Office of the Historian

99. Memorandum for the Record1

NFAC–4081–78
Washington, September 18, 1978

SUBJECT

  • SCC Meeting on Nicaragua, 18 September 1978

PARTICIPANTS

  • David Aaron, Warren Christopher, Robert Bowie, Viron P. Vaky, Robert Pastor, six others unknown to me, Ed Heaton, [name not declassified]

1. Christopher indicated that the meeting had been called because the Nicaraguan crisis had worsened during the past week in two respects: the conflict was becoming internationalized with a clearer indication of planned Venezuelan and Panamanian support to the FSLN guerrillas; and the Guard’s capability to control the country is proving to be less than we expected. He believes it is too late to work out a settlement without FSLN participation.

2. We qualified both points. Perez and Torrijos [1 line not declassified] want the US to move decisively. This does not, however, deny that they are fully capable of carrying through with more direct support for the guerrillas. The Guard is steadily restoring control of the cities where the FSLN had made headway, though over the longer term the guerrillas would be back in force again.

3. A number of other issues were discussed at length, including the role of the Guard in a mediation process, the possibility of international peacekeeping forces, and our limited knowledge on the character of the FSLN.

4. In a roundabout manner, a new policy approach emerged. Ambassador Jorden had been under instructions to urge the heads of other countries he is visiting—Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela—to put together a multilateral mediation initiative, which the US would fully support. Now his itinerary and instructions will be changed. He will ask the heads of state to join the US in a mediation initiative. He will imply that the mediation should take its own course, but the US will be prepared to budge Somoza if that is where it goes.

5. Jorden will go to Nicaragua before Venezuela, however, to offer Somoza an international mediation without preconditions. There will [Page 276] be an effort to get some of Somoza’s friends in the US to encourage him to go along.

6. It is not expected that the initiative will be put together in time for Thursday’s OAS meeting.2 Therefore, the US will seek a cease-fire resolution and advise that a mediation effort is in train.

7. Aaron felt that the President should not make any distancing statements at this time, but Christopher won approval for at least a statement of concern about the violence. It was also agreed to cut off lethal military equipment in the pipeline to Nicaragua.

[distribution list not declassified]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 36: (SCC) Nicaragua. Secret; CIA Internal Use Only. Drafted [text not declassified] on September 19.↩
  2. See footnote 5, Document 100.↩