Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

74. Summary of Conclusions of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1979, 9:45–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• NSC Meeting on Soviet Ground Force Presence in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

• Defense

  • Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
  • Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor

• JCS

  • General Lew Allen, Jr., Chief of Staff of Air Force

• Central Intelligence Agency

  • Director Stansfield Turner

• The White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Lloyd Cutler, SALT Coordinator
  • Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President

• National Security Council

  • Colonel William E. Odom, USA, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The President convened the meeting of the National Security Council on Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba with opening remarks on the growing importance of the issue, its long-lasting impact on U.S.-Soviet relations, and on the American people’s attitude toward this Administration. He underscored that how we handle this issue will have enormous consequences on all three counts.

The first part of the meeting was devoted to a review of what our intelligence shows about the Soviet ground force presence in Cuba. It was reiterated that the Kennedy Administration told the Soviets in November 1962 that Soviet ground combat forces in Cuba were not acceptable. In February 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara asserted that the reduction of Soviet combat troops had reached the 4,000–6,000 level and that the combat equipment had been turned over to the Cubans. The level of Soviet troops dropped to the figure of about 2,000 in 1964 or 1965. There have been minor fluctuations since. For the remainder of the 1960s, our intelligence indicates that there was some joint Soviet-Cuban combat training. It is unclear whether or not such training continued into the early 1970s. Since 1976, however, the evidence strongly indicates that Soviet ground force units have engaged in exclusively Soviet combat training—without Cuban participation. Surveillance since 1976 indicates unmistakably that Soviet ground combat forces are stationed in Cuba and that they train exclusively as such. Although it is not clear when and how the change in training activity took place, it is clear that the nature of the Soviet ground force presence has changed since 1963 even if the number of Soviet troops has not changed significantly. It was also pointed out that there is some evidence of additional Soviet combat units beyond those we have confirmed at present. The intelligence community has low confidence in that evidence.

The President next asked Secretary Vance to report on his meetings with Dobrynin. The purpose of the meetings has been to ask the Soviets for additional information on their forces in Cuba. The last meeting was described as very stormy.² Dobrynin had to query Moscow for additional information before further discussions could take place. Word has been received from the Soviet Embassy this morning that he has a reply which he will deliver to Secretary Vance before the end of the day.

The President next asked Dr. Brzezinski for a summary of the Policy Review Committee discussion which took place immediately before it was turned into a National Security Council meeting.³ The PRC discussion focused on two points. First, it was assumed that Secretary Vance’s list of points for a proposal to the Soviets is adequate; the issue in that case was additional points that might be added for the purposes of negotiating tactics rather than any basic alteration in Vance’s proposal.⁴ Second, it was asked if the proposed list is indeed adequate. Two answers to this question emerged. The first accepted the proposal as an adequate response to what is seen as a political problem, not a military problem. The second answer judged the proposal inadequate as a full response to the Soviets. It runs the risk of being primarily cosmetic and impossible to verify. The very minimum successful outcome from a negotiation with the Soviets at this point is that some Soviet equipment be withdrawn from Cuba. Anything less will seriously damage the ratification possibilities for SALT. Other steps that might be added to Vance’s list include reinforcing the U.S. presence at the Guantanamo Naval Base, a “Carter Doctrine” for the hemisphere, and linking Soviet presence in Cuba to a broader international context of Soviet-Cuban military relations. These two answers were then rearticulated by their proponents.

The first answer was reaffirmed by the Vice President, Secretary Vance, and Lloyd Cutler. The thrust of their argument is that we deal now with the short-term problem of Soviet ground combat force presence in Cuba. We have described this presence as unacceptable. We should go to the Soviets with Vance’s proposal, seeking a cooperative Soviet response. If that fails, then we must change the unacceptable status quo in Cuba by our own unilateral actions. They would include first, a significant increase of our intelligence surveillance of Cuba and second, reinforcement with U.S. ground troops of our naval base in Guantanamo. Once that is done, we would be able to argue convincingly to the Senate that we have redressed the situation in Cuba and that we can proceed with SALT. In the event we cannot get a negotiated agreement with the Soviets, we will have to work closely with Senator Byrd and others on the Hill to learn what is acceptable as a firm U.S. response. The proponents of this position agreed that there may be broader geopolitical implications in the Soviet-Cuban military relationship which will require U.S. action outside of Cuba. A decision on such actions, however, is of enormous significance and should be debated and taken separately from the handling of this phase of dealing with the Soviets. It was suggested that we have already tilted excessively toward China in this regard.

The second answer was restated by Harold Brown and Brzezinski. They agreed that we need to go forward with Secretary Vance’s proposal to the Soviets, but we should add to the list a request for information about any additional Soviet combat units which we may not as yet have identified, and that we should include the option of separating the Soviet troops from their equipment in Cuba. This approach is most likely to fail, and if it does, we must not confine our response to Cuba alone. That limitation carries a number of dangers. First, it is a very weak response to Soviet “messing around in our backyard” which the public will see as nothing more than cosmetics and will not accept. Second, reinforcing our presence in Guantanamo runs the risk of merely legitimizing the Soviet combat ground force presence in Cuba, and perhaps provoking a Soviet reaction of increasing that presence. Third, it leaves wholly unaddressed the larger geo-strategic problem of the Soviet-Cuban military relationship in other parts of the world. Finally, the worst outcome for this Administration is it be caught somewhere between the two positions, with what is seen as a cosmetic solution and therefore picked apart not only by the public and the Congress, but also within the Democratic Party. A number of broader responses are essential, such as an increase in the Defense budget and an improvement of our Indian Ocean military presence. We need actions, not just more expressions of concern through demarches to the Soviet government. In fact, judging by the recent transfer of a patrol boat to Cuba, the Soviets are showing increasing disregard for our demarches.

The President turned the discussion to public and Congressional attitudes toward the problem. His talks with several Senators during his recent visit to Southern states after the hurricane have impressed him with a much stronger sense of public concern and demand for strong action than have discussions here in Washington with Senators Byrd and Nunn. Although Byrd, Goldwater, and Nunn have behaved responsibly on the issue while Senators Church and Stone have behaved irresponsibly, the American public is closer to Church and Stone. The American people are demanding action, and they will not give this Administration more than a couple of weeks to act. This assessment was shared by most of those present, but the Vice President, Vance, and Cutler expressed a preference to follow Senator Byrd’s lead rather than Senator Stone’s. They argued for actions in Cuba first before considering other steps.

In reviewing Vance’s proposed list for negotiations, the President expressed a desire that our negotiating list for the Soviets be one that we could make public to the Congress. He is dubious, therefore, about negotiating “bargaining chips” being added to Vance’s list. Several doubts were expressed about the advisability of announcing our list publicly. It was argued that we negotiate the list in secret and that we let our public position develop based on actions we have in fact taken.

After considering the various views and discussion, the President asked for the following action:

—Two points are to be added to Secretary Vance’s proposed list for negotiations with the Soviets. It must include a request for information about additional Soviet forces in Cuba, and it must include a proposal to separate Soviet troops from their equipment.

—If Dobrynin’s answer today is not acceptable, Secretary Vance is to ask for a meeting with Gromyko in the near future.⁵

—For the event that the Soviets reject our proposal, the following list of possible U.S. actions is to be reviewed and differentiated as to those against Cuba and those against the Soviet Union, given an appropriate sequence for execution, distinguished for those to be announced publicly and those to be merely carried out and, finally, assessed for their immediate and ultimate consequence for U.S.-Soviet relations:

1. Reinforce Guantanamo;

2. Increase the Defense budget;

3. Consider additional sales to China;

4. Highlight the Vice President’s recent visit and Harold Brown’s upcoming visit to China;

5. Increase intelligence capabilities;

6. Possibly alter the Clark amendment;⁶

7. Ask the Congress to reinstate registration for the military draft;

8. Renew SR–71 flights over Cuba;

9. Augment our military presence in the Indian Ocean;

10. Deny MFN to the Soviet Union;

11. Delay a SALT vote in the Senate; and

12. Announce a “Carter Doctrine” for the Caribbean.

A brief discussion followed on the advisability of renewing the SR–71 flights. Harold Brown and General Allen favored renewal as a strong gesture. The President was reluctant about renewal if it is only a gesture, not needed for intelligence purposes. It was also pointed out that we should not go forward with renewal without first making a strong case for the intelligence need and then considering the actions we will take on the remote chance that an SR–71 is shot down. Turner stated that there is no intelligence need for SR–71 flights. A final decision on renewal was not expressed by the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–022, 9/17/79, Soviets in Cuba. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On a covering memorandum from Brzezinski, Carter wrote, “Zbig, Poor drafting & not quite accurate—Go over with principals & resubmit. (No copies floating around).” The Summary of Conclusions printed here is the revised text.
2. Presumably the September 14 meeting; see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 223.
3. According to his memoirs, Brzezinski suggested that Carter attend the meeting, since the former found “the PRC under Vance’s chairmanship filled with his more dovish State Department associates” undesirable. (Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 349)
4. Vance’s proposal for negotiating topics suggested Soviet elimination of brigade headquarters, discontinuation of field exercises, and removal of combat equipment. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 57, NSC–022, 9/17/79, Soviets in Cuba) A list of additional measures to be taken against the Soviet Union is described in a draft proposal in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba, Soviet Brigade, 9/1–18/79.
5. When Vance met with Dobrynin later that day to receive the Soviet answer to the September 14 U.S. oral message, he informally and “off-the-record” raised possible negotiating topics. In a meeting with Dobrynin on September 20, he officially transmitted the suggested topics. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 224.
6. The Clark amendment to the Arms Export Control Act prohibited U.S. aid to private groups engaged in the fighting in Angola.