Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

100. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 19, 1978

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua

David Aaron chaired an SCC meeting today on Nicaragua to decide whether new instructions were necessary for Bill Jorden.² The consensus of the group is that the situation has worsened in two respects. First, it is becoming internationalized. Both Perez and Torrijos have informed us that they are prepared to give full support to Sandinistas in their struggle to overthrow Somoza. They believe that if Somoza stays in power, there will be more suffering, and the Sandinistas, who they believe they can control now, will inevitably turn to Cuba for support.

Secondly, the capacity of the National Guard to maintain control of the situation is less than we thought. There is a real possibility that the Guard could disintegrate, leaving the Sandinistas the only viable military force in Nicaragua. Because of these two fundamental changes, the SCC recommends a modification in the mediation approach.

Ambassador Jordan has held talks today with Torrijos in Panama, and has flown to Costa Rica late this afternoon.³ He plans to return to Panama tomorrow, and we are instructing him to fly to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador after speaking with Torrijos. We believe that the need for mediation is greater now than ever before, but the only way to initiate such an effort is to play a leading role in putting it together. Only a central U.S. role will make it possible to contain Perez and Torrijos’ support for the Sandinistas and be reassuring to the more conservative Latin American states.

Warren Christopher recommended the following new instructions to Ambassador Jordan: He should tell the heads of state in Central America that the U.S. intends to report⁴ positively to the call from the Nicaraguan opposition for international mediation, and we would like for other Latin American nations to participate in this effort and name mediators.

In line with our desire to keep the Latin Americans out in front as much as possible, we will take advantage of the OAS foreign ministers meeting scheduled for next Thursday⁵ to endorse mediation in Nicaragua. At that meeting we will try to check international intervention by calling for a cease fire and for an OAS presence on the Costa Rica-Nicaraguan border.

Jordan will also go to Nicaragua to seek Somoza’s acceptance of mediation. At that point it may be necessary to spell out the possible consequences should Somoza reject mediation. As indicated in my last memo to you, that means we may eventually have to ask Somoza to step aside.⁶

Warren Christopher has discussed this approach with Cy and he strongly recommends it, as do I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve modifying Bill Jordan’s instructions to ask Latin American countries to join us in the mediation in Nicaragua. We will provide some recommendations on a possible U.S. mediator.⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, David Aaron, Box 224, (Aaron, David) Nicaragua, (9/8–19/1978). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Carter initialed the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum. Brzezinski indicated by hand that the memorandum should be sent to Aaron.
2. See Document 99.
3. Jorden reported on his talks with Torrijos in telegram 6765 from Panama City, September 18. Torrijos took the “position that it was too late in the game for traditional approaches.” Jorden noted that Torrijos also “urged President Carter to consider immediate strong statement repudiating Somoza, deploring violations of human rights and large-scale violence, urging National Guard to use restraint with its own people.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1839) In telegram 6809 from Panama City, September 19, Jorden reported on his talks with Carazo, commenting that Carazo had asked “How can I help?” Carazo also said that Somoza had to go, “but we must not handle problem in a way that will open the door to Castro to get a foothold in Central America.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1845)
4. An unknown hand changed “report” to “respond.”
5. The MFM of the OAS, called to discuss the situation in Nicaragua, took place September 21–23. In telegram 243423 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, September 25, the Department noted the U.S. Government had achieved “our primary objective” at the meeting because a resolution was affirmed that would “provide an OAS umbrella of efforts by member states (including the US) to offer their services to the Nicaraguan Government in seeking to mediate in the current crisis and to help find a peaceful, democratic solution to the current violence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780392–0315)
6. See Document 97.
7. Carter wrote “ok. J” at the bottom of the memorandum. Telegram 237296 to Lima, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa, September 19, informed Jorden that that his instructions were amended to authorize him to “invite host governments with which you are consulting to join USG in a mediation effort.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 38, Nicaragua Cables: 9/17–20/78) In a September 19 memorandum to Carter, Christopher noted that Honduras had agreed to join the mediation, that the Dominican Republic was favorable, and that other countries would “probably accept tomorrow.” Christopher also proposed Rogers as a first choice for a mediator with Linowitz a second choice. Carter indicated his approval of this recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 33, Nicaragua: 9/13–30/78)