405. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • US Policy to El Salvador (S)

On January 18, David Aaron chaired a mini-SCC meeting to assess the situation in El Salvador, and to decide on the strategy for Assistant Secretary Bowdler’s trip to Central America this week.2 (S)

The immediate problem in El Salvador is the inability by the Christian Democrats and reformist military to reach agreement on a new Cabinet or on the direction which the new government should take. The Christian Democrats (PDC) are insisting on the resignation of the hard-line Defense Minister, General Garcia, because they feel that association with him would taint their Party and make it more difficult for them to attract popular support away from the revolutionary front groups. Bowdler will try to perusade the PDC and the military to put their differences aside so that they can address more effectively the armed struggle which lies ahead. As an added carrot, he will offer our economic and military aid.3 (S)

Once the Junta requests military aid, DOD will expedite its release, and we will speak to the Italians about selling helicopters to the government. In addition, we will assist the Junta in public relations to make clear that US military assistance is our response to Cuban and other external involvement, and that it represents our support for the reformist goals of the new government. In addition, Bowdler will encourage leaders from the PDC, including Duarte, to come to Washington for [Page 1012] talks. Such meetings would provide us the opportunity to demonstrate our firm commitment to the new government. (S)

Our economic assistance efforts are on track. Since Archbishop Romero is so influential in Nicaragua, and since he could be doing much more to strengthen the moderate groups, we are considering approaching him through the Vatican.4 (S)

[2 lines not declassified] Honduras, which has become the conduit for arms smuggling to Salvador. I intend to request a broad military-intelligence review of our operations in Central America in order to better adjust our resources to our requirements.5 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 34, Meetings—Vance/Brown/Brzezinski, 1/80–2/80. Secret. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the page: “We have to wait for Bowdler’s return.” Denend wrote at the top of the page: “1/23 ZB—this was used as a DR today. LD.”
  2. See footnote 2, Document 406.
  3. In a January 22 memorandum to Vance, in advance of a January 23 Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski luncheon, Bartholomew noted that a $55 million economic assistance package was proceeding, but security assistance was delayed because the junta “has not yet agreed to ask for it.” (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State, 1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Lunches Jan./Feb./Mar.) In a January 23 memorandum to Aaron and Denend, Brzezinski reported the decisions reached at his January 23 luncheon meeting with Vance and Brown, writing: “wait for Bowdler to report and to take up at next V–B–B. In the meantime, check about interception of Cuban planes to Honduras.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 20, El Salvador: 1/80)
  4. In a January 25 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski noted Bowdler’s argument that “a neutral position from the Church must be achieved” in El Salvador and stated that Carter “noted that we might talk to ‛el Papa.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 123, Vance, Miscellaneous Communications 1/80–4/80)
  5. Brzezinski’s January 22 memorandum to Vance, Brown, McIntyre, Jones, and Turner requested an interagency assessment of the “current military and intelligence needs in Central America.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 121, SCM 107, 1/18/80, Mini SCC El Salvador)