102. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State and the National Security Council1
4537. For Assistant Secretary Vaky from Ambassador Solaun. Subject: Conversation With Somoza: 21 September, 11:00 am. Refs: A) State 239658,2 B) State 239655.3
Summary: Amb met with Somoza today, raising points reftels. Somoza continued to blame Nicaragua’s situation on a combination of USG human rights policy and oppostion incompetence but portrayed a slightly more flexible position toward USG-backed mediation effort. End summary
1. Somoza made no specific reference to points of ref A, but appeared pleased that Amb Jorden, or other official, would be visiting Nicaragua.
2. As to ref B, Somoza “was aware of and appreciated” USG concern regarding alleged abuses. Amb, he said, must tell Washington that a de facto situation existed here. Although he had ordered the GN to act with restraint, Amb must understand that, in battle, individual GN could “misinterpret the actions of a civilian and shoot him.” Mostly, he added, alleged atrocities are not reported to the GON, but were made by journalists wishing to discredit the GON.
3. Amb suggested that, if Somoza established mechanisms to handle complaints, many could be received. Journalists could be encouraged to register complaints. Somoza said he would do what he could because it was best that the GN come out “clean” as an institution. He went on to say that it was a mistake for the USG to try to accelerate the IAHRC visit. This, he said, projected the image that the IAHRC [Page 282] worked for the USG and not for a neutral organization. Somoza expressed his concern that the USG was trying to further “kick” him.
4. Somoza said he had received a letter from the Archbishop (Managua 4522) and asked if Amb had had anything to do with it.4 Somoza expressed surprise that the Archbishop had written the letter as if nothing had happened between him and the GON. The Archbishop was not neutral as he had already asked for Somoza’s resignation. The Amb said he thought the letter balanced and sensible and its tone, one of neutrality. He asked what Somoza’s reply would be. Somoza said he would agree. (Note: At end of conversation, Amb asked if he could report an affirmative reply. Somoza replied he would prefer Amb did not report this officially until he was ready to respond, but that he was favorably disposed toward the letter. End note).
5. Somoza said he hoped the USG recognized its moral responsibility and was aware that its human rights policy had encouraged misperceptions by the opposition regarding his weakness. All along, he said, he “had hoped the human rights campaign would not end in this tragedy.” Clearly, there was a need for assistance to remedy the great destruction made by the rebels and substantial reconstruction was needed. During the MFM, unrest would continue, as the oppostion hoped for intervention to oust him. He cannot permit the country to return to a state of license and anarchy (libertinaje). The problem with the oppostion was that it didn’t realize he (Somoza) was acting in good faith and was willing to renogotiate all major insitutions because he wants to leave the country in good shape when he leaves power. The opposition reads this as weakness, he said and this is not so. “These new leaders lack experience and read my willingness to negotiate as weakness. This is not so. I have already negotiated in the past with Chamorro and Aguero. Out of these negotiations we revamped the entire constitutional system. This is what we should do now. These fools doubt my resolve. I am willing to change the entire legal system, but I am not willing to break the constitution. I am willing to change those articles of the constitution that can be changed without breaking it. (Note: Somoza has told the Amb that shortening of his current term is unconstitutional. As far as Emb knows this is not correct. Art. 336 of 1974 constitution does limit “total amendment” of constitution as it “may take place only 10 years after it has been in force.” Art. 338 limits “partial” constitutional reform “when this includes the constitutional articles that prohibit the re-election of the person who is exercising the presidency of the republic and the election of his relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity;” these “amendments shall [Page 283] not go into effect in the period in which they are made, nor in the following period.” The same provision applies to Article 338 itself. However, Amb believes that Somoza was making reference to his perceived impossibility of constitutionally changing his 1981 term. Emb is asking for local legal opinion on this matter. End note).
6. Amb then asked if Somoza had any message for Washington about his position on mediation. Sometimes, the Amb said, he thought Nicaraguans were like children. At first, the opposition wanted dialogue, the GON didn’t. Then the term was changed to negotiation and the opposition was willing to negotiate. A similar problem of semantics was occurring with the term mediation. The opposition wants mediation, but the GON wants good offices. “I want to bring to your attention, Mr. President, that there is a difference between mediation, on one hand, and arbitration or adjudication, on the other. The latter two terms imply that any decision of the arbiter or adjudicator is binding regardless of the opinion of the parties in conflict. Technically, mediation does not imply this result.” After consulting a dictionary, Somoza said that, despite his legal advisors’ opinion, the term apparently was not necessarily what he had feared. Somoza then suggested that, of course, he was willing to discuss with an American emissary the terms of any mediation or good offices effort.
7. Comment: Somoza today portrayed a slightly more flexible position toward U.S.-backed mediation. Amb has noted that Somoza is a very proud man and, in his lengthy contact with him, has concluded that initatives suggested by USG and subsequently adopted by Somoza have been portrayed later by him as GON initiatives. At an early stage of their relationship, Somoza emphasized his openness to any suggestion from Amb, but insisted upon taking credit for any policy decision, as he felt it unseemly to appear as if his actions were determined by the USG.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427–0021. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Caracas, Guatemala City, Mexico City, Panama City, San José, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa.↩
- In telegram 239658 to Managua, September 21, the Department instructed Solaun that he could “tell Somoza that there was never any intention of slighting him, that it is our present plan to have Jorden or someone see him very soon.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0799)↩
- In telegram 239655 to Managua, September 21, the Department directed Solaun to inform Somoza that “we are greatly concerned over mounting reports of alleged atrocities by the National Guard against the civilian population in various urban areas where there has been fighting” and to urge Somoza to “impress upon the National Guard the need for restraint” and to “undertake a full-scale investigation of these allegations so as to bring to justice those who may have taken part in such serious violations as the alleged summary executions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0732)↩
- Not found.↩