Office of the Historian

370. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Raphel) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, October 24, 1979

[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]

1. [8 lines not declassified]

2. [less than 1 line not declassified] assessment was also misleading in two important ways:

—He contends that real progress in our relationship depends upon Pakistani acceptance of full-scope safeguards. This is not true, and [less than 1 line not declassified] seems either to be intentionally misreporting to Zia, or has misread our position;

—[less than 1 line not declassified] believes that even if the nuclear issue were behind us, our economic aid to Pakistan would not increase beyond 40–45 million a year, and our military sales would not go beyond what Lucy2 offered last year (in other words, we would not sell F–16s, or any other advanced or major sophisticated weaponry).3

We should look for ways to ensure that the Pakistanis understand clearly;

a. that we are not asking for acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a prerequisite in order to resume a normal relationship, and

b. that the advantages to be gained by such normalization probably go beyond $40 million in aid a year and F–5 sales.

  1. Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 3, Chron 1979. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Christopher. Printed from an uninitialed copy.↩
  2. Lucy Benson.↩
  3. See footnote 4, Document 312.↩