The situation in El Salvador is quite fluid. Several members of the Junta
and the Cabinet have apparently carried out their threat to resign if
the military chose not to accelerate the process of reform or to curb
their unlawful use of force.2 The Christian Democratic Party
(PDC), after a serious internal
crisis, has apparently coalesced around a bold proposal. Napoleon Duarte, the leader of the
PDC, has publicly offered PDC participation in the formation of a
new government and has sought to down-play this current crisis as a
“natural development in the revolutionary process” rather than as a
“collapse of the revolution.” The PDC
initiative is an encouraging sign, but we will need to wait to see how
the negotiations play out. (S)
Cy’s memo at Tab A discusses the problems which undid the current junta
and outlines his recommended policy. Essentially, the junta has found
itself under continuous pressure from the extreme left, which Castro has helped to unify. At the
same time, the right-wing military has inhibited the reform process and
refused to curb its excessive repression. Under these conditions, the
junta and the Cabinet split. (S)
We have informed the junta repeatedly that we are prepared to be helpful
in dealing with their security, intelligence, and economic situation.
Teams from State, AID, DOD, and CIA have all completed assessments of the situation and
what we can do to help. We are ready to send in military training teams
and political operatives and to expand our aid program when the
situation clarifies, and the government requests it. Cy also wants to
“substantially reduce” the number of our mission dependents and other
Americans in El Salvador for security reasons. While I obviously agree
that we do not want to keep Americans there if the chances of physical
harm are high, I believe we need to
[Page 1003]
be careful about taking steps—such as pulling out
large numbers of Americans—that could unintentionally destabilize the
government and be interpreted as a loss of our confidence in the
government. I have told this to Cy; you may want to mention it as
well.3 (S)
The Vice President has written me, expressing his great concern about the
deteriorating situation in El Salvador. He recommends that we set up a
small group to explore all available alternatives.4
An informal group involving my staff, Assistant Secretary Bowdler, and CIA is following developments closely, and we have a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State in San Salvador now helping our Ambassador.
We have sent cables to countries that have important interests in
Salvador, including Venezuela, Colombia, Portugal, Germany, and Costa
Rica, bringing them up-to-date and encouraging them to help the
Salvadoreans find a way out of the crisis. We believe the PDC plan may represent the best way out of
the crisis, and we are supporting it and urging the military to be
flexible. (S)
Tab A
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter5
Washington, December 26, 1979
SUBJECT
- El Salvador: Prospects for the Junta and U.S. Policy
THE SITUATION
The five-man military/civilian Junta that took office following the
October 15 military coup against the repressive government of
President Romero finds
itself in serious difficulties because of inherent weaknesses, the
immediate violent opposition of the extreme left, and
[Page 1004]
the latent threat of the
far right. In trying to follow a reformist program it is buffeted by
cross currents and challenges that inhibit resolute action to
implement specific projects or deal effectively with disruption of
public order.
Junta’s Program: The Junta has called for
fundamental socio-economic reforms, including higher wages,
nationalization of the marketing of export crops, agrarian reform,
free trade union organization and tax reform. On the political side
it has called for the democratization of the political process,
including free elections and the right of all political groupings to
organize freely, and respect for human rights. It has failed,
however, to come up with concrete proposals on many of these key
issues and has not yet developed a consensus within the Junta on
many points essential to governing effectively. This has produced a
dangerous sense of drift.
Vulnerabilities: Consolidation of the Junta’s
position is hampered by these vulnerabilities:
—The Junta has inherent weaknesses, including political inexperience,
ineffective collegial decision making, fundamental philosophical and
ideological differences and a tendency to hold to the views of their
constituencies rather than working for consensus.
—The left’s systematic use of violent tactics to undermine the
Junta’s authority and provoke a repressive reaction results from a
realization that the Junta’s reformist program would destroy the
extreme left’s use of widespread popular discontent as a vehicle to
power.
—The Junta’s proposed reforms, which are essential for building a
strong popular following and depriving the extreme left of appealing
issues, threaten the economic interests of the still powerful right;
this poses the danger of a coup by conservative elements and
produces caution and indecision in the Junta.
—Many of the progressive young military officers who promoted the
coup are becoming increasingly impatient at the apparent lack of
action by the Junta and could move to take power into their own
hands.
—At the same time the proficiency of the security forces has
deteriorated to such a degree that their ability to deal with a
sustained guerrilla effort by the extreme left is in question.
Factors favoring the Junta: Despite the
foregoing weaknesses, the Junta still has these factors working in
its favor:
—The Junta has its priorities straight in emphasizing socio-economic
reforms and moving cautiously in dealing with public disturbances so
as not to adversely affect its popular base.
—Broad support from the Church and moderate organizations which
opposed the previous governments, conditioned on implementation of
the reform program.
[Page 1005]
—Continuing approbation and support of most of the international
community.
—An extreme left still not unified or able to launch a full-scale
offensive against the government.
—An economy which although under increasing attack by the extreme
left retains a strong productive capacity.
THE PROSPECTS
In the two months it has been in office, the Junta has not
consolidated its position as it should. It is aware of this and
under the continued pressure of the extreme left has come to realize
that it must act on both the reform/development and security fronts
if it is to halt the deterioration of its position.
The Junta’s most immediate threat is a determined and violent
challenge from the groups which comprise the extreme left.
Intelligence sources indicate that preparations to launch a
concerted attack on the government are under way.
The danger from elements of the far right is still incipient, but
nonetheless real. How they react will depend on their perception of
the reforms and the ability of the Junta to control leftist
violence.
We believe the Junta can meet these threats if it:
—moves quickly to organize itself and implement significant elements
of its reform and development program;
—responds firmly (but with due regard to human rights) to current
efforts to undermine its authority;
—takes immediate steps to upgrade the capabilities of its security
forces; and
—does a much better job of publicizing the mobilizing public opinion
in support of its programs.
In order to improve the lot of the underprivileged the Junta has
raised wages significantly in certain sectors and frozen the prices
of some essential commodities. Over the weekend it announced the
nationalization of the foreign marketing of principal agricultural
products. Last week it decided to use measured force in dealing with
the violent tactics of the far left and is already acting on this
decision. It has been slow to upgrade its security forces, but under
the prodding of our intelligence and military survey teams it has
formally requested USG assistance.
It has also invited a New York public relations firm with
considerable experience in advising democratic governments in Latin
America to help devise a strategy for winning support at home and
abroad.
We cannot predict whether the Junta will correct the deficiencies in
time to meet the challenge from the left or possibly from the right.
[Page 1006]
The imponderables
are too many. But with the advantages it now enjoys, coupled with
timely action along the lines described above, the Junta stands a
better than even chance to consolidate its position. In this
confrontation with the far left the role of our Embassy in
counseling the Junta and our ability to respond rapidly to essential
needs will be very important.
UNITED STATES POLICY
In supporting the Junta we identify with forces advocating basic
economic and social change and a return to democratic procedures.
The alternatives to the Junta are inimical to our interest: a
takeover by the far right will further polarize and radicalize the
crisis, while a victory by the far left, because of the strong class
antagonism existing in El Salvador, will usher in a revolutionary
regime more radical than the Sandinistas. The impact on Honduras and
Guatemala of either outcome, following on the heels of revolutionary
success in Nicaragua, would be highly destabilizing.
We therefore need to give maximum support to the Junta while avoiding
too close an identification that could be exploited by the extreme
left. The far right will be inhibited by our involvement especially
as it serves to bolster the Junta against the radical left. Our
strategy for helping the Junta is based on these elements:
We have already:
—asked Ambassador Devine to
increase his efforts as a catalyst in helping the Junta see the
seriousness of the extreme left’s challenge and the need for
cohesion and decisiveness in maintaining its authority;
—asked Ambassador Devine to
devise an approach to the Junta to elicit Andean and Mexican
assistance in order to multilateralize the support effort. We would
move behind the Junta’s initiative and encourage those governments
to be forthcoming;
—provided the GOES with tear gas
and other nonlethal crowd control equipment and an MTT to give instruction in its use
($205,000);
—sent an AID team to develop with
GOES officials high-impact
projects in rural and urban areas pegged to a target FY 80 aid level of $35 million;
—sent intelligence and military teams to assess needs for U.S. remedial assistance in training
and equipment;
—reached inter-agency agreement to reprogram $3.5 million of FMS financing (when we have our FY 80 appropriation) for purchases of
most immediately needed materiel; and
—notified Congress of our intent to reprogram $300,000 of IMET for provision of MTT’s and other training to cover most
immediate deficiencies.
[Page 1007]
We have under consideration:
—a visit by Junta members to the U.S.
for discussions with official and private groups in early February.
(If your schedule is too full to receive them, we might follow the
pattern used with the Nicaraguan Junta and have them meet with the
Vice President with you dropping in);
—in connection with the foregoing visit an appropriate high-level
statement welcoming their plans to return to constitutional
procedures with full respect for human rights and indicating support
for their reform and development programs;
—a visit to El Salvador in early January by a high U.S. official to underscore our support
of the Junta; and
—gearing up a people-to-people program for El Salvador as soon as the
security situation permits Americans to travel there without serious
risk; meanwhile we are working on efforts which do not require such
travel.
In order to reduce our vulnerabilities we
are:
—substantially reducing the number of U.S. mission dependents;
—closing out the small HEW-malaria and IAGS-mapping operations; and
—working on a further scale-down of the Peace Corps presence, looking
toward close-out if the situation deteriorates further.
