I believe the attached study (Tab I) is right on target as regards all
its major judgments.2 Specifically:
—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect
of armed confrontation with the U.S.;
—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down
the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift
in the balance of military power which would require them either to back
down or accept the risk of confrontation. They genuinely fear our
technological capacity and probably doubt that they could keep up if we
went flat out. And just trying to keep up will put enormous pressures on
their shaky system.
—Of all the regional disputes, they are probably most nervous about the
Middle East, primarily because of the proximity of our forces there. In
their eyes, they have acted prudently by not challenging directly our
military actions in Lebanon. Israeli or (worse in their eyes) U.S.
strikes on Syrian territory would be harder for them to tolerate—but
they would probably do so. Still, they do not want to be faced with the
choice.
One element which is not elaborated in the paper deserves attention. That
is, the nature of Andropov’s
internal rule, as it is shaping up. I see increasing signs that it is in
fact a sort of neo-Stalinism, with the emphasis on discipline and police
controls, combined with pronounced Russian nationalism. These trends
stem primarily from internal factors and Andropov’s own personality, but have implications for
foreign policy. In fact, we may have, in Andropov, a Soviet leader who has a policy stake in the
appearance of tension, since it makes it easier to mobilize the
population if the latter is convinced that there is an external threat.
Therefore, while Andropov may be
very careful not to provoke a real confrontation, he may see little
merit in relaxed tensions for their own sake (as Brezhnev clearly did).
Tab I
Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the
Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency3
Washington, December 30, 1983
SOVIET THINKING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED
CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES
Summary
Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does
not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the
United States. With the major exception of the Middle East, there
appears to be no region in which the Soviets are now apprehensive
that action in support of clients could lead to Soviet-American
armed collision. By playing up the “war danger,” Moscow hopes to
encourage resistance to INF
deployment in Western Europe, deepen cleavages within the Atlantic
alliance, and increase public pressure in the United States for a
more conciliatory posture toward the USSR. [portion marking not
declassified]
Soviet policymakers, however, almost certainly are very concerned
that trends they foresee in long-term US military programs could in time erode the USSR’s military gains of the past
fifteen years, heighten
[Page 537]
US political leverage, and perhaps
increase the chances of confrontation. [portion
marking not declassified]
Moscow’s sense of pressure and challenge from the United States is
probably magnified by difficult near-term policy dilemmas which
US actions pose. The Kremlin
must consider painful any increases in the rate of military
spending; it must provide or deny additional assistance to client
regimes under serious insurgent attack; and it must react to a sharp
ideological offensive against communist rule at a time of growing
public demoralization arising from stagnation in living standards in
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Not
surprisingly, Moscow is frustrated by and angry at the Reagan Administration. [portion marking not declassified]
1. Soviet rhetoric would suggest that Moscow believes the Reagan Administration has sharply
increased the likelihood of armed confrontation between the United
States and the USSR. Soviet
spokesmen have accused the President and his advisers of “madness,”
“extremism” and “criminality” in the conduct of relations with the
USSR. They have charged that
the United States is pursuing a nuclear first strike capability and
preparing to unleash nuclear war as a means of crushing communism.
The Soviets maintain that the Reagan Administration is eager to apply military
force in the Third World and has no intention of resolving its
differences with Moscow through negotiation. One Western visitor to
Moscow was recently told that Andropov had sent a letter to all party
organizations in October forcefully declaring that the fatherland
was truly in danger. [portion marking not
declassified]
2. Conversations by Westerners with Soviet citizens indicate that the
“war danger” propaganda line is probably widely believed by the
public at large, and that various elements of this line are accepted
within the foreign policy advisory community. [2
lines not declassified] there was an obsessive fear of war,
an emotionalism, and a paranoia [less than 1 line
not declassified] that had not been present earlier.4 [portion marking not
declassified]
3. The question of whether Soviet leaders actually believe that war
could break out, and whether they are basing policy on such a
judgment, is critical. If the answer to this question were positive,
then Moscow would have a strong incentive to pre-empt the United
States and might be so hypersensitive to US moves that the chances of accidental conflict would
be greatly increased. In our view, however, Soviet leaders do not
believe their own war danger propaganda and are not likely to base
policy on it. Rather, they have a fundamental and
[Page 538]
transparent policy interest in making
it appear to the world public that the USSR is dedicated to preserving the positive elements
of the bilateral relationship, that the United States has been
intransigent and irresponsible, and that the Soviet side is
rightfully angry. Their purpose is to:
• Encourage continuing resistance to INF deployment by the “peace movement” in Western
Europe.
• Create support for a restructuring of arms control talks on a
basis more acceptable to Moscow.
• Foster a long-term shift in Western Europe toward
neutralism.
• Deepen suspicions in West European governments of the motives
and competence of the Reagan Administration.
• Increase public pressure in the United States for concessions
to the USSR in future arms
control negotiations.
• Undercut the President’s reelection prospects. [portion marking not
declassified]
4. [1 paragraph (9 lines) not
declassified]
5. Apart from the basic Soviet interest in fostering the appearance
that confrontation with the United States could erupt at any moment,
there are other strong reasons for skepticism that Soviet
policymakers either believe this proposition or base policy on
it:
• Moscow’s inflexibility in its INF tactics, its suspension of arms negotiations,
and its reduction of contacts with the United States, are not
moves the Kremlin would have taken if it genuinely feared
confrontation. Rather, it would have tried to keep the dialogue
open in order to keep closely in touch with US intentions and lessen the
chances of miscalculation.
• Soviet policymakers almost certainly realize that the
developments most disturbing to them—full US
INF deployment, the broad
US strategic buildup, and
strengthening of US general
purpose forces—could influence the military balance only
gradually, would not affect the near-term US calculus of risks, and are still
subject to substantial political uncertainty.
• Historically, Soviet policy has generally been driven by
prudent calculation of interests and dogged pursuit of long-term
objectives, even in the face of great adversity rather than by
sudden swells of fear or anger.
• However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be by the Reagan Administration, they
also have a sense of the USSR’s strengths and of potential domestic and
international vulnerabilities of the United States. They
typically take a longer view of Soviet prospects, and the
perception from the Kremlin is by no means one of unrelieved
gloom. [portion marking not
declassified]
6. These considerations imply that any anticipations of near-term
confrontation that may exist in Moscow are likely to affect policy
more at the margin than at the core. We believe this generalization
is supported by how the Soviets probably assess the risk of conflict
with the United States arising from two most likely quarters:
nuclear-strategic
[Page 539]
rivalry,
and competition in the Third World. [portion
marking not declassified]
The Nuclear-Strategic Rivalry
7. Despite their impassioned rhetoric about the “nuclear danger,” we
strongly believe that the Soviets are fundamentally concerned not
about any hypothetical near-term US
nuclear attack, but about possible five-to-ten year shifts in the
strategic balance. In a TV interview on 5 December, the Chief of the
General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, pointed to the factors that would
presumably now deter even the most hostile US administration from a deliberate first strike
attempt—the large Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons, diverse
delivery systems, “repeatedly redundant systems of controlling
them,” and the vulnerability of the United States to retaliation.
And, in a speech on 18 December, Minister of Defense Ustinov stated there was no need
to “dramatize” the current tense situation. [portion marking not declassified]
8. The Soviets probably do believe that US
INF missiles, when fully deployed,
would significantly affect their plans for conducting nuclear war.
They think that the Pershing II is part of a broader US strategic plan to acquire forces to
fight a limited nuclear war in the European theater, and that it
would be able to strike critical strategic targets—particularly the
Soviet command and control system—in the Western USSR, reducing Moscow’s confidence in
its launch-on-tactical warning option. They probably believe their
public assertion that the range of the Pershing II is 2,500 km
rather than the 1,800 km claimed by NATO, which would—as they assert—substantially increase
the vulnerability to a sudden disabling nuclear attack of the Soviet
leadership and strategic command and control facilities located in
the Moscow region. But they apparently were willing to run the risk
of passing up a possible INF deal
involving no Pershing II deployments, in order to pursue their
maximum objective of no US
INF deployment at all. They are
aware that full INF deployment is
not scheduled to be completed until 1988, that it will be attended
by heavy political opposition in Western Europe, and that it could
be aborted or limited. Their likely near-term countermeasures to
INF deployment are not
provocative, and do not appear to be emotionally inspired. In
Europe, in fact, there has been no serious Soviet threatening, and
efforts to woo the democratic Left and maintain economic ties
continue. [portion marking not
declassified]
9. As INF deployment is completed
about the same time new US strategic
systems are being fielded, the Soviets could see a greater
possibility of confrontation with the United States. We do not
believe the Soviets think that deployment will decisively alter the
strategic balance, but they could think it would embolden the United
States to take more risks and increase the chance of accidental war.
With the
[Page 540]
sharp reduction
in warning time accompanying deployment of the Pershing IIs, the
Soviets could also well fear—as some spokesmen have obliquely
implied—that they themselves might mistakenly trigger a nuclear
exchange. [portion marking not
declassified]
Competition in the Third World
10. Despite the truculent mood in Moscow, we see no signs of any
emerging general pattern of Soviet behavior risking armed
confrontation with the United States in the Third World. Nor, by the
same token, do we detect much fear that US actions in most parts of the Third World might
precipitate an armed clash with Soviet forces that Moscow could not
avoid. [portion marking not declassified]
11. The single case today in which Moscow clearly does foresee a
heightened threat of armed confrontation with the United States is
Syria-Lebanon. The Soviets almost certainly are apprehensive that
the proximity of US and Soviet
combat units could spark a direct conflict. They may also fear that
the recent US-Israeli security
agreement could increase the risk of a US-Soviet clash in the event of renewed major
hostilities between Israel and Syria. The Soviets have given no sign
of interest in attempting actively to use their military resources
in Syria and Lebanon to provoke Washington. And Moscow’s public
response to recent Syrian-US
hostilities has been quite cautious. Yet, the Soviets have not been
moved by fear of confrontation with the United States to qualify
their support of Assad. Thus, in attempting to protect their
equities in relations with Syria, they have assumed a posture toward
a possible clash with the US that
remains basically reactive. [8½ lines not
declassified]
12. In attempting to make good on their threats, the Soviets might
face choices that could lead directly to confrontation with the
United States. But Moscow’s capability to act militarily in the
Lebanese-Syrian theater itself in ways that threatened armed
confrontation with the United States is limited physically by severe
constraints on the Soviet ability to project force rapidly into the
region during hostilities, and would be influenced psychologically
by considerable uncertainty about reactions that might be
anticipated from the White House. The Soviets might agree to expand
the number of Soviet advisers in Lebanon if the Syrians demanded
this, but would strive hard to limit their combat exposure. They
would probably prefer to ignore US-caused casualties among their advisers in Lebanon. At
higher escalation levels, they might choose to increase their naval
presence in the eastern Mediterranean if they had not already done
so, dispatch some fighter aircraft to Syria, and deploy small
numbers of airborne or naval infantry troops to rear areas in
Syria—with the intention of showing the flag more and raising the
deterrent tripwire. They would continue to provide warning
[Page 541]
data from their ships
offshore to air defense units in Syria, would allow Soviet advisers
with Syrian air defense units in Syria to participate in combat
operations, and probably would authorize Soviet pilots already in
Syria to fly combat missions within Syrian air space. They would try
to use the SA–5s only in defense of Syrian territory, and even then
might restrain themselves if US
attacks on Syrian targets were not extensive. They would certainly
attempt to defend SA–5 sites against US strikes. [portion marking not
declassified]
Soviet Concerns
13. Having asserted that the Soviets basically are not acting on the
belief that war is likely to “break out” soon, we must add that in
Moscow the Reagan
Administration is nevertheless the least loved of any US administration since that of
President Truman; that some Soviet officials may have talked
themselves into believing their own war scare propaganda; and that
the general level of frustration and anxiety surrounding relations
with the United States is substantially higher than it was in the
1970s. [portion marking not declassified]
14. Soviet officials have perceived a hardening of US policy beginning in the latter part
of the Carter
Administration. But US actions since
President Reagan’s election
have heightened Soviet anxieties. The major foreign policy defeat
represented by the initiation of INF deployment, the perceived unyielding current US posture in the START talks, the US action in Grenada, the deployment of
marines in Lebanon, US aid to
insurgencies against Soviet client regimes, the Reagan Administration’s perceived
political “exploitation” of the KAL
shootdown, and in general the Administration’s perceived
unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or
to treat the Kremlin with the “superpower” deference it desires,
appear to have combined to generate a sense of anger toward the
United States among Soviet officials and a belligerent mood. [portion marking not declassified]
15. Moscow, moreover, is probably genuinely concerned or uncertain
about several developments that seem to have changed the terms of
reference in bilateral relations and could potentially increase the
likelihood of hostilities between the United States and the USSR or constrain opportunities for
Soviet political gains abroad. These include:
—A possible adverse shift downstream in the overall military
balance with the United States arising from the acceleration of
US defense spending, support
in America for a broad range of new strategic force programs,
and increased momentum behind development of US general purpose forces.
—The perceived lower priority accorded by the Reagan Administration to arms
control negotiations with Moscow, its unwillingness to
accommodate Soviet interests in arms talks, and its apparent
intention of developing weapons systems that Moscow may have
thought were blocked simply by the fact that arms talks were
ongoing.
[Page 542]
—The end of the “Vietnam syndrome” and readiness of Washington to
use force once again in the Third World, either by supporting
insurgencies against Soviet client regimes—as in Nicaragua, or
acting directly—as in Lebanon and Grenada. [portion marking not declassified]
16. The immediate psychological and political impact of these
developments—the enlivened sense of US pressure and “imperialist encirclement”—is probably
greatly magnified by the difficult near-term policy dilemmas they
pose for the Kremlin. In the defense area, US plans to deploy the Peacekeeper, R&D on the “Midgetman,”
development of the B1 and Stealth bomber, the beginning of
deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs, development of precision guided munitions to
attack armored forces, and announcement of a program to develop
space-based defense systems confront Soviet leaders with a painful
and possibly contentious choice of accelerating the growth of
defense spending in the 1986–90 five-year plan. Decisions on the
plan must be made over the next 12–18 months, and even the costs at
the margin of slighting either investment or some improvement of
living standards are clearly viewed by the Soviet leadership as very
high indeed. [portion marking not
declassified]
17. Insurgencies against client regimes also create unpleasant
near-term policy choices which probably reinforce a certain seige
mentality on Moscow’s part. Instead of being on the attack, the
USSR has been placed on the
defensive. It is constrained either to up the ante of military and
economic aid, or pay the price of loss of political influence.
Increases in Soviet assistance carry with it possible indirect costs
in relations with third parties. Not least, the existence of
insurgencies casts an unwanted propaganda spotlight on the
repressiveness of allies of the USSR. [portion marking not
declassified]
18. While the Soviets have an obvious interest in portraying their
own side as deeply offended by the militancy of the Reagan Administration’s ideological
offensive against communism, they probably do in fact find it quite
unsettling. On a purely personal level, the top Soviet leadership
undoubtedly does resent being challenged publicly by the President
of the United States. More importantly, perhaps, Moscow is no longer
inclined to treat the Administration’s words as “rhetoric,” but sees
them as reflecting a serious policy aimed at actively exploiting
political vulnerabilities across the board in the USSR and the Soviet bloc. The Soviets
are well aware of public malaise generated by stagnating consumption
and corruption, and of repressed nationalism throughout their
empire; and they do not discount the power of ideas to weaken
compliance or—as in Poland—spark actual resistance. [portion marking not declassified]
[Page 543]
Prospects
19. The Soviets have a number of options for dealing with the
situation as they perceive it. They are probably still counting on
the Reagan Administration
overreaching itself and
• Revitalizing the “peace movement” in Western Europe.
• Fanning anti-Americanism in the Middle East, Central America
and elsewhere in the Third World.
• Losing support among American voters.
Their response to INF deployment
provides evidence that they have not abandoned hope of capitalizing
upon such developments. [portion marking not
declassified]
20. They could attempt to heighten the war of nerves by engaging in
threatening military operations, conducting menacing military
exercises or the like. Their approach here would have to be
selective in order to avoid counteracting the attempt to depict the
United States as the major threat to peace. So far they have not
systematically engaged in such activities. To some extent their war
scare propaganda has already backfired on them in Eastern Europe,
where there has been considerable resistance to the emplacement of
new Soviet missiles as a “countermeasure” to NATO
INF deployment. [portion marking not declassified]
21. They could also attempt through proxies to step up the pace of
ongoing leftist insurgencies (for example, in Central America) or to
provoke new armed conflicts that would, by forcing either US engagement or abstention, damage
American interests. Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, or Zaire,
perhaps, might be candidates for such attention. However, there are
important obstacles or disincentives in most instances to pressing
destabilization too hard and too openly, and thus the attractiveness
of currently available options along such lines is arguable. [portion marking not declassified]
22. If Soviet security concerns are basically long-term, as we
believe, and are seriously felt, as is likely, we would expect that
anxieties here would be expressed in an acceleration of the pace of
military spending in the 1986–90 five-year plan. The current tense
superpower environment will probably increase the pressures on the
Politburo to accept “worst-case” threat assessments and stipulations
of requirements from military planners—despite the further strain
this would place on an already taut economy. The extent of such a
response, however, might not be visible to us for several years.
[portion marking not declassified]
