Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

101. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 21, 1978

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua—Update

The National Guard seems to have regained control of the country for the moment, and the action has shifted to the international plane.

1. The mediation effort has been set back considerably. El Salvador seems to have backed out, and Somoza’s footprints are evident.² Colombia is wishy-washy; they told Jorden that they would participate in the mediation effort only if all of Central America, as well as Somoza, would participate.³ Jorden is going to Guatemala today, and will return to Panama to await instructions from us on when to go to Nicaragua.⁴ In the meantime, Somoza’s Minister of Government, Mora, has passed a very strong message [less than 1 line not declassified] that Somoza will not accept mediation. The message sounds as if Somoza is trying to get us to back down before Jorden asks him directly.

2. Our three “friends.” Costa Rican Foreign Minister Calderon met with Christopher last evening and requested a meeting between President Carazo and President Carter and possibly including President Perez. Vaky and I believe that we should put off Carazo; one of the things we want to do right now is to establish some credibility with Somoza, and not to associate ourselves too closely with the “radical democrats”.

Perez has written a stinging letter to the President after his conversation with Jorden.⁵ Perez urges the President to make a hard decision to preserve peace in the region. He said, “the problem of Nicaragua places your human rights policy in dramatic danger.” Vaky met with Consalvi last night and told him that if Venezuela attacks Nicaragua, Venezuela will not find the U.S. on its side. We will have to condemn such intervention. Consalvi hinted very strongly that the help they will give to the Sandinistas will be covert, but they intended to see Somoza overthrown, and they do not view the Sandinistas as we do. I will probably speak to the Panamanian Foreign Minister, who is in town for the OAS meeting, this evening, and will make the same points as Vaky did.

3. Outside Support. We have intelligence reports that suggest leftist guerrillas in Guatemala and in El Salvador plan to coordinate attacks in their respective countries with the next wave of attacks by the Sandinistas. In addition, there are reports of extensive recruiting in Panama and several other countries of leftists to go to fight in Nicaragua against Somoza.

There is also a report that the Nicaraguans are getting more arms from the Israelis.

4. OAS. The OAS session opened this afternoon, and Christopher will be giving a very tough speech, deploring the violence and inhumanity and calling for a ceasefire, an international humanitarian effort, and an international mediation.⁶

5. More bad news. We have received an intelligence report that indicates the Sandinistas have postponed their assault on Managua until they receive more reinforcements. When they attack, they plan to cut water lines, electricity and telecommunications.

The intelligence report [less than 1 line not declassified] suggests that the Honduran military will intervene in Nicaragua if it appears that the Sandinistas will take over. The Honduran military have also been in touch with their Guatemalan counterparts. I attach a copy of Jorden’s conversation with Perez.⁷ In this conversation, he argues strongly for a Presidential statement on the human rights violations in Nicaragua. “One firm categoric statement by President Carter denouncing what has happened in Nicaragua would shake Somoza’s foundations.” He says that he believes that Somoza will fall, and if this takes time and is not done correctly, that the Communists will come to power. He also said that he believes the mediation effort will fail, and that the only solution was heavy pressure on Somoza to leave office.

Congressman Murphy is supposed to be circulating a “Dear Colleagues” letter to try to gain support for Somoza, and already has 54 signatures.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 33, Nicaragua: 9/13–30/78. Secret.
2. Jorden reported on his talks with Romero in telegram 6846 from Panama City, September 20. Romero “joined his Honduran colleague [Paz] in approving mediation commission for Nicaragua and agreeing to participate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1855) Jorden had earlier reported Paz’s acceptance in telegram 6845 from Panama City, September 20. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1850)
3. In telegram 6899 from Panama City, September 21, Jorden discussed his meeting with Turbay, commenting: “In sum, if Somoza will accept mediation, and if U.S. is involved, Colombia will join with us and Turbay will select a personal representative.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780385–0886)
4. Jorden reported on his talks with Lucas in telegram 6904 from Panama City, September 22. Lucas was “disposed to collaborate” with the mediation but felt that the “essential first step is to convince Costa Rica to eliminate Sandinista presence in that country and get Venezuela and Panama to end their backing for insurgents.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780386–0959)
5. Telegram 8921 from Caracas, September 20, included a translation of Perez’s September 20 letter to Carter, in which Perez wrote of his talks with Jorden: “I obtained nothing out of that conversation which permits me to be optimistic concerning the attitude of the United States toward General Somoza’s bloody regime.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0704)
6. See footnote 5, Document 100.
7. Not attached. Jorden reported on his talks with Perez in telegram 6900 from Panama City, September 21. Perez felt that it was too late for mediation and that Somoza’s “removal” was the only option. Jorden noted that Perez said he has “no intention of using Venezuelan military force against Nicaragua unless Nicaragua launches an aggressive attack against Costa Rica.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780395–0013)