in
nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going
to Soviets. Prospects. Follow-on session on
communications CBMs tentatively set
for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer.
Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming
Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some
agreement with Soviets.
CDE:
Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with
basic NATO and Soviet approaches
still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as
Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO
seeks substantive notification measures. Prospects. We should pursue private dialogue underway in
Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even
years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package
with points satisfying both sides.
NON-PROLIFERATION:
Status. Third round of highly technical and
essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both
sides see them as valuable mechanism for policy coordination in this
area. Prospects. Soviets have proposed and we
are ready to agree to another session for December.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS:
Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft
CW treaty in coming months; once
State and ACDA competing versions
are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance.
OSD opposes concept of such a
treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet
bilateral verification discussion. Prospects:
Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April
[Page 658]
at the earliest; we may wish to pick up
bilateral discussion proposal in interim.
NUCLEAR TESTING:
Status: Soviets have turned down our
proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe
they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only
after it is ratified. Prospects: An
interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One
option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site
verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies
oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance
report to Congress.11
ASAT ARMS
CONTROL:
Status. Soviets probably intend to make this
major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S.
ASAT system absent talks with
Soviets.12
Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental
verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures
are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets.
Prospects: Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could
be discussed once USG study
completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS:
Status. Little dialogue between military
establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held
back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. Prospects. A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made
whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of
Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to
be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.
II. REGIONAL ISSUES
MIDDLE EAST:
Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow,
and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon. Prospects.
Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about
Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role
[Page 659]
and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in
return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further
discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid
miscalculation.
AFGHANISTAN:
Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but
feeling pressure. Talks under UN
auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as
supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet “experts” talks in Moscow in July 1982. Prospects. As pressure on the ground rises,
Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to
UN process and/or to direct
talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role
of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal
timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and
prove we support UN process.
SOUTHERN AFRICA:
Status. Steady progress now on South African
disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final
settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets
could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets
three times in 1982, but not since. Prospects. Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a
better feel for the dilemmas they face.
KAMPUCHEA:
Status. Soviets combine support for
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis
ASEAN states, and item has
not ranked high in bilateral dialogue. Prospects. No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets
to decrease aid to Hanoi.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS
EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM:
Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other
emigration continues, with last year’s Jewish total about 3% of 1979
figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest
“representation lists” on divided families and spouses and U.S.
nationals handed over to Gromyko’s deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised
anti-Semitism with Dobrynin
after Stockholm;13 Bronfman visit to
Moscow now uncertain. Prospects. Return to
large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures—through
quiet diplomacy or to public figures—in election year, and numbers
could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in
relationship.
SOVIET DISSIDENTS:
Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all
but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular
intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal
exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and Shcharanskiy is still in jail. Prospects. Again not good,
[Page 660]
although, again, gestures are probably
more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet
diplomacy.
IV. BILATERAL
ISSUES
MARITIME BOUNDARY:
Status. We offered a 50–50 split in the
disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in
Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming
additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental
shelf rights. Prospects. New round is
expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off
their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few
months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended
negotiations.14
KAL SAFETY
MEASURES:
Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal
with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved
communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the
Soviet Far East along KAL 007
route. Prospects. Soviets have proposed
US-Soviet-Japanese experts’
group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps
under the ICAO umbrella. Action
should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even
implicit responsibility for shootdown, and results could take
months.
KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES:
Status. Advance teams preparing for the
formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as
an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in
Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their
UN Mission. Last summer both
sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in
principle to Gromyko in
Stockholm, noting timing must be right. Prospects. A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are
ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume
immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could
perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay
formal opening for some years.
EXCHANGES AGREEMENT:
Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after
Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets
can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot
exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount
USIA travelling exhibits in
the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman’s efforts to run cultural
programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July
to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in
principle to Gromyko in
Stockholm. Prospects.
[Page 661]
Draft proposal is far advanced, but would
require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to
negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.
CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS:
Status. First round of talks aimed at
alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems
with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea
at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new
points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). Prospects. If FBI lifts
veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce
balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.
SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE:
Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January.
They have yet to respond. Prospects. Soviets
have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if
there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this
summer.
COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS:
Status. Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with
senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on
coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our
December efforts to set up a meeting. Prospects. Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions
and a possible agreement could be impressive following our
well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.
PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in
expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite
a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. Prospects. To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might
encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of
Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract
major Soviet figure to U.S.
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL:
Status. 10-year agreement, which has some
utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in
June. Prospects. U.S. could propose renewal
in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.
JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION:
Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as
an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has
thus not met since 1978. Prospects. We could
propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive
response on other economic steps.
FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL:
Status. Extended twice under this
Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has
allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen.
Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since
Afghanistan. Prospects. Approval of an
18-month extension would permit improved
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planning by U.S. fishermen. USG could consider giving the Soviets
a direct fish allocation at any time.
CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in
force on the environment, health (including artificial heart
research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low
levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly
because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving
these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. Prospects. Agreements could be given
additional content by USG side with
the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.
NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS:
Status. A number of agreements were allowed
to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to
renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and
basic sciences and engineering. Prospects.
Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of
agreements, and in these cases, affected agencies also [favor] new
agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we
had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals
and negotiate agreements.
