Office of the Historian

73. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, September 14, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Foreign Reaction to the Brigade Issue (U)

It is worth keeping in mind that there has so far been no Third Country reaction of which I am aware which would in any way incline the Soviets toward making concessions to us regarding the brigade in Cuba. All signals to them on this score would point the other way. Our Allies have been studiously silent. No statements of support have emanated from any European capitals. This contrasts markedly with 1962, when all of them within two days voiced complete backing for us in the showdown with the Soviets. (C)

Nor has the issue created much of a stir in Latin America.2 Conservative governments (e.g., Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay) there have regarded reports of the Soviet unit as confirmation of their own concerns over Soviet-Cuban activities, but they have not viewed the brigade, in itself, as a real threat. Furthermore, there has been no significant official reaction to this event from any of the major non-aligned countries. (C)

In other words, the only consideration weighing upon the Soviets to make some sort of accommodation on this issue derives strictly from the US-Soviet context. Seeing themselves as having just had a major triumph with the NAM, and knowing that our Allies and the whole developed world are skeptical about this issue and not supportive of the position we have taken, the Soviets have little impetus on the international front to see things our way. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 8, Cuba, 9/79. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.↩
  2. Telegram 236643 to all American Republics diplomatic posts, September 9, transmitted talking points for démarches to host governments to inform them about the Soviet troops in Cuba. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 220.↩