367. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
11814. Dept also for NEA Ambassador Hummel. Subject: Charge’s Meeting With President Zia. Refs: (A) Islamabad 11788;2 (B) State 270293;3 (C) Islamabad 11813.4
1. (S–Entire text).
2. Flash precedence being used to assure distribution prior to commencement of final day of US/Pakistani bilateral talks.
3. President Zia opened meeting by saying that he wanted US Government to have his personal explanation of why he had felt it necessary to postpone elections and ban political activity. He had been completely sincere in setting November 17 date for elections many months ago. He had wished to allow orderly evolution of electoral process, whereas practice in Pakistan had usually been to call elections on shortest possible notice. Despite this he had not been able to achieve satisfactory conditions for holding elections. Country’s largest party, Bhutto’s PPP, had disqualified itself by refusing to comply with constitutionally based order requiring submission of financial statement. It had seemed that Pakistan National Alliance would contest election, but after a great deal of vacillation its leadership had finally left itself in a position where it had not met legal requirements. Consequently, the only parties which in the end were qualified to contest election were so insignificant that there was no possibility of setting up a representative and effective government based on elections held at this time.
4. Zia said that he had forwarned Ambassador Hummel recently that things were not progressing well and that he was doubtful that [Page 843] elections could be held as scheduled.5 This had turned out to be the case, and he had decided that under the circumstances the best course was to take firm and decisive action. He had decided on a period of severe martial law to bring the situation under control. The first order of business would be the urgent human needs of the mass of the population, to provide them with basic necessities and protect them against the effects of inflation and corruption. The common man did not care “two hoots” whether Zia or anyone else was running the country as long as his basic needs were met, and this was Pakistan’s first priority. At the same time, a political solution would be sought, and he had hopes that the local bodies election which had already taken place would produce new leadership from the grassroots. While martial law would be severely applied for the time being, he recognized that after a few months martial law begins to lose its effectiveness. Zia added that there had been no violent reaction to his speech—Mission observations confirm this—only a flood of congratulations. He did not anticipate violence, “although, of course, one can never be completely sure.”
5. I said that he would certainly recall that Ambassador Hummel had anticipated that any such action as he had taken last night would lead to an adverse reaction in the U.S. administration, Congress, and among the American people. Zia added “and the press”. Now that the step had been taken, I had been instructed to say that the U.S. Government regrets his decision. It is our belief that it is important for Pakistan to develop its political institutions through free elections. We hope that the postponement of the November 17 elections will be for as brief a period of time as possible.
6. In reply, Zia said that he appreciated the U.S. point of view and that he shared our belief in elections as the proper way to build political institutions. However, now that he had been forced into the decision he had taken, it was quite possible that it would be necessary to devise some new system under which elections should be held. In any case, he would certainly hold elections just as soon as he felt it was possible.
7. Comment: Zia’s remark on political institutions confirms [less than 1 line not declassified] and Pak Times editorial that Zia and his colleagues now see future elections in the context of some as yet unidentified new political system in Pakistan.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790475–0674. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent Priority for information to Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, and New Delhi.↩
- In telegram 11788 from Islamabad, October 16, the Embassy notified the Department that on October 16, one hour after he cancelled the elections scheduled for November 17, Zia requested a meeting with King on October 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0431)↩
- In telegram 270293 to Islamabad, October 16, the Department directed King to inform Zia during their October 17 meeting that “the reaction in the US to a postponement of Pakistani elections would be sharply adverse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790474–0528)↩
- Telegram 11813 from Islamabad, October 17, provided a summary of Zia’s October 16 speech, which announced the indefinite postponement of elections scheduled for November 17, the banning of all political activity, and the closing of selected newspapers and periodicals and the imposition of media censorship. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790475–0871)↩
- In an October 7 discussion with Hummel, Zia expressed doubts that elections could be held. (Telegram 11417 from Islamabad, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2132)↩