371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
285130. Subject: Demarche to Soviets on Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ref: State 277901.2
1. (S–Entire text)
2. During discussions with the Pakistani delegation October 16–17 (reftel), the U.S. side strongly reaffirmed its support for Pakistani security. The Secretary specifically stated that in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan the United States would consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be relevant.3 Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Agha Shahi asked that we assert to the Soviet Union our interest in Pakistan’s security and our concern that the USSR not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs. Shahi suggested that such a reaffirmation might usefully contain a reference to the 1959 agreement.
3. In response to Shahi’s request, either Secretary Vance or Under Secretary Newsom will call in Ambassador Dobrynin at an early date to discuss Afghanistan and Pakistan. During your meeting with Gromyko or, alternatively, Korniyenko, you should make a similar demarche using the following talking points:
—During two days of intensive talks October 16–17 in Washington with a high level Pakistani [garble—delegation] led by Agha Shahi, we had an opportunity for a thorough discussion of the regional situation and our bilateral relations, including the nuclear issue.
—On the nuclear issue we had a full and candid exchange. We made clear our continuing deep concern about the direction of Pakistan’s nuclear program. While there was no breakthrough on this issue, both sides have a clearer understanding of the other’s perspective. We agreed to continue our dialogue over the coming weeks and months.
—During an exchange on the situation in the region, concern was expressed about the implications of developments in Afghanistan for regional stability.
[Page 855]—The Pakistani delegation indicated Pakistan’s desire to continue a diplomatic dialogue with Afghanistan in an effort to find ways to reduce tensions and resolve outstanding problems. The United States is following a similar policy.
—We hope that the Soviet Union shares our desire to encourage better and more stable relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this regard we believe it important that the Soviet Union avoid exacerbating relations between the two countries by false and contentious official and semi-official statements alleging Pakistani interference in Afghan internal affairs.
—The United States reaffirmed its support for Pakistan’s security and stated that in the event of aggression from Afghanistan against Pakistan we would consult with Pakistan in accordance with our 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan.
—We would also like to reaffirm the view which we have made clear to the Soviet Government previously. We believe that in the interest of regional stability Afghanistan should be left to resolve its internal problems without outside interference. In this connection we cannot but note the increasing involvement of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790503–0073, D790500–0228. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad. Sent for information to Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, London, Bonn, and Paris. Drafted by Peck; cleared in EUR, S/MS, L/PM, S/AS, PM, and S/S–O, and by Newsom, Coon, Leslie Brown, and Thornton; approved by Vance.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 368.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 368.↩
- In telegram 25153 from Moscow, November 2, the Embassy reported the November 2 delivery of the démarche to Korniyenko, who, in response, “did not directly address the question of charges of Pakistani interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but spoke instead of the use of Pakistani territory for hostile actions against Afghanistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790505–1230) Telegram 25153 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 79.↩