247. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco1
275033. For Charge. Subject: Western Sahara Policy Review.2
1. (S)–Entire text.
2. At earliest opportunity please convey following message to King Hassan, either directly or through a channel of established reliability:
A. The U.S. Government has decided to proceed with congressional consultations on the possible sale to Morocco of a limited number of OV–10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and other material to be [Page 603] supportive of Morocco in dealing with increased military challenges.3 We are not in a position at this time to predict the result of these consultations but wanted His Majesty to be aware of the direction in which our policy is moving.
B. The decision is based on the U.S. desire to support a long time friend of the U.S. in reaching a solution to a difficult problem. At the same time, it is essential that the U.S. and Morocco have a common view of the purpose of this support. That is, it is important that we both understand that a liberalized U.S. military supply policy is for the purpose of stabilizing the situation and thereby encouraging both sides to come to the negotiating table.
C. The U.S. believes that the continuation of the conflict in the Sahara is in no one’s interest, including that of Morocco and that the time has now come for Morocco to move from a position of renewed strength to take the lead in negotiating a resolution of the conflict. The U.S. hopes that, by making known its willingness to strengthen Morocco’s defense, the Government of Morocco will be in a better position to negotiate a peaceful resolution with all the parties principally concerned. We will want to undertake discussions at an appropriate time on the full context and implications of the President’s decision. Indications of progress toward a peaceful resolution will play an important part in the implementation of the President’s decision.
3. FYI only: While President’s decision involves provision of 6 OV–10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and other material useful in the Sahara, the full package is conditional on the King’s willingness to negotiate with the Algerians and the Polisario. Decision states the OV–10’s should not be delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations. However, we believe that best tactic is to raise this requirement in a discussion with Hassan that follows this initial presentation, and where this requirement could be placed in the context of a description of congressional and other restraints on U.S. policy in this area.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–0140. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Algiers, Cairo, Jidda, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, and Tunis. Drafted by Coon; cleared in NEA, NSC, and DOD; approved by Newsom.↩
- For the policy review and the President’s decision on the arms sale to Morocco, see Documents 41, 42, and 46–49.↩
- In telegram 275034 to Algiers, October 21, the Embassy was instructed to inform the Government of Algeria of congressional consultations on the sale of military equipment to Morocco: “As we have previously told GOA, the United States, as a friend of Morocco cannot be indifferent to Morocco’s legitimate defense needs. We wish to respond to these needs in a context which will, at the same time, promote meaningful moves on the part of all concerned toward a fair settlement. We hope that if, within this context, Morocco shows an inclination to move toward a settlement, such moves will be reciprocated by Algeria and the Polisario.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483–0146)↩