93. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Meeting with Lyuben Gotsev (U)

Attached is the memcon of the meeting which Marshall and I had on Friday, October 26, 1979 with Lyuben Gotsev,2 Head of the North American Section of the Bulgarian MFA. As I suspected he would, Gotsev did raise the issue of a meeting between Lyudmila Zhivkova and the President and expressed disappointment that the President had not been able to see her. He also made a strong pitch for MFN, arguing that recent progress on family reunification and visas had removed any remaining obstacles to Sofia obtaining MFN. (C)

I had the impression from the meeting with Gotsev that the Bulgarians do genuinely desire an improvement in relations and that they feel that they have met us more than halfway with the recent resolution of the family reunification problems, etc.—a view shared by George Vest as a result of his recent trip to Sofia. (C)

[Page 270]

While granting Sofia MFN is clearly out of the question in the immediate future, we should give serious consideration to what else we might do to encourage Bulgaria’s interest in improved relations. Despite Bulgaria’s close ties to the Soviet Union, the prospects for some change over the long run may not be as dismal as often assumed. The rejuvenation in the Bulgarian leadership which has taken place since 1976 combined with a prolonged succession crisis in the Soviet Union could induce Bulgaria to pursue a moderately more flexible policy in areas where this does not fundamentally contradict Soviet interests. This was the case in 1964 at the time of Khrushchev’s ouster (when Bulgaria came close to normalizing relations with Bonn and took a number of other uncharacteristically independent initiatives in the Balkans) and it is not inconceivable that a similar development could occur in the immediate post-Brezhnev period. (C)

In short, while we should have no illusions about the degree of Bulgaria’s dependence on the Soviet Union, we should not write off Bulgaria entirely. We should do what we can to encourage Bulgaria to broaden its ties with the West and test Sofia’s willingness to improve relations with the United States (perhaps by including Bulgaria in a trip by a Cabinet official at some point). (C)

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation3

SUBJECT

  • Summary of Meeting with Lyuben Gotsev (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • Marshall Brement
  • Stephen Larrabee
  • Lyuben Gotsev, Head, North American Section, Bulgarian MFA
  • Krassin Himmirsky, First Secretary, Bulgarian Embassy
  • Elena Bobtodorova, Interpreter

Gotsev opened the meeting by stating he wished to concentrate on bilateral relations. He proceeded to review the state of US-Bulgarian relations, pointing to progress in the resolution of 20 of the 35 pending family reunification cases in the last several months and progress in [Page 271] visa applications. He stated that the meeting between Foreign Minister Mladenov and Ambassador Garthoff in May was an important indication of Bulgarian’s interest in improving relations with the United States.4 Assistant Secretary Vest’s visit this week had also contributed to the improvement of relations.5 Bulgaria wanted to see this process strengthened, but it often had the impression that the United States was not really interested in such a development. (C)

Gotsev then made a strong pitch for MFN, arguing that with the recent resolution of many family reunification cases there were no longer any meaningful obstacles to Bulgaria receiving MFN. He asked how we saw the prospects for Bulgaria receiving MFN. (C)

Gotsev also pointed to the current visit to the US of Lyudmila Zhivkova, daughter of Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov and a member of the Politburo, as an indication of Bulgaria’s interest in improving relations. Mme. Zhivkova had met with Secretary Vance at the UNGA in New York and had met with Secretary Harris, Mrs. Mondale, and John Reinhardt in Washington.6 He regretted, however, that Mme. Zhivkova had been unable to be received by the President despite the many attempts by the Bulgarian Government to get an appointment. (C)

In response, Messrs. Brement and Larrabee stated that Foreign Minister Mladenov’s meeting with Ambassador Garthoff and the progress in the resolution of family reunification cases had been duly noted in Washington. We were encouraged by this trend and hoped it would continue. As to a meeting between Zhivkova and the President, we pointed out that the President was extremely busy; that he normally met only Heads of State, even of our closest allies; that October was the busiest month of the year for him; and that the request had come at the last moment. Under such conditions, it was hardly realistic to expect that it would be granted. Moreover, there had only recently been a slight improvement in relations. Before a meeting with the President could be realistically considered, relations would have to develop further. We stressed that the US would like to see a positive development of relations, but that this would depend upon concrete [Page 272] steps that the Bulgarian Government was willing to undertake in the coming months and years. (C)

On MFN Messrs. Brement and Larrabee pointed to the fact that there were certain legislative requirements which had to be met in order for Bulgaria to qualify for MFN. In our view, all possibilities had not been exhausted within the existing framework. However, we were prepared to discuss with Bulgaria what requirements would have to be met in order to qualify for MFN. (C)

Returning to the question of bilateral relations, Gotzev noted the apparent US lack of interest in improving relations with Bulgaria. In his view the Bulgarians had been forthcoming on issues of concern to the US, but the US seemed to be making a change in its policy conditional on a change in Bulgaria’s relations with the Soviet Union. The US should recognize that these ties were deep and long-standing, and he argued that we should not make a disruption or cessation of these prerequisites for an improvement of US-Bulgarian bilateral relations. Bulgaria was an independent country and US-Bulgarian relations should stand on their own merits. Concluding, he noted that Secretary Vance would be visiting Yugoslavia and Romania in December and expressed the hope that Bulgaria could be included in his travel plans in the near future.7 (C)

In response, Messrs. Brement and Larrabee said that the US recognized Bulgaria’s strong ties with the Soviet Union and that we did not make a cessation of these ties a prerequisite for improved relations with the United States. Our main concern was that the Bulgarians pursue a policy which accorded with their own national interests. This did not mean that we expected Bulgaria to break all ties with the Soviet Union. We understood that these ties were deep and long-standing. Nonetheless, we hoped that there could be more common ground on a number of issues between our two countries in the future and that if this occurred, it would have a positive effect on bilateral relations. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security File, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Bulgaria: 1/77–1/81. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Brement, Blackwill, Rentschler, and Griffith. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Let’s explore a single initiative as a test. ZB.”
  2. Brzezinski had approved the meeting with Gotsev on October 24.
  3. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brement’s office.
  4. For Garthoff’s meeting with Mladenov, and his subsequent discussion with Gotsev, see Document 91.
  5. Vest’s travel was reported in telegram 2682 from Sofia, October 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy File, D790511–0120)
  6. See Document 92. No records of Mrs. Zhivkova’s meetings with Secretary Harris, Mrs. Mondale, and USICA Director Reinhardt were found. In a memorandum to Brzezinski dated October 6, Tarnoff recommended that Joan Mondale meet Zhivkova at the White House since it would be viewed in Sofia as “another favorable response to its recent moves to improve relations with us.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 6, Bulgaria: 1/77–1/81) The NSC forwarded the memorandum with its concurrence to Denis Clift on October 9. (Ibid.)
  7. Vance was scheduled to visit Bucharest and Belgrade in mid-December 1979. The trip was canceled at the last minute, however, due to the developing Iran hostage crisis.