Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

122. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1978, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• US–GDR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• GDR

  • Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer
  • Ambassador Rolf Sieber
  • Ambassador Harald Rose, MFA
  • Manfred Niklas, MFA
  • Paul Ringleb (interpreter)

• US

  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary George Vest
  • William M. Woessner, Director, EUR/CE
  • Victor Gray, EUR/CE (notetaker)
  • Harry Obst (interpreter)

After initial pleasantries concerning the Dresden exhibit,² the Secretary raised the subject of the consular convention, saying that without progress in this area, meaningful progress in our general relations would be very difficult. He reminded Fischer that, when the two last met in September, he (the Secretary) had proposed separate statements on the nationality question and was now puzzled by the lack of progress, given Fischer’s agreement to that proposal.³ Fischer replied that he too was puzzled. Separate statements were indeed a good idea but should not present the other party with a problem it could not digest. Fischer said that he had understood in September that each party would address its own problem. He had also understood that the U.S. had no treaties with other countries containing nationality clauses. Since then, he said, he had learned that the U.S. had such treaties with the U.K. and Japan. He then produced a text, which, he said, was based on the language in those treaties, saying that it was “a compromise but acceptable.” Fischer hoped that the Secretary would also find this text acceptable and said it was a propitious date for reaching a solution on this issue, since it was the anniversary of the UK–GDR consular convention. The “compromise,” he said, would involve the GDR’s acknowledging that the U.S. maintains its position on nationality. (Comment: A later reading of the “compromise” text indicated that Fischer meant here U.S. nationality not German nationality.) “We would not,” he said, “want to hurt your ally and we would not want to be embarrassed ourselves.” The Secretary said that he would study the proposal “promptly” and would provide the GDR with an answer “before he left next week.”

Turning to Africa, the Secretary said he had noticed in the press that GDR Minister of Defense Hoffmann had recently visited Africa. He asked Fischer for his views of developments in Zaire. Fischer said that Hoffmann’s visit and the events in Zaire were two different things having nothing to do with each other. He noted that the events in Zaire had started while he (Fischer) was in Belgium. He had received many questions there about whether there were GDR troops in Zaire. It was obvious, he said, that he would not have wanted to have his official visit to Brussels harmed by having troops in Zaire at the same time. Fischer said that he “assumed” that the Secretary receives his information not only from the press and added that events in Zaire are “an internal affair in which the GDR is not involved.” Nobody from outside, he said, should be involved in Zaire. “That goes for us and for others.” Claiming that he could not tell the Secretary what is happening, he repeated that, if there is trouble in Zaire, it is internal. External activities can only hurt. He reminded the Secretary that GDR has no official relations with Zaire but that that fact is not related to recent events. The Secretary then referred specifically to reports that the GDR was involved with the training of Katangan Gendarmes who had invaded Shaba. Fischer responded with: “These reports will not gain truth by their being repeated.” “We have trained nobody and will not,” he added. “In general,” he said, “we have been concentrating on economic assistance and the training of cadres in the economic and education areas.” This he said “applies to all of Africa and to other third world countries.” “You may, he concluded, “take that as authentic.”

With regard to CSCE and human rights, the Secretary said that he was pleased with recent progress concerning divided families. We hoped, he said, that this progress will carry over to other cases, specifically those of the Wilhelmi family and Gundrun Koch. The Secretary also said that he would welcome consultation that would lead to progress and less acrimony. He proposed, therefore, that Assistant Secretary Derian meet with her counterpart in the GDR. In this regard, the Secretary noted that Derian would soon be in Europe and that such a meeting would be helpful. Fischer said that he had absolutely nothing against such a meeting and was, in fact, for it. Fischer allowed that he was not a consular officer and was only interested in divided family cases to the extent they cause “problems.” So far, he said, these cases had “lacked sufficient mass” to attract his attention. His consular officers are addressing and solving these cases and, he added, “work on the basis of binding political decisions.” In closing, Fischer noted that the Secretary had raised only two names.

Returning to the consular convention Fischer said that he is against linkages that “bind our legs so that we can not walk.” He was mentioning this, he said, in relation to the consular convention, since, if we were linking problems, he would hope that the Secretary would carefully examine his “compromise” proposal on this problem. Saying that he owed it to himself and to the Secretary, he added that he had the feeling that their talk in September had not been understood by their staffs. He had, he said, left in September with the feeling that they had “found a solution that would not involve one party expecting the other party to do something it could not do.” That solution, which he termed “a face saving solution,” would have involved both sides doing what was “feasible.” Unfortunately, he said, things had then broken down. The Secretary said that he, too, had thought they had a solution, according to which each side would state its position on nationality. He hoped that, after examining Fischer’s compromise proposal, we would put “this matter aside once and for all,” to which Fischer replied: “We are not treading on your feet, please don’t tread on ours.”

In response to the Secretary’s question as to whether he had any other issues to raise, Fischer brought up the matter of a cultural agreement. In the cultural area, he said, we have a “vivid exchange.” He asked why this could not be carried forward on a “contractual basis.”

The volume of our trade compared to our overall relations, Fischer said, is almost negligible. In the trade area, he claimed, there were lost opportunities. Foreign Trade State Secretary Beil, he said, had confirmed to him there are great opportunities not only in grain sales but in general. There were, however, some barriers, namely MFN, credits and the GDR’s fishing quota. That quota Fischer noted was “zero point zero.” Removal of such barriers and expansion of trade would have good effects on our bilateral relations and in the European context. We had to consider, he concluded, not only our bilateral relations but the “radiance” of those relations in Europe where we have “greater responsibilities than normal.” “Frankly,” Fischer said, “you could get along without relations with us and so could we. But that would be irresponsible because of the impact on the European climate.” “I have tried to be as precise as possible,” Fischer concluded, “perhaps a bit brutal but nevertheless realistic.” The Secretary responded that we, too, believe in realities and realize that our relations can have a positive or negative effect on Europe. We hope, he said, that that effect will be positive, since we favor detente. We realize, he said, that we have differences but we should seek more common ground in the future.

Fischer then said that he wanted to raise two additional economic items. To be in a better position to realize the trade opportunities about which he had just spoken, Fischer said that the GDR needed a trade post in New York. Beil, he said, had left the U.S. with that very strong impression. Fischer then asked about the possibility of long-term multiple-entry visas for business and commercial travelers. At the Secretary’s request, Assistant Secretary Vest informed Fischer that the question of trade offices had been under review for some time.⁴ At the moment, he said, we were not in a position to allow the opening of new offices, since our general relations have “not sufficiently developed.” Vest then told Fischer that we had recently begun the process which would lead to the granting of six-month multiple-entry visas to GDR business travelers. Fischer asked if that process might be carried out faster.

Concluding their conversation, the Secretary said that it had been useful to talk directly. He said he would again examine Fischer’s proposed text and review the other matters raised by him. He also said that he looked forward to Assistant Secretary Derian’s visit to Berlin.⁵ Fischer told the Secretary that he proposed to characterize US/GDR relations to the press as “normal but capable of development.” The Secretary did not disagree.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1967–1985, Lot 92D404, Box 8, GDR–US (Political) 1977–1978. Confidential. Drafted by Gray on June 8; cleared by Vest and Woessner; approved by Anderson on June 16. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.
2. Fischer was in New York for the UN Special Session on Disarmament and traveled to Washington to meet with Vance. On June 1, the Smithsonian’s National Gallery opened an exhibit entitled “The Splendor of Dresden: Five Centuries of Art Collecting.” (Telegram 3590 from East Berlin, May 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223–0261)
3. See Document 119.
4. The idea of the East German Government opening a trade bureau in New York was brought up during Beil’s visit to Washington. Cooper told Beil that the United States was unwilling to consider allowing the German Democratic Republic to open an official trade representation without an agreement on the Consular Convention. However, the Department was willing to consider allowing East German companies to open trade offices. (Telegram 140489 to East Berlin, June 16, 1977; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770215–1088)
5. See Document 123.