Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

72. Memorandum for the Record Prepared by Herbert E. Hetu, Public Affairs Officer, Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, September 14, 1979

SUBJECT

• Mini-PRC/PA Meetings Concerning Soviet Combat Brigades in Cuba

1. Background: At about 1:15 p.m. on Monday, 10 September, Jody Powell called me to say that the President wanted all government public affairs officers concerned with the Soviet combat brigades in Cuba to get together to discuss the public affairs ramifications of the discovery, to be certain that there was no inter-agency disagreements via the news media. Jody said that meeting would take place at 6:00 p.m. that night in conjunction with the mini-PRC in the White House Situation Room.

I told Jody that David Binder had asked to come and see me that afternoon to discuss a chronological story he was preparing concerning Soviets in Cuba. Jody said he knew about the Binder article and that was one of the reasons we were all getting together. Jody and I then discussed whether or not I should cancel the meeting with Binder. We decided it might make sense for me to meet with Binder to get a better and more detailed idea of the type of article he was preparing.

I did meet with Binder at 3:00 p.m. on 10 September and reported on that meeting at the PRC meeting later that same day (see below).

2. What follows is a very brief description of what occurred at the three mini-PRC/PA meetings that took place.

a. Monday, 10 September. The meeting convened at 6:00 p.m., chaired by David Newsom. Jody Powell came in and said that the President wanted it made clear in any dealings with the press that: (1) there was no intelligence failure; (2) he did not want agencies taking issue with one another concerning intelligence and; (3) there would be no answering charges allegedly made by one agency in the media by other agencies. It was decided at that meeting that there would be no comment on any of the Vance/Dobrynin meetings.²

We then discussed in some detail the problems we could expect to face from the media. The result was a list of problems which were:

(a) The need for a chronology of intelligence activities which would be for internal use only in the event it was decided to brief Binder;

(b) Address the charge that footdragging by the Intelligence Community on getting out the word on the Soviet brigade was a SALT saving episode, i.e., trying to hold the information until SALT was ratified;

(c) Activities at Cienfuegos;

(d) The intelligence priority assigned to Cuba;

(e) Caves in Cuba;

(f) Soviet naval task forces using Cuban bases;

(g) Soviet pilots in Cuba.

Preparation of the chronology was assigned to Arnold Horelick and questions and answers concerning the other seven topics would be prepared by State and NSC. It was agreed that the chronology and questions and answers would be discussed at our next meeting at 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday.

There was also some discussion about the probability of backgrounding David Binder but a solution was never arrived at and it was left hanging. It was noted that Binder had been put off another day either by Jody Powell or Jerry Schecter. As noted above, I reported at the meeting on Binder’s plan. I said he was writing the article not so much as a day to day chronology but in phases—in his words, “phases of heightened attention by the Intelligence Community.” To wit: 1 March—Brzezinski and Turner discussed the problem and Turner was told to take a hard look; April—Brzezinski sends Turner a memorandum and tells him to make an indepth analysis; July—White House calls CIA and tells CIA to step up activities;³ August—Another call from the White House assigns highest priority to the problem. Binder asked me if I could provide more specific dates and details. I told him I was sure that I could not provide specifics but the scenario as described by him was not an indication of failure but a description of how the intelligence process should work.

b. Tuesday, 11 September. The group convened again in the White House Situation Room at 5:00 p.m. and spent literally the entire meeting going over in minute detail the questions and answers discussed above. David Mark was the recorder who promised to get the refined answers to everyone present by the next morning for a final review. Arnold Horelick had one copy of a rough chronology which I did not see and which was not discussed in the meeting: NOTE: David Binder called in at 4:25 just as I was leaving for the meeting to see if I was able to provide any information relative to his story. I told him I did not have any information and asked if he was writing for the next day. He said he was uncertain; that the White House had promised him answers—in his words, “Promised a big briefing tomorrow,” but that his uncertainty was caused by the suspicion that they were being sandbagged because the SSCI hearings on the subject began the next day (Wednesday).

c. Wednesday, 12 September: Meeting convened at 5:00. Binder had called me at 4:00 to ask again if I was able to provide answers he had requested. I told him I could not and asked if he was writing for the next day. He told me that he was because they could just not wait any longer. I reported this at the beginning of the meeting and Jerry Schecter left the meeting to call Binder to find out what was happening. He came back and confirmed that Binder was writing for Thursday.⁴ There seemed to be a general consensus that they were off the hook as far as briefing Binder and it was my perception that preparation of the chronology, while still important, was not quite so relevant. Arnold Horelick did a detailed critique of the Oberdorfer article of the previous Sunday verbally.⁵ All participants had a copy of the article. Following that the meeting degenerated into a very lengthy discussion about Secretary McNamara’s press conference of February 1963.⁶ People left one at a time and the meeting ended about 7:00.

Herbert E. Hetu

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 1: DCI Booklet—DCI Testimony on Cuba (II). Secret.
2. See footnote 6, Document 67.
3. See Document 57.
4. See David Binder, “Soviet Brigade: How the U.S. Traced It,” The New York Times, September 13, p. A16.
5. See Don Oberdorfer, “The ‛Brigada’: An Unwelcome Sighting in Cuba,” The Washington Post, September 9, p. A1)
6. McNamara held a press conference about Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba on February 6, 1963.