404. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Mini SCC Meeting on El Salvador, 18 January 1980, 1630–1730 hours
1. The meeting addressed both short-term and long-term aspects of US policy toward El Salvador. Aspects affecting CIA interests and tasking of CIA are covered in paragraphs 11–13.
2. The meeting was chaired by David Aaron. Attendees included: Pastor, NSC Staff; Assistant Secretary Bowdler and Ambassador-designate White of State; General Pustay, JCS; Frank Kramer and Admiral Schuller, DOD/ISA; NIO/LA and [name not declassified] of OPA/CIA.
3. Aaron opened the meeting by underscoring the extreme concern of the White House and of top Department officials about the Salvadoran situation.
4. Bowdler emphasized his own concern about the seriousness of the situation and presented the bottom line of short-term US policy as getting the government going so that it can protect itself from the extreme left challenge. He presented various options for pressuring the military and Christian Democrat (PDC) members of the junta to settle their differences, complete the forming of a cabinet, and open the way for US security as well as economic assistance2 (see discussion paper dated 18 January 1980, attached).3
[Page 1009]5. The group expressed general support for Bowdler’s conclusion that Defense Minister Garcia be kept in place for the time being, despite concerted PDC and some military efforts to remove him. Bowdler feels that the military is too weak for Garcia to be removed for political reasons (i.e., to the left, including the left-wing minority of the PDC, Garcia is a symbol of an independent law-and-order military). Bowdler suggested that the PDC be told that Garcia could be removed later, under circumstances less threatening to military unity and effectiveness.
6. Bowdler reported (a) he intended to visit El Salvador next week to effect the above,4 (b) he already had sent his assistant, James Cheek, to El Salvador to pave the way, and (c) he plans to ask the Venezuelans to send a representative to urge PDC leader Duarte to resolve the present impasse.
7. Aaron suggested that the US use its leverage on the Salvadoran military for some symbolic act—such as a declaration affirming military subordination to the junta government—to defuse the General Garcia issue. The PDC, at the same time, should be pressured into accepting US security assistance, which party leaders had not yet approved.
8. [less than 1 line not declassified] said that key players inside and outside El Salvador did not know how to read US intentions regarding staying the course. If US policy concludes that an extreme left takeover is intolerable and communicates our intentions to stay the course (even behind a center-right government without the PDC), the US would probably have greater leverage to get the forward movement needed to confront the rapidly growing threat from the extreme left. This would also give us a sounder footing for (a) giving Cuba some pause in aiding the extremists, (b) gaining Honduran cooperation in curbing infiltration of arms for the extremists through the Salvadoran border, and (c) pressuring Panama and Costa Rica not to assist the extremists.
9. Aaron said that we had to get the US policy line out through a high-level statement. Pastor urged that this be tied to Cuban intervention in El Salvador.
[Page 1010]10. [less than 1 line not declassified] pointed out that the church in El Salvador was making soundings against US security assistance and about an extreme left-center left government as the best way to avoid a civil war. It was decided to request the Vatican to make representations to Archbishop Romero against these leanings.
CIA Interests and Tasking
11. Aaron expressed with emphasis and repetition the need [2 lines not declassified] He wanted a coordinated CIA–DOD plan on how to expand our intelligence in the region and enhance the intelligence capabilities of the Honduran and Salvador governments.
12. Aaron asked [less than 1 line not declassified] to take the lead in developing ideas on strengthening the perception of US policy determination to resist the fall of El Salvador to leftist extremists.
13. [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]
14. Notes
a. Aaron urged that El Salvador get as much aid as quickly as possible. He indicated that Italian-made helicopters were available.
b. Bowdler indicated that the State paper on Caribbean policy was ready to go to the Secretary and would soon be available for an interagency airing.
c. General Pustay indicated that we should not make avoidance of civil war a top priority, because this could undercut our other objectives.
d. Bowdler suggested that we invite Duarte to Washington to emphasize US backing for reform as well as for curbing the extreme left.
e. NIO/LA stressed the growing strength of the extreme left to emphasize that reversing the situation in El Salvador required more than government unity and determination. Pastor praised the high quality and usefulness of the advanced draft of the OPA interagency paper on Salvadoran extremists.5
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 11: (SCC) Central America. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment. Neither a completed version of the minutes nor a summary of conclusions for the January 18 SCC meeting have been found. Pastor’s handwritten notes are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 1/80.↩
- In telegram 274 from San Salvador, January 11, Devine reported that he had met with the newly constituted JRG on January 10 and briefed the members on the “present status of USG proposed programs of assistance in economic, military and intelligence fields.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800018–0809) In telegram 391 from San Salvador, January 16, Devine reported that Dada had telephoned him to give a “green light” regarding the proposed U.S. economic assistance program. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, unlabeled folder)↩
- Not attached. The January 18 mini-SCC discussion paper which was sent to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones and Turner under a January 18 memorandum, is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 121, SCM 107, 1/18/80, Mini-SCC El Salvador.↩
- Devine wrote to Bowdler in telegram 373 from San Salvador, January 15, to renew his warning about the deteriorating situation in El Salvador and to endorse U.S. support for the Junta. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1879) Bowdler responded in telegram 12255 to San Salvador, January 16: “The problem is not the level or nature of our planned economic and military assistance programs but our inability to get even these programs under way. Our top priority effort, therefore, must be to press the JRG to quickly put together an effective government apparatus, launch its reform programs and open to the door to USG economic and military assistance by reconfirming its earlier request.” Bowdler also noted that he would be visiting San Salvador the following week to “help resolve these issues.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880137–1872; see also footnote 2, Document 406)↩
- Not found.↩
- Davis initialed “D” above his typed signature.↩