Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

94. Memorandum From the Former Ambassador to Bulgaria (Garthoff) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest)¹

Washington, December 28, 1979

SUBJECT

• Some Departing Observations on American Policy Toward Bulgaria and Eastern Europe

As I reflect on my recent service as Ambassador to Bulgaria,² I wish to offer several comments on our policy approach to Eastern Europe, and specifically to Bulgaria. While I believe our general objectives are sound, the guidance on specific policy implementation seems to me too constricting.

Policy Guidance

American policy toward the Communist countries of Eastern Europe has not changed basically for some years, and the gradual evolutionary change which has occurred has generated very little public (or, for that matter, internal governmental) debate—save for the brouhaha over the so-called “Sonnenfeldt doctrine” in 1976.

Some of us did consider that the policy established by the last Administration and codified in NSDM 212³ (May 2, 1973) was excessively rigid and constraining. “With regard to the Eastern European countries generally,” it stated, “progress in the economic area should be made contingent on satisfactory political conduct on international issues involving our interests and on a demonstrated willingness to solve outstanding bilateral political problems.” Progress on bilateral relations alone was not regarded as sufficient. But there was a further “chain” linkage:

The NSDM laid down a clear rank ordering of the Eastern European countries in the eyes of the US Government, irrespective both of “political conduct” and of resolution of bilateral problems by each country. For commercial agreements (recognized as the principal “carrot”), a set order of priority was prescribed: Romania, then Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, and then Bulgaria. (Settlement of the claims of American bondholders was also called for, and was the only specific prerequisite for MFN and Export-Import Bank loans.) Similarly, cultural and scientific exchange agreements (where not already established) were required to reflect the same rank order: Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, and only then Bulgaria.

NSC Presidential Directive 21, or PD–21, (September 13, 1977) under the present Administration, established “a new order” for our relations with countries of Eastern Europe. Rather than explicitly linking progress in bilateral economic and good relations to “satisfactory political conduct on international issues,” the new approach was keyed to the twin aims of enhancing international independence and increasing internal liberalization. “To that end,” the Directive read, “the United States will demonstrably (sic) show its preference for Eastern European countries that are either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent internationally.” In addition, a new order of priorities was set: The first group comprised Poland and Romania, with Hungary to be raised to that same level; as the second group: “Relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR will remain limited until there is demonstrated progress along one of the two dimensions mentioned above.” No “initiatives” would be taken toward these three, and any steps to improve relations with any of them “must tangibly and demonstrably advance specific US interests.” Also, finally, there were to be no “indications of willingness to grant MFN.”

The objectives of encouraging greater external independence and greater internal liberalization were newly articulated as basic policy, although they had for years underlain our policy toward the area. On the other hand, while no longer listing individual countries in set priority order, a distinction between the three for whom we would “demonstrably” show a “preference,” and the other three, was sharply drawn.

A quite different note was struck by Secretary Vance on January 7, 1978,⁴ when publicly asked: “Is there any difference between the policy of this Administration and the policy of the previous Administration towards the nations of Eastern Europe? And if there is a difference, would you care to elucidate it?” The Secretary replied: “The current Administration is seeking to improve its relationships with the countries of Eastern Europe. Each of us will have to approach this with our own national interests involved. I think that the best way to deal with these problems is to have face-to-face discussions where we can discuss the differences and the common interests. We shall pursue these on the basis of dealing on a case-by-case basis, country by country, on the various issues and common concerns which we have.”

The distinction in PD–21 has not officially been made public, although some news accounts have given its gist. Later public statements of American policy toward Eastern Europe have been consistent with PD–21, but have not disclosed its key elements either with respect to objectives or to differentiation between two categories of countries, favored and disfavored by the United States. These public statements have also been consistent with Secretary Vance’s rather different case-by-case approach. (The most comprehensive authoritative public statement of policy was the testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers on September 8, 1978, before the House International Relations Committee, distributed also as a State Department pamphlet, “Eastern Europe: An overview.” Also important was Assistant Secretary Vest’s statement before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East on July 12, 1979, which explicitly reaffirmed that the Luers statement “remains valid as a comprehensive account of U.S. policy and objectives toward the region.”)

The annual development, both by the posts and through Washington coordination among interested agencies, of “U.S. Goals and Objectives,” for the Ambassador to each country provides a useful opportunity for some clarifications of policy guidance, but only up to a point. Differences over the question of active promotion of MFN for Bulgaria, for example, led to this minimalist implementation guidance statement: “If Bulgaria requests, explain U.S. legislative requirements for MFN.”

The Foreign Service Inspection Report on The Conduct of Relations with the Countries of Eastern Europe (May 1979), based on an inspection of the operations of the EUR/EE Office in the Department and the diplomatic posts in Eastern Europe, concluded that: “While the strategy [of PD–21]⁵ is basically sound, it does appear to preclude U.S. Missions in Sofia and Prague from exploiting certain opportunities to pursue U.S. interests, and therefore should be reviewed.” The Department was advised to “seek amendments to the Directive if it now appears too restrictive.”

Policy Toward Bulgaria, 1977–1979

PD–21 was issued on the very day I flew from Washington to Sofia to assume my mission. I was not made aware of drafts while being briefed in Washington in July to September; I was aware of the general trend of the policy line from a discussion with Dr. Brzezinski (but not of the sharp division of countries into two groups nor of the confining language on MFN for Bulgaria).

In 1978, I was advised by STADIS message (State 179410 of July 15, 1978)⁶ of consideration of possible movement on the issue of MFN for Bulgaria, and replied (78 Sofia 2016, and with a series of “open” messages relevant to such a review, including 78 Sofia 2010, 2011 and 2012).⁷ Earlier I had reported active Bulgarian interest (78 Sofia 1228, 78 Sofia 1063 and 78 Sofia 1182).⁸ Consultations in the Department in September/October 1978, however, made clear to me that Washington did not deem the season appropriate to pursue the matter, despite Bulgarian interest and even possible responsiveness to legislative requirements. The Bulgarians understood this in part from my more cool attitude on the subject, and certainly after their own reconnaissance in the Tsvetkov-Gotsev consultations in Washington in November 1978.

Foreign Minister Mladenov personally made a pitch for overall improved relations, including their desire for MFN, in discussions with me before my return for consultations in June 1979 (79 Sofia 1185, 1187 and 1233).⁹ We were also given a broad hint that the Bulgarians had not yet consulted with Moscow on their desire to obtain MFN possibly even on the Hungarian model (79 Sofia 1233).

Since my return, the matter has again been raised by the Bulgarians in discussions in general with you, I understand, and in particular during Deputy Assistant Secretary Barry’s visit and the recent visit here of Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Ginev (State 319388).¹⁰

The Issue

The purpose of this review is simply to highlight what I see as a possible failure on our part to serve our own interests (and for that matter the aims of PD–21), owing to the effects of its confining strictures on our policy toward Bulgaria, above all against pursuing any line of action involving a grant of MFN. I am aware that other factors—especially attitudes on the Hill (or at least perceived attitudes), and the woeful tangle of policy implementation concerning MFN for China and the Soviet Union—may have counseled not raising the clearly secondary matter of our relations with Bulgaria.

Nonetheless, I believe there is a good case to be made for seeking to negotiate a trade agreement with Bulgaria involving MFN. First of all, there is literally no other way the U.S. could wean Bulgaria even a few degrees away from the USSR than to encourage her to take the Romanian/Hungarian path to MFN qualification. (And, on a more long-term calculation, by increasing trade we can reduce somewhat Bulgaria’s heavy economic dependence on the USSR.) As I have reported, Bulgarian relations with the Soviet Union, while destined to remain close, are not those of a puppet—and economic differences exist (79 Sofia 1244).¹¹

From the standpoint of “demonstrated progress” toward “relative” independence, we should not expect or, therefore, even try to effect any major change in Bulgaria’s relationship with the Soviet Union. (Again, see the analysis in 79 Sofia 1244). But neither have we seen such a move in the case of Hungary. In terms of the other criterion, relative internal liberalization, Bulgaria is not democratic or liberal, but it is less repressive than the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and probably Romania, and I would argue not really demonstrably less liberal than Hungary in many respects (see 79 Sofia 2379,¹² and the earlier cited series 78 Sofia 2010, 2011 and 2012). While Bulgaria has not proceeded as far in economic “reform” as has Hungary, the Bulgarians are moving—and are soliciting our advice (e.g., see 79 Sofia 0561 and 2377).¹³ Even in creeping affluence, Bulgaria has 6.1 automobiles for 100 population—nearly as many as Hungary’s 7.6 and more than Poland’s 4.5 or Romania’s 1.6. In art and music, there is a great freedom and accomplishment. The general standard of living is advancing, and compares favorably with Romania.

Bilateral Relations

Bulgaria has been working to improve its relations with the U.S. The Bulgarian leaders have also been making some effort to “earn” MFN. They have resolved favorably the vast majority of divided family cases—only some 14 currently remain (out of twice that number still unresolved only a few months ago). Moreover, they quietly and fully resolved the sensitive case on which we placed greatest emphasis over the past two years (Slavova). Their record on divided families is almost up to the Hungarians, and much better than the Romanians. They agreed on October 8, literally on the eve of my departure—a “going away” present, the Minister of Finance told me—finally settling on favorable terms the claims of private American bondholders, removing the last unresolved problem of this kind. Bulgaria is, incidentally, the first Eastern European country to resolve its foreign bondholders claims before a settlement involving extensive MFN. We have, operating satisfactorily, the whole panoply of normalized contacts and relations—a consular agreement (1975), a cultural exchange agreement (1977, renewed in 1979), reciprocal elimination of travel restrictions on accredited diplomats (1977), a scientific exchange agreement (1978), and an agricultural agreement (1979).

There are no obstacles in bilateral relations—no unsettled claims, no prisoners, no gold or crowns. (There are also no Jewish or other minorities discriminated against on emigration nor clamoring to leave.) There is no Congressional or public lobby opposed in particular to Bulgaria.

There are many aspects of Bulgarian internal and external policy which we find objectionable, but not necessarily more than for Poland, Romania, Hungary or China—or a number of non-communist countries to whom we accord nondiscriminatory MFN trade status.

There are other areas of bilateral and international Bulgarian cooperation worth noting. In interdiction of narcotics trafficking, for example, there is close U.S.-Bulgarian cooperation (unlike our situation with the USSR). Bulgaria apprehended, and returned to the Federal Republic, German radical terrorists (unlike Yugoslavia). Bulgaria has refrained from providing direct military or police assistance and advisors in Africa and the Middle East (unlike East Germany). Incidentally, I several times commented to Bulgarian leaders that it could not contribute to improving our bilateral relations if they were to embark on such programs; whether that had any effect I do not know.

Concluding Comment

MFN is the only real matter which I see prejudiced by PD–21—and the only area where I see opportunity for a useful American initiative to serve the purposes of PD–21. That is why I have dealt with it at such length. (I have larded the text with references, rather than repeat relevant information and arguments, in an effort to be brief.)

I hope you and the Secretary will find occasion to consider one way or another possible modification to the Directive or of its application.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bulgaria Desk, Personal Files of Retired Ambassador to Bulgaria, Raymond L. Garthoff (1960–1980), Lot 80D218, Box 1, Policy Toward Bulgaria 1978–80. Secret. The date is handwritten. Copies were sent to Nimetz, Barry, Schmidt, and Gilmore. Printed from Garthoff’s copy.
2. Former Ambassador Garthoff departed Bulgaria on October 9, 1978. He was replaced by Jack Perry on October 17.
3. NSDM 212 of May 2, 1973, outlined U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, creating a ranking among the Eastern European regimes. For the text of NSDM 212, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973–1976, Document 8.
4. Vance was in Budapest on January 7 to attend the ceremonies organized for the official return of the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary.
5. Brackets in the original.
6. In telegram 179410 to Sofia, July 15, 1978, the Department informed the Embassy that consideration was being given to negotiating a trade agreement, including possible MFN status, with Bulgaria. Despite the lack of a decision to do so, and with no timetable in mind for the negotiation, the Department suggested that the Embassy begin addressing certain questions that would need to be addressed in case negotiations were to begin. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780290–1284)
7. In telegram 2010 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, the Embassy addressed Bulgarian policies toward foreign travel by Bulgarian citizens, and the process of obtaining a passport and exit visa from the country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0752) In telegram 2011 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, the Embassy reported on the status of CSCE implementation in Bulgaria, describing it as unsatisfactory. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0870) In telegram 2012 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, the Embassy reported on the status of human rights and minorities in Bulgaria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780391–0867) In response to telegram 179410 (see footnote 6 above), the Embassy surmised in telegram 2016 from Sofia, September 25, 1978, that Bulgaria was interested in seeking MFN status in order to gain increased access to the U.S. market. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0104)
8. In telegram 1228 from Sofia, June 26, 1978, the Embassy reported on the discussions between David Morse, partner at Surrey, Karasik, Morse, and Seham law offices in New York, and Bulgarian officials. Morse was asked by the Bulgarian Government to prepare a memorandum on what Bulgaria would need to do to obtain MFN. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780265–0185) Telegram 1063 from Sofia, June 6, 1978, reported the discussions between Luers and Tzvetkov which also touched on the outlook for MFN for Bulgaria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780235–1063) In telegram 1182 from Sofia, June 20, 1978, the Embassy reported on the meeting between Luers and Bulgarian Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Ginev. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780257–0202)
9. See Document 91. In telegram 1185 from Sofia, May 25, the Embassy reported that, in his meeting with Garthoff on May 23, Mladenov made a strong pitch for MFN for Bulgaria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–0793) Telegram 1187 from Sofia, May 25, reported their discussion of international issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–0762)
10. In telegram 319388 to Sofia, December 11, Schmidt informed the Embassy of the results of Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Ginev’s visit to Washington, which focused on MFN and GATT. Schmidt suggested that the Bulgarians, while interested in MFN, were unwilling to take the initiative out of concern over Soviet reaction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790570–0651)
11. In telegram 1244 from Sofia, June 4, the Embassy noted that while the two countries were close, Bulgaria was not a Soviet puppet but rather a junior partner which saw its interests very closely related to its larger ally. The Embassy also stressed that there were instances in which the interests of the two countries diverged, and that the United States could use those opportunities to move Bulgaria toward a more balanced position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790252–0784)
12. In telegram 2379 from Sofia, October 1, the Embassy submitted its annual Country Report on Human Rights practices for Bulgaria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790449–0146)
13. In telegram 561 from Sofia, March 9, the Embassy reported that, in his address to the U.S.-Bulgarian Economic Council, Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov asserted that Bulgaria was embarking on a process of decentralization and modernization, and outlined the expectations of the Bulgarian Government for the economy over the next five years. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790112–0922) In telegram 2377 from Sofia, September 1, the Embassy reported Garthoff’s farewell call on Lukanov, in which the Deputy Prime Minister discussed Bulgarian foreign trade and economic outlook. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790448–1018)