Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, October 20, 1979, 1713Z

274950. Subject: US-Pak Discussions, October 16–17: Overview and Nuclear Issue. Ref: State 270484.²

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. Summary: There was no breakthrough on the nuclear issue during two days of discussions in Washington with a Pakistani delegation headed by Agha Shahi, but both sides agreed to continue the dialogue. Shahi said his government had not yet made a decision on the goal of its nuclear program, but was at pains to indicate that a test was not imminent. He probed unsuccessfully for flexibility in U.S. willingness to resume economic assistance and military sales in the absence of progress on the nuclear issue. Discussion of the relevance of the 1959 bilateral agreement in the present situation covered septel.³ The first day of talks was largely devoted to discussion of regional issues and Pakistani security concerns. These issues are also reported separately.⁴ End summary.

3. The US and Pakistani delegations spent over seven hours in formal discussions at the State Department October 16 and 17. The Pakistani delegation included Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Lt. General Ghulam Jilani Khan, Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Dr. Munir Khan, UN PermRep Niaz Naik, and others. Secretary Vance attended all the sessions (with some interruptions); he also hosted a luncheon the first day and held a private bilateral meeting with Agha Shahi at the conclusion of the talks.⁵ The US delegation included Deputy Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary Newsom, Under Secretary Benson, Ambassador Hummel, Ambassador Gerard Smith, Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretaries Saunders and Pickering, and others.

4. The Secretary opened the talks with a welcoming statement (reftel) and Agha Shahi gave a less formal reply. The remainder of the first day was devoted largely to a discussion of the geopolitical situation in the region and Pakistani security concerns (septel).⁶ The second day Deputy Secretary Christopher led a discussion of the nuclear question.

5. Setting the stage: The principal themes developed by the US side were set out in the Secretary’s opening statement and Under Secretary Newsom’s initial presentation on the US strategic overview. These were:

(1) The US has important interests in the area, including countering Soviet expansionism, and is determined to defend those interests;

(2) The US values its ties with Pakistan, is concerned about growing threats to Pakistani security, and wishes to find a way to restore full cooperation;

(3) The spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states affects vital US interests;

(4) Pakistan’s nuclear programs are a threat to regional stability and Pakistan’s own security; the two issues of Pakistani security and its nuclear activities cannot be separated.

The US strategy was to demonstrate that Pakistani security required a mix of measures including economic and political strength at home, an adequate military defense and a diplomatic posture to minimize threats from abroad and maximize support for Pakistan from outside the region. We argued that Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons option ran counter to such a balanced approach, particularly since it limited the degree to which the US and other friends could assist Pakistan.

6. The Pakistanis developed the following basic themes:

(1) The Soviet Union was aggressively expanding its influence throughout Asia and Africa, and public opinion in the region increasingly perceived the Soviet Union as able and willing to support effectively leftist movements and friendly regimes, while the US was perceived as disinterested and ineffective.

(2) The Soviet Union was consolidating its hold on Afghanistan; a reorganized and reequipped Afghan Army would face the insurgents in the spring; assuming the present Marxist regime consolidated its position in two or three years it would be ready to turn its attention to Pakistan; measures had to be taken now to strengthen Pakistan’s ability to meet this inevitable threat.

(3) Pakistan had not yet decided whether to pursue present nuclear programs to the point of development of a nuclear device, and therefore there was no real urgency to the problem; strong Pakistani public opinion had to be taken into account, and the present military government was particularly vulnerable to the charge that it might sell out to the Americans on the nuclear question.

7. Christopher presentation: Leading off the second day’s discussion on the nuclear issue, the Deputy Secretary reiterated that the nuclear problem could not be separated from other aspects of our overall relationship. He said our interest in this issue reflected a very deep and fundamental concern in our body politic. He cited the President’s personal commitment to nonproliferation and congressional legislation in this regard. Recalling past US-Pak discussions regarding our objections to the scale and nature of Pakistani programs, Christopher concluded that these programs will result in a substantial increase in the threat to Pakistan and our own interests in the area. He discussed potential Indian and Soviet reactions, noting that Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear explosive capability would tend to engage basic Soviet interests in a manner the Soviets would probably attempt to exploit to their own advantage. At the same time the ability of the US and others to counter Soviet influence would be constrained. He said we also were concerned that these activities raised a serious risk of conflict with India.

If Pakistan achieved an explosive capability or exploded a device, India would almost certainly resume its nuclear explosives program and pressures would develop within India to take even more forceful actions against Pakistan. Christopher stressed that the US would not condone any such action.

8. Christopher concluded that we believed Pakistan’s best interests would be served by following a course which would not even suggest it was pursuing a nuclear explosive capability. This would mean that nuclear programs should be consistent with real nuclear energy needs, which today they are not. As a first step he suggested a declaration that Pakistan would not develop or explode any nuclear explosive device nor engage in any transfers to other countries of weapons-usable material or sensitive equipment or technology, such as that connected with enrichment or reprocessing. Such a first step, he continued, would provide a framework for US and other friends of Pakistan to meet Pakistan’s security needs in parallel with changes in its current nuclear program. It would also provide a framework for wider cooperation in peaceful nuclear development. He warned, however, that if Pakistan explodes a device the basic relationship between us would suffer a drastic change. He indicated our understanding of Pakistan’s political problems and offered to try to find ways to help Pakistan deal with them.

9. Shahi’s response: In reply, Agha Shahi cast Pakistan as the aggrieved party whose credibility had unfairly been called into question. He described at some length the safeguards Pakistan had agreed to for the reprocessing plant to be supplied by France. These “iron-clad” safeguards were unprecedented and Pakistan had even been prepared to place its plutonium in an international plutonium reserve. The US, he complained, had applied the provisions of the Glenn Amendment retroactively. Pakistan would understand a US policy of limiting the transfer of sensitive technology to other countries, but we had gone beyond this to oppose even indigenous acquisition (an apparent reference to the enrichment facility). Pakistan’s enrichment capability, he said, is being developed on the basis of self-reliance, “apart from some parts or equipment”. Shahi said Pakistan wanted to exploit its own uranium reserves, and he didn’t understand what we meant in our references to a “relatively large” enrichment program. Pakistan had planned for light water reactors, but construction of these had been postponed because of resource constraints.

10. Former Prime Minister Bhutto had made himself a symbol as the defender of Pakistan’s vital interests on the nuclear issue and many believed he came to grief only because of his refusal to give in to the US. Thus the nuclear issue had become a central political issue in Pakistan and political leaders were united in a policy of resisting outside pressure. The military government which overthrew Bhutto was in a particularly difficult position. It had on a number of occasions considered US requests regarding nuclear policy, but had hoped the issue could be handed over to an elected government. Now elections had again been postponed,⁷ and the government was “squarely faced with this challenge”.

11. Shahi pointed to various Pakistani initiatives over the years which demonstrated Pakistan’s commitment to nonproliferation. He said Pakistan was convinced India was manufacturing nuclear weapons—indeed already had some on the shelf—and was only waiting for a pretext such as a Pakistani explosion to go public. China was also convinced of this. Pakistan did not wish to say this publicly since it would only cause bilateral problems. Pakistanis were not “madmen”, and recognized that, if there were a nuclear arms race, there would be no possibility of Pakistan catching up with India.

12. Assurances: Shahi then turned to what he called the US’s “three demands”: no weapons, no transfer, and no explosion. Pakistan had already met the first demand in undertaking, in letters to President Carter and Prime Minister Desai and Charan Singh, not to manufacture or develop nuclear weapons. Regarding the issue of no-transfer, Shahi quoted from Pakistan’s April 24, 1978 aide memoire provided to Ambassador Hummel.⁸ In the third paragraph of this document Pakistan said it would “neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons, nor assist other nations in doing so”. He concluded that Pakistan therefore had met two of our three “demands”.

13. On the question of a no-test assurance, Shahi said the Pakistan Government had given great thought to this matter. There had been “wild speculation” that President Zia would explode a device this fall to permit him to postpone elections. There would be no such explosion since Pakistan was not near the stage where it could conduct one. Pakistan had listened to the arguments against such an explosion, but this decision would be one for the government at the time when Pakistan was nearer the capability. That government would have to take into account its relations with the US, international opinion, and the possible reaction of India. This government had not taken the decision to conduct an explosion. It was an academic question. At this point Shahi said he did not have the authority to give this assurance (no-test), but it could be discussed when the time was appropriate. Pakistan had respect for our nonproliferation concerns and the policies of President Carter. The GOP intended to act as a responsible government and was doing its best to reassure India and to avoid the dire consequences the US feared. Thus, he concluded US concerns were unwarranted.

14. The Secretary commented that Shahi had seemed to be saying that Pakistan would continue to develop the capability to conduct an explosion but would not make the decision until it was nearer this goal. Shahi replied that no decision had been taken to develop this capability. The goal of Pakistan’s nuclear program remains to be determined. It should not be assumed, he said, that Pakistan would develop this capability. This is an “open question”. In a digression, Shahi described Pakistani efforts to make some bilateral arrangements with India. He concluded that the effort to “bring India into line” was Pakistan’s “principal preoccupation”.

15. Christopher asked if the previous day’s announcement regarding postponement of elections would affect the Pakistani position that this was not a decision to be taken by the present military government. Shahi replied that he personally did not believe that the question of an explosion would arise for a decision “during the tenure of this present government”.

16. No-transfer: Christopher asked for a clarification of the no-transfer assurance contained in the April aide memoire. He pointed out that the kind of statement which would be most reassuring to the world would be one to the effect that Pakistan would not transfer to others sensitive technology or equipment which could provide the capability for development of nuclear weapons. Shahi replied that he thought Pakistan’s previous assurance covered our concerns but, if we wanted it to be spelled out, they would certainly examine the question.

17. Ambiguity in Pak intentions: Christopher asked what purpose was served by Pakistan’s maintaining the ambiguity with respect to its intentions. Among the disadvantages, he added, was the fact that it would not be feasible for us or others to cooperate with Pakistan in the area of nuclear power generation as long as the ambiguity remained. In reply Shahi commented at length on the alleged discriminatory features of US policy, both as regards our reaction to the Indian explosion and to our alleged indifference to the research and development programs of many other countries in the enrichment and reprocessing fields. Shahi argued that the ambiguity in Pakistan’s program is inherent in the technology of enrichment, since the technology could be used for various purposes. Christopher replied that the ambiguity was not inherent in a program of the size and shape of that which Pakistan was pursuing.

18. Amb. Smith introduced the argument that Pakistan’s timing in constructing sensitive facilities before even placing an order for a light water reactor was “very curious”—even preposterous. Shahi countered that the elements of the Pakistani program had been synchronized in the planning stage, but because of lack of resources Pakistan had been unable to acquire a reactor and its program had become “incoherent and disjointed”. Smith also argued that, should Pakistan explode a device, there would be a great tendency for international commerce in the nuclear field to dry up, which would be contrary to what both Pakistan and the US wanted in regard to nuclear commerce.

19. Discrimination: In reply to Shahi’s repeated charge of discrimination, Christopher recounted the growth of concern about proliferation in this country and development of nonproliferation policy following the Indian explosion in 1974. He said we had not singled out Pakistan, but the facts had singled out Pakistan. We were prepared to work with Pakistan to help it meet legitimate energy needs if the ambiguities regarding Pakistan’s program could be removed. He added that if Pakistan’s enrichment program really were designed to meet these needs, we were willing to work with Pakistan to develop the necessary safeguards and limitations.

20. Shahi’s final pitch was that he hoped that the nuclear issue would not be the sole determinant of US policy toward Pakistan. As a result of these discussions, he hoped there would be some change of attitude and a relaxation of our policies toward Pakistan, particularly because of the geopolitical situation in the region. This situation, he added, had far greater significance than Pakistan’s peaceful research and development program. Christopher replied that a meeting of this length always resulted in some reappraisal, but he would be misleading the Pakistan delegation if he indicated anything other than the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear program would continue to stand as a very tall impediment to our doing the things for Pakistan we would otherwise want to do.

21. In summing up at the concluding session, Newsom stressed our appreciation for the candor of our exchanges and our hope to continue the dialogue. We were very sympathetic to Pakistan’s energy needs, and understood the problem of Pakistani public opinion. While noting our position on premature reprocessing and enrichment, Newsom said we would be willing to talk further, possibly at the expert level, in the context of assisting Pakistan in developing a power reactor program. It would have to be clear, however, that an explosion of a nuclear device was ruled out and the problem of Pakistan’s development of sensitive facilities would have to be resolved. For his part, Shahi said he would be returning home somewhat disappointed. He said he had nothing hopeful to report regarding our bilateral relations and the US approach to assistance. Nonetheless, he echoed our satisfaction that the discussions had been unusually frank and that we had gained a better appreciation of each other’s positions. He also said we should continue the dialogue begun with these talks, with particular reference to the 1959 agreement (see septel).

22. This is a summary report for the information of the addressee posts only. Addressee posts should not repeat not utilize this report in conversations with host governments. We are briefing appropriate Embassies in Washington and will inform you when these briefings have taken place.

Christopher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2050, N790008–0225. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Beijing, Bonn, London, Moscow, New Delhi, and Paris. Drafted by Peck; cleared in S/S and by Constable, Gerard Smith, and Coon; approved by Newsom.
2. Telegram 270484 to Islamabad, October 16, transmitted the text of Vance’s opening statement made on October 16 at the U.S.-Pakistani talks in Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0771)
3. In telegram 277952 to Islamabad, October 25, the Department reported the discussion of the 1959 bilateral agreement: “In reply to a direct question from Shahi the Secretary stated forcefully that the agreement was not linked to any other issue and that it stands on its own. The Secretary stressed that in the event of aggresion from Afghanistan against Pakistan the United States would consider the agreement to be relevant and that we would be prepared to consult immediately with Pakistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0815)
4. In telegram 277901 to Islamabad, October 24, the Embassy reported on the October 16 U.S.-Pakistani bilateral discussions on regional issues. Both sides agreed on the danger posed by the situation in Afghanistan. The Pakistanis “were fairly relaxed about the state of the current relations with India, but still consider India to be Pakistan’s principal long-range security threat. On Iran, Shahi emphasized the importance of establishing a personal equation with Khomeini and indicated that Pakistan was trying to save the RCD in the face of Iranian opposition. The US strongly reaffirmed its support for Pakistani security, but we indicated that our ability to express this support in practical terms would remain constrained as long as our differences over the nuclear issue were unresolved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790488–1023)
5. See Document 366.
6. See footnote 4 above.
7. See Document 367.
8. Reference is to the aide-mémoire of April 24, 1979, which Shahnawaz gave to Hummel in their April 25 meeting. See footnote 2, Document 341.