369. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

4544. Dept pass the Secretary Immediate. Subj: Transmission of Letter From Pakistan Adviser for Foreign Affairs.

1. (S–Entire text.)

2. Following is text of letter received this afternoon (10/22/79) from Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Adviser for Foreign Affairs. He had hoped to see you personally or to speak to you, but I told him that you were away from Washington and that classified telephone transmission was difficult, if not impossible.

3. Text follows, quote:

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Before returning to Pakistan today, I would like to say how greatly we valued your participation and unflagging interest in the two days of intensive discussions between our two delegations in Washington last week.2 It is gratifying that in regard to the nuclear issue which became the prime topic of the talks, you expressed to me in our private session3 your readiness to explore how our dialogue on this issue may continue.

I venture to hope that my assurances to you on the non-manufacture of nuclear weapons and non-transfer of sophisticated nuclear technology, have allayed the non-proliferation concerns of your government. In regard to the explosion of a nuclear device, I stated during our discussions that Pakistan was nowhere near the attainment of explosion capability and that the present Government of Pakistan would not test a nuclear device. I also said that a decision in this regard would have to be taken by a future government which, in doing so, will no doubt take into account all the relevant circumstances, including the international political climate, regional repercussions and other factors.

I would like to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that President Zia-ul-Haq is fully in accord with President Carter’s non-proliferation concerns and attaches the greatest importance to the maintenance and further strengthening of US-Pakistan relations.

[Page 852]

It is our profound hope that the continuation of the dialogue between our two sides would, in the months ahead, lead us towards a solution which would set your apprehensions at rest and at the same time would be acceptable to Pakistani political and public opinion. We were gratified that in his summing up statement, Mr. Newsom appreciated this difficulty which the Government of Pakistan faces.

In our private talks, you were kind enough to ask me how I thought we might fruitfully explore a solution of the divisive issue which confronts us. Let me assure you that we will address ourselves most earnestly to this formidable challenge.

We would be in the best position to continue our efforts in this direction if the talks between our two sides on this highly sensitive issue remain confidential until a solution is found. Revelations such as Don Oberdorfer’s unfortunate remarks in the Washington Post of October 20, suggesting that an atomic test by Pakistan was likely within a period of six months to a year, which I take this opportunity to categorically contradict, can cause avoidable complications.4 I have thought it necessary to issue a reply in the hope of removing any misapprehensions that may have been aroused. What I said in our private discussion about the relevance of the postponement of elections in Pakistan and the consequent prolongation of life of the present government, to the question of explosion, in no way implied that it might be carried out between six months to a year.

In conclusion I would like to express our deep satisfaction at the convergence of views and shared concern over the threat from Afghanistan and at your assurance that the United States is ready to hold consultations under the agreement of 1959 in regard to the specific nature of the support that the US would extend to Pakistan in the contingencies that may arise.

It is very reassuring for me to know that you found our talks most useful and that you have agreed to remain in close touch with us in regard to our security concerns in the immediate future and for the long term.

With highest regards, sincerely, signed Agha Shahi, Adviser for Foreign Affairs. End quote.

McHenry
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137–2326, N790008–0279. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
  2. See Document 368.
  3. See Document 366.
  4. See Don Oberdorfer, “Effort to Block Pakistan From A-Bomb Faltering,” Washington Post, October 20, 1979, p. A3.