Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

98. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 18, 1978

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua—Next Steps

Update

The situation is getting worse. Perez and Torrijos have apparently decided to step up their support of the Sandinistas, and it is possible that they may be thinking about helping the Sandinistas to secure a relatively small area on the Nicaraguan side of the Costa Rican border and establish a provisional government, which they would then promptly recognize. The Nicaraguans have accused the Panamanians and the Venezuelans of supplying air cover for the Sandinista invasion, and while Torrijos and Perez have denied it, we have received intelligence which suggests otherwise.

The OAS will be meeting today to discuss and perhaps vote on a MFM (meeting of Foreign Ministers), and we expect it to pass. However, it is clear that the Nicaraguans will try to preempt the Venezuelans and turn the issue to their advantage by talking of Venezuelan aggression.

U.S. Policy Goals

Over the weekend, I spent a good deal of time thinking about Jorden’s mission because I feared that our goals were not sufficiently clear to achieve success. I have arrived at a number of conclusions and policy suggestions, which I will describe below. I recommend that you call an SCC meeting to review them. I have mentioned virtually all of the points to Vaky, but he has not shown much enthusiasm for them, though he has not given me very good arguments for not taking them.

Our preferred outcome is to see a moderate transitional government succeed General Somoza. While the Sandinistas, through the Group of 12, will no doubt participate in some form in this transitional government, our goal should be to try to isolate them and to minimize and to gradually reduce their influence. (If their influence is reduced gradually, that would permit the new government sufficient time to cohere, to gain the support of the Guardia, and to ultimately defeat the Sandinistas.) Our preferred means of reaching that outcome is to work with like-minded Latin American governments in a mediation effort.

The question is, how can we structure the Jorden mission so as to achieve these two goals as rapidly as possible.

Policy Recommendations

With Somoza:

We are being sharply criticized by moderate opposition leaders for continuing to support Somoza (the Nicaraguan National Conference of Clerics has just written the President asking him to cease supporting Somoza), while at the same time, Somoza continues to try to manipulate us into criticizing the Panamanians and the Venezuelans.² In order to gain credibility with the opposition and with Somoza, we need to discreetly begin distancing ourselves from Somoza. We need to do this anyway because of the wanton brutality exercised by the National Guard as it has regained control of Leon and other cities. By all accounts, the Guardia’s actions were totally out of proportion to the threat. I have received calls urging the President to make some statement about the violence, and I think the time has come to do that. At the same time that the Presidential statement is issued, our Ambassador should be sent in to tell Somoza that because of the Guardia’s brutality, we will be making an announcement the next day that we are freezing all military aid to Nicaragua and that the Attorney General has taken steps to prevent the recruiting of any U.S. citizens as mercenaries for Somoza. Our Ambassador should also inform Somoza that we are beginning to review whether or not to withdraw our Military Group. (This decision should be held until the hard negotiations begin.)

With the Opposition:

The opposition in Nicaragua believe that the U.S. wants Somoza to stay. The steps outlined above will begin to correct that impression. At the same time, it is imperative that we begin talking with opposition leaders with the purpose of trying to elicit from them their vision of the mediation process, the transitional government, and the future government. We should do this for three reasons: (1) to try to get to know the goals of each of the leaders better; (2) to try to get them to think beyond Somoza and start formulating some concrete proposals; and (3) to try—as indirectly and subtly as possible—to mesh the different views into a single coherent plan.

There is one additional reason. We need to know much more about how the various opposition groups view the Sandinistas. We need to know who are Sandinistas-in-disguise, like Ramirez for example. From conversations with Torrijos, Lewis, and Tad Szulc, I believe that the goal of the Sandinistas is not to seize the government soon, but rather to help to establish a provisional government with as many of their front-men in positions of influence as possible. These front-men will then permit the Sandinistas to penetrate different governmental sectors and gradually move to take over the government. They may see this process as taking as long as two years, and they will spend as much of their energies outside as inside Managua. We need to be able to alert our friends of the Sandinista strategy so as to help isolate them.

Which opposition leaders should we get in touch with? We should start with the three who have been designated leaders—Robelo, Rivas, Ramirez—but should include leaders from both the Conservative and the Liberal Party and discreetly begin talks with Army leaders.

With the Sandinistas:

Many of our Latin American friends believe that the Sandinistas will prevail. Obviously, Perez believes that, and he and Torrijos evidently also see them as non-Communists. Our intelligence suggests otherwise though, of course, we can’t be certain. Up until now, despite many direct and indirect requests from them to establish contacts, we have avoided that. As a result, Tad Szulc, among others, now knows more about them than our intelligence community. I would recommend establishing extremely secret contacts with the Sandinista leaders as well as with the Group of 12 to increase our knowledge of their organization, goals, and strategy, and for two additional reasons. If it is true that the Sandinistas are in reach of attaining power, and if it is true that there are moderate tendencies in the Sandinistas—as Perez and Torrijos evidently believe—then, we certainly don’t want to overtly antagonize them at this point, and we may want to give them an impression that we are listening to them and that we take them seriously. At the same time that we try to give them a sense that we care, we will have the contradictory goal of trying to seek their isolation from the other groups. This is obviously very delicate, and it’s possible that we may not be able to pull it off. To do so, we need to pursue this strategy in two steps: (1) establish contacts and begin talks aimed primarily at eliciting information from the leadership of the Sandinistas and the Group of 12; (2) identify moderate elements in both organizations and pursue more active discussions with them. Our purpose should be to obtain rather than to convey information. We should insist on absolute confidentiality.

The International Mediation Effort

We are running out of time; and I fear that unless Jorden makes some specific requests in his conversations, his mission will produce little more than concern over recent developments. Let me suggest that Jorden should ask each Head of State to designate one person to participate in a Nicaraguan Mediation Consultative Group. From this Consultative Group, we should then designate two people—one U.S. and one Latin American—to be the mediators between Somoza and the opposition (the three R’s—Ramirez, Robelo, and Rivas). The Latin American mediator should be selected on the basis of the person (international stature and credibility) and the degree to which his views of the process coincide with our own. That person should be chosen at the end of Jorden’s consultation.

Then, the two mediators should be sent immediately to Nicaragua. At the same time, the O.A.S. should be asked to endorse the mission, and we should try to elicit letters (preferably public cables) of support from leading Latin American Presidents (as many as possible).

The task of the mediators is to attain Somoza’s resignation in exchange for guarantees from the opposition for his safety and his property. In the bargaining, the best way to achieve these guarantees will probably be to make the minimal governmental changes. Somoza, his half-brother, his son, and perhaps a dozen others should go; the rest of the government should pretty much stay. Someone very conservative and establishment—like Mora, Minister of Government, or Rivas—should be designated provisional President, and he should install a new cabinet which is dominated by the conservative party and by moderate business opposition leaders (like Robelo) and one or two from the Group of 12. The National Guard should be consulted and, to the maximum extent possible, involved. The task of this transitional government would be to bring the Nicaraguan economy back to its pre-war level, to recover the people’s support, and to plan for free elections in 18 months. We should be prepared to support them fully.

If Jorden is to succeed, it may be necessary for him to convey to various leaders, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, some ideas about the likely scenario, along the lines described above. We have received intelligence from El Salvador and elsewhere that the concern of these military leaders is that they fear that the alternative to Somoza is chaos. To the extent that they can see a more regional and moderate alternative, they will be better prepared to support the international mediation effort.

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, David Aaron, Box 224, (Aaron, David) Nicaragua, (9/8–19/1978). Secret; Sensitive. Pastor sent the memorandum under a September 18 note to Gates indicating his interest in discussing Pastor’s memorandum with Aaron in preparation for that day’s SCC meeting. For a synopsis of the SCC meeting, see Document 99.
2. Telegram 4391 from Managua, September 16, reported the Embassy received a letter to Carter signed by representatives of the Sacerdotal Council of the Managua Archdiocese and the Board of Directors of the National Conference of Clerics of Nicaragua. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua Cables: 9/11–16/78)