49. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Brzezinski) to
Secretary of State Vance,
Secretary of Defense Brown, and
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Seignious)1
Washington, October 19, 1979
SUBJECT
- Decision on North African Policy/Morocco (U)
The President, having reviewed the recommendations of the PRC on our arms
supply relationship with Morocco (as per the three attached options),
has approved option 3. (S)
Morocco is to be provided six OV–10 aircraft, Cobra-TOW helicopters and
other material useful in the Sahara. The full package is conditional on
the King’s willingness to negotiate and the OV–10s should not be
delivered until an actual start is made on negotiations. (S)
With regard to implementation:
1. The Moroccans should be informed that this decision reflects U.S.
firmness in supporting its friends; it is also meant, however, to
stabilize the situation and to encourage both sides to come to the
negotiating table. We thus expect the King to exploit the additional
support this decision conveys to express a willingness to negotiate with
the Algerians and the Polisario.2
2. The Saudis should be informed that the positive decision was made in
part because of Saudi representations and as an expression
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of U.S. sensitivity to Saudi
concerns. The Saudis should now follow through in regard to
financing.3
3. The Algerians should be informed that the U.S. is interested in
stabilizing the situation and in bringing both parties to the
negotiating table. It is not the U.S. intention to promote a military
solution either by Morocco or by its opponents. The U.S. accordingly is
not giving King Hassan a blank
check but is using this leverage in order to promote a negotiated
settlement.4 (S)
4. The Congressional effort associated with this decision should be
closely coordinated by the Departments of State and Defense, and a
special effort should be made to have the Secretary of Defense
personally speak to key Congressional figures about this package.
(C)
Attachment
Options Papers5
Washington, undated
Option 1. The present policy of selling to
Morocco whatever arms are necessary for the defense of its own
territory, but not transferring weapons that clearly would be used
in the Western Sahara.
ACDA believes the present policy is
the best way to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Western
Sahara and thus to ensure that King Hassan remains in power. Intelligence assessments
make clear that the course of the war will not be altered by the
availability of new types of weapons. In March 1979, we liberalized
our policy by supplying Morocco with F–5 spare parts and other
equipment, but this has provided no leverage in our efforts to
persuade Hassan to negotiate
and he has prosecuted the war with greater vigor, but less success.
Regardless of what we tell Hassan, further liberalization would probably
encourage him to believe that if he continues to pursue a military
solution, the United States ultimately will directly support him in
the Western Sahara. Thus, a change in policy would probably prolong
the conflict and risk escalation to direct Algerian-Moroccan
clashes.
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Sending new types
of arms to Morocco would move us closer to direct involvement in a
no-win situation. Additionally, deeper U.S. involvement in the
Western Sahara conflict would jeopardize now-improving relations
with Algeria, and antagonize most OAU nations. Finally, liberalizing our policy would
provoke a bruising battle in the Congress where the responsible
committees in both Houses can be expected to hold public hearings on
resolutions of disapproval, raising questions about the
Administration’s commitment to arms transfer restraint.6
OPTION 2
This option would backstop an active diplomacy with all concerned
parties to achieve a negotiated settlement by a partial relaxation
of our arms transfer policy to Morocco. We would still not supply
sensitive new weapons systems that would be particularly suited to
the Sahara war, such as the OV–10 or the Cobra attack helicopter. We
might sell the Hughes 500 MD anti-tank helicopter and non-lethal
items such as aerial surveillance equipment and night vision
devices. We would continue to support previously supplied equipment
and replace end items, including F–5 aircraft, APC’s, jeeps, trucks and so forth.
With careful managing we think this policy will enable us to:
—Help Hassan enough,
politically as well as militarily, to establish conditions making it
possible for him ultimately to negotiate peace terms that he and
Morocco can live with, while giving us the influence we need to move
him in this direction. At the same time our help would not be such
as to encourage him to believe he could win a military victory.
—Show concerned countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia that
we are willing to help our friends, but without going so far as to
alienate Algeria, the OAU, and
third parties who are convinced Morocco should give up its claim to
the western Sahara.
—Avoid the bruising battle we would face in Congress under Option 3.
Systematic and detailed consultations with the committees of both
Houses since July indicate that both would oppose Option 3. The
Senate would support Option 2 while House opposition to Option 2
would be markedly less than for Option 3. Congressmen Solarz and Hamilton and members of the Black
Caucus have expressed their strong opposition to OV–10s and Cobras.
Senators Church and Javits have stated in a joint letter that “. . .
the United States should not provide weapons that would be suitable
only for counterinsurgency operations in the western Sahara.” Any
effort to get approval under such circum
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stances, even if we won, would be at a heavy
cost in terms of Congressional support of other important issues
(e.g., Salt II).7
OPTION THREE
All agencies agree that a diplomatic rather than a military solution
to the Western Sahara conflict is required. However, before
negotiations are possible, the military situation must stabilize.
The King must feel confident enough to negotiate, and the POLISARIO
and their supporters must realize that they cannot win a military
victory. Given the POLISARIO’s recent escalation, including
increasingly frequent attacks into Morocco proper, the US Government should now liberalize its
arms sales policy to include sale of OV–10 aircraft and other
equipment and training useful to Morocco not only in the Western
Sahara but in maintaining the balance vis-a-vis Algeria.
Some assistance can and should be rendered immediately, but the full
package must be conditional on the King’s willingness to negotiate.
We favor a commitment to provide Morocco at least 6 OV–10 aircraft,
Cobra-TOW helicopters, and other material useful to his defense in
the Sahara, but the OV–10’s will not in fact be delivered until an
actual start is made on negotiations.8 This package, as well as associated training and
technical assistance will not win the war for Rabat. But it will
help stabilize the situation in the near term and encourage both
sides to come to the negotiating table. While this option runs the
risk of tempting King Hassan
toward greater intransigence and will meet some resistance in
Congress, it more nearly serves US
objectives in North Africa and provides greater possibilities for
starting negotiations.9
