Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

246. Letter From Representative Stephen Solarz to President Carter¹

Washington, September 19, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

The State Department, as you are undoubtedly aware, is currently re-evaluating our policy of restricting the sale of arms to Morocco which are suitable for use in the Western Sahara.

In an effort to get a better understanding of the implications of a change in policy for U.S. interests in the region, I recently traveled to Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Spain and France in my capacity as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in order to personally study the problem.² During my trip I met with all of the principal leaders involved including King Hassan II of Morocco, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, Prime Minister Ould Haidalla of Mauritania, and the leadership of the Polisario Front.³ While I have already briefed Undersecretary of State Newsom on my conclusions, and will be seeing Secretary Vance this week, I would like to give you a brief report on my principal observations and conclusions.

My basic recommendations are these:

1) We should continue our current policy of providing Morocco with arms for its own defense but not with arms specifically suitable for use in the Western Sahara;

2) We should quietly encourage efforts by friendly intermediaries, such as Spain, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and France, to bring the parties to the conflict together in order to encourage a peaceful settlement and help King Hassan extricate himself from a conflict he cannot win militarily and which, if it continues, may well undermine him politically; and

3) We should simultaneously remove the existing prohibitions on contact between our diplomats and Polisario officials and on visits by our diplomatic personnel to the Moroccan-held areas of the Western Sahara.⁴

I believe it would be a fundamental contradiction of the principles on which our country was founded if we were to assist in the suppression of a genuinely indigenous and internationally recognized effort to achieve self-determination, in the absence of any compelling strategic and political considerations to the contrary. In the case of the Western Sahara, I believe that the provision of arms to Morocco to combat the Polisario would be compatible with neither our ideals nor our interests.

When I began my visit to the region, Mr. President, I leaned toward the view that there might well be a convincing strategic and political case for changing our arms sales policy. But I came away from my trip persuaded that the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara would have significant negative consequences for U.S. foreign policy and that the advantages cited in behalf of such a course of action are either minimal or non-existent.

In the first place, I’m convinced on the basis of detailed and exclusive conversations with the leaders of the Polisario as well as the observations of knowledgeable journalists and diplomats that this is an authentic national liberation movement which has managed to create a national as opposed to a purely tribal sense of political consciousness, and that it is likely to play a major role in the political future of the region. An independent Saharan entity would have a probable population of over 100,000 and a substantial resource base. Furthermore, of all the liberation movements in the world, there is none I can think of that is seemingly less hostile to and potentially more friendly towards the West than the Polisario. Based on my conversations with the Polisario leadership, it is clear that they are neither pro-Marxist nor pro-Soviet. Indeed, the leadership has specifically refrained from asking the Soviets for military support because it does not want to internationalize the conflict. And it has indicated that in the context of an independent Saharan state it would be inclined, for economic and geopolitical reasons, to look to the West, not the East, for support. Consequently, while we may not have any real interest in facilitating the establishment of some kind of Saharan homeland in the Western Sahara, it seems to me we clearly do not have any significant interest in preventing it.

Second, while Morocco would clearly like to purchase counter-insurgency weaponry from us, I am persuaded after my conversations with both Moroccan officials and U.S. diplomats in Rabat that a continued refusal on our part to provide this equipment would not occasion a serious break in our relationship, although it would undoubtedly be a [illegible] of continued irritation. In fact, the state of U.S.-Moroccan relations is much better than I was led to believe before I made the trip, partly because of U.S. cooperation in the Shaba airlift, the recent Congressional decision to increase U.S. military aid by 50%, the sale of spare parts for the F5s, and the Administration’s approval of the sale of U.S.-licensed Chinook helicopters to Morocco by Italy.⁵ In fact, Moroccan leaders seem much more interested in our diplomatic understanding than in the arms sales issue per se. We also have to ask what an improvement in Moroccan-American relations would actually produce. If the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara would lead the Moroccans to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, endorse the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and effectively support the Camp David process—thereby providing President Sadat with additional backing in the Arab world—it would be possible to make a very persuasive case for some change in our arms sales policy. But to the extent that the King has decided to sever relations with Egypt and refrain from supporting the Camp David process because he clearly believes that the opposite course would be incompatible with his own political interests, it is exceedingly unlikely that a change in our arms sales policy would produce a reversal of his present position.

Third, a change in policy would undoubtedly bring to a halt the improvement that has taken place in our economic and political relationship with Algeria, which is Polisario’s major external supporter. In recent years Algeria has become a much more important economic partner of the U.S. than Morocco. Thus Algeria provides 9% of our crude oil imports (16% of East Coast imports); U.S. firms have won over $6 billion in construction contracts since the early 1970s; and Export-Import bank exposure is now at the $1.4 billion mark. Algeria has also begun to take more moderate positions on a number of international issues which are consistent with our own policy objectives. The Algerians have worked with Yugoslavia to try to prevent Cuba from moving the Non-Aligned Conference toward a directly pro-Soviet position, worked for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two Yemens, and opposed Soviet and Cuban policy in Cambodia, Ethiopia and Uganda. Furthermore, the election of President Chadli Benjedid, who unlike former President Boumedienne is more of a pragmatist than an ideologue, has created new opportunities for improvement in our bilateral relations. There is reason to believe that, if and when President Benjedid consolidates his power, the stage will be set for further progress in the relations between our two countries. But such an improvement will probably become impossible if, in the interim, we eliminate the restrictions on the sale of arms to Morocco which are suitable for use in the Sahara. I thought you would be interested in knowing that as my meeting with Benjedid concluded and he escorted me to the door, he indicated that he was very much looking forward to his forthcoming visit to Washington next year, although he indicated that he would not be able to come if in the interim we abandoned our policy of neutrality on the conflict in the Western Sahara.

Fourth, a change in our arms sales policy would have adverse consequences for our relations with a number of important African and Third World countries. At its Monrovia summit this July, the Organization of African Unity voted overwhelmingly to approve the recommendations of five African Presidents (Nimeiri of Sudan, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Traoré of Mali, Touré of Guinea and Nyerere of Tanzania) for a cease fire and internationally supervised referendum in order to achieve self-determination in the Western Sahara.⁶ This represented a clear evolution in the OAU’s position on the conflict, and I was particularly impressed by OAU Chairman and Liberian President Tolbert’s advice, when I was in Liberia last month, that the vote indicated “a clear consensus in Africa for an independent Saharan state” and “Africa would look with much disfavor” upon a change in our arms sales policy.⁷ In particular, Nigeria and Tanzania are likely to take equally strong positions. In the aftermath of the OAU vote, Morocco’s diplomatic position has been greatly weakened and we will probably see growing support for the Polisario position at the United Nations, in other world forums, and in acts of individual diplomatic recognition. While few states are likely to permit bilateral relations with the U.S. to suffer due to this issue alone, a change in our policy will probably contribute to cumulative downturns where there are also other matters of concern. It would also deeply disappoint many of our African friends who have appreciated the determination of your Administration to view African problems in an African context and who would see such a change in policy as an implicit repudiation of the new direction in which you have moved our African policy.

Fifth, Morocco’s international isolation has been accentuated by its recent de facto annexation of the Mauritanian-administered portion of the Western Sahara. A U.S. decision to provide Morocco with arms for use in the Sahara at this time would appear, both at home and abroad, as a reward for aggression. I understand that the Department has been preparing a new legal interpretation of our military agreement with Morocco that would recognize Morocco’s “lawful administrative authority” in its sector of the Sahara and thereby enable us to provide arms that could be used in that sector to defend Southern Morocco.⁸ But this would not justify their inevitable use in the formerly Mauritanian sector to defend a clearly illegitimate act of territorial annexation.

Sixth, by removing restrictions on arms sales to Morocco we would run the risk of internationalizing what has so far been a localized crisis. Until now, Polisario has refrained from requesting Soviet military assistance. If we change our policy, the Soviets could see an opportunity to gain an advantage, particularly in view of Polisario’s widespread diplomatic support, and begin to become involved in a conflict from which they have so far abstained.

Seventh, some people have argued that a change in policy would increase our influence with Morocco and put us in a better position to urge Morocco to negotiate a resolution of the conflict. In reality, I believe it would be likely to have the opposite effect. During the course of my conversation with the King, he made it clear that he looked to U.S. arms for the Sahara as a means for producing a quick Moroccan victory. To the extent that both the King and his chief military advisers believe that a military victory is possible—in spite of the opinion of knowledgable military observers that such a victory is impossible—our selling Morocco arms suitable for use in the Sahara would not encourage Morocco to make the concessions necessary for a diplomatic solution. I also suspect that such a change in policy would result in a hardening of the Algerian position, and to the extent that Algerian cooperation is necessary for a peaceful resolution of the problem, would reduce the chances for a negotiated settlement. Since our major interest in the Sahara is in ending the war rather than in facilitating any particular outcome of the war, and since the only way to end the war is by political rather than military means, I think it would be a serious mistake to initiate a change in policy that would make meaningful negotiations more difficult to achieve.

Eighth, some have suggested that a change in our arms sales policy would be seen by other countries as a manifestation of our willingness to help a friend in need. While there are some countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt which would clearly be pleased by such a development, I do not believe they view our arms sales policy toward Morocco as a litmus test of our determination to come to the aid of friendly countries. To the extent that we provide Morocco with arms for its own self-defense, but not for use in the Sahara, we can maintain that we are willing to help our friends, although not by providing assistance in a war of dubious legitimacy which has attracted virtually no international support. Also, if we changed our arms sales policy, other friends of the U.S. with interests in the region would be very displeased, particularly Spain, Liberia and Nigeria. Still other friends, such as Kuwait, North Yemen, Tunisia and Jordan, are not particularly concerned with this issue and could easily accept a continuation of our previous policy.

Lastly, it seems to me that from the moment the State Department began to actively consider the sale of arms to Morocco for use in the Sahara, all the subsequent developments in the region have militated in favor of a continuation of our present policy: the OAU has voted overwhelmingly in favor of self-determination for the people of the Western Sahara; the Non-Aligned Conference has strongly supported the new OAU position; Morocco has annexed the Mauritanian-administered section of the Sahara and been denounced by its former partner as an aggressor; and both President Tolbert and Tunisian President Bourguiba have called for regional peace conferences to deal with the conflict. Also, if the purpose of a change in arms sales policy is to improve our relations with Morocco, I hope you will take into consideration that such a change would inevitably result in a significant confrontation between Congress and the Administration. Even if the opponents of a change in policy were not successful—although once the facts were made known to a currently indifferent Congress, the prospects for passing restrictive legislation would be quite favorable—the confrontation itself would probably do our relations with Morocco more harm than good.

Finally, Mr. President, I would hope that instead of increasing the level of militarization of the conflict in the Sahara we could, without taking the lead ourselves, quietly encourage other interested parties, such as Saudi Arabia, Spain and Liberia, to take the initiative in moving the dispute from the battlefield to the conference table. In this regard, I believe it will be helpful if we quietly ease the existing prohibitions on contact between our diplomats and Polisario officials and on visits by our diplomatic personnel to the Moroccan-held areas of the Western Sahara. For us as a matter of policy to refrain from these potentially informative contacts is to deprive ourselves of the information needed for rational decision-making. We paid a significant political price by depriving ourselves of such contacts in Iran.

I hope that you will take these views into consideration in your decision-making on this complex problem. Needless to say, I would be more than happy to meet with you personally to discuss the matter further, if you thought that such a meeting would be useful.⁹

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Solarz
Chairman
Subcommittee on Africa

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 78, PRC 127, 10/16/79, North Africa. Unclassified. A stamped notation on the letter reads: “Congressional Liaison” and is dated September 20. A copy was sent to Beckel.
2. See Document 242 and footnote 3, Document 241.
3. No detailed account of the meeting with the Polisario was found. In telegram 2299 from Algiers, August 22, the Embassy provided a summary of the meeting between Solarz and Polisario Assistant Secretary General Bachir Mustapha Sayyed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790383–0736)
4. In telegram 46369 to Rabat, February 24, the Department transmitted guidelines for contact with Polisario representatives at post. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Algeria, 10/31/79–11/3/79: Briefing Book [II])
5. See Document 167 and footnote 6 thereto.
6. See footnote 4, Document 45.
7. In telegram 6173 from Monrovia, August 8, the Embassy reported on Solarz’s meeting with Tolbert. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790360–0171)
8. Not found.
9. Senators Church and Javits also wrote Carter about U.S. arms sales to Morocco and the Western Sahara on September 21; see Document 177.