243. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Tokyo1
Tosec 60134/167615. The Secretary from Christopher. Subject: Revised Scenario—Nicaragua. Info addressees for Ambassadors Luers, Bowdler, Moss, Pezzullo.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Following recommendations represent our (State) views, and have DOD concurrence in substance. They are not, however, cleared as yet with NSC. I am sending them for your guidance and comments.
3. Reports from Ambassadors Pezzullo and Bowdler indicate we have virtually no chance of establishing an independent executive committee of moderates with enough support to bargain effectively with the FSLN-backed provisional government (PG).2 We conclude that our best fall-back now is to try to modify the composition of the PG and set forth certain conditions which will give the moderates a fair opportunity to survive in the power struggle that is bound to ensue. Expansion of the PG is essential not only to counter-balance the extremists but also to inspire confidence of those whose support is necessary inside and outside Nicaragua to rebuild the economy. Our best leverage to do this is our apparent capacity to get Somoza to step down in the next several days, as well as the desire of the PG for our ultimate recognition. We may have some additional leverage in the form of the PG’s hope for economic recovery help which any new government is going to need badly. We will, however, also require the unqualified and active backing of Torrijos, Carazo, Carlos Andres Perez and Luis Herrera Campins. I therefore propose that we seek to trade our cards for such an expanded PG and for as many of the other conditions set forth in para 4 as feasible.
4. Accordingly, we propose the following:
A. That we agree among ourselves that we would seek to expand the PG along the following lines (accepting Bowdler’s suggestions):
—Mariano Fialloa: Rector of the National University, a man respected by both sides for fairness and objectivity.
[Page 613]—Ernesto Fernandez Holman: A banker who can inspire the confidence of the international lending institutions and the private sector. He is young and progressive—of the generation as Robelo, Ramirez and most of the FSLN leaders.
—Julio Gutierrez or some other professional soldier who commands respect and has not been involved in any of Somoza’s recent repression. We need a tough soldier to put backbone in the civilian moderates and negotiate a merger of the FSLN and GN with the likes of Ortega Saavedra.
—Emilio Alverez Montalban or Archbishop Obando Y Bravo: Men who stand above the struggle and are respected for their wisdom, fairness and unwillingness to compromise with Somoza.
B. We then approach Torrijos, Carazo, CAP and Herrera Campins immediately to say that we would be prepared to attempt to secure Somoza’s departure in the next few days provided we can reach with the PG quick agreement and clear understandings on the following elements: a) an expanded Junta membership (as per above); b) a ceasefire/standstill; c) a clear promise of no reprisals, revolutionary courts and executions, and perhaps some plan similar to the sanctuary proposal of Torrijos; d) some agreement for continued existence side by side of GN units (under different leadership) pending an eventual reconstitution of police and security forces by the new government of national reconciliation. (We may not be able to obtain all of these points, but it is important to try.)
C. We would then approach the PG, preferably jointly with Torrijos, CAP and others, to negotiate the above agreement.
D. If we reach agreement we would then move to coordinate, through Ambassador Pezzulo, Somoza’s departure on X date with a transfer of power to an expanded PG, probably through a constitutionally selected successor. (That is, rather than our old plan of the successor passing power to an executive committee which would negotiate a new government of national reconciliation (GNR), he would pass power to the expanded PG which would become the GNR.)
5. Another development is that the PG has announced a new government plan, which we have just received.3 It names a 30-person (but no names mentioned) “council of state” to “share legislative duties” with the 5-man Junta, and which would include representatives of moderate elements—but many Sandinistas as well—and which will greatly expand what the Junta can claim it represents. It provides for [Page 614] a new army, police, court system and guarantees. We may be able to work with this plan to achieve some of our goals. There are still a lot of unanswered questions regarding it. We would still want to negotiate an expansion of the effective executive Junta, i.e. the present five, and perhaps we could “thicken” the 30-man council—and the top levels of the bureaucracy—with greater moderate participation, as well.
6. I repeat that the above has not been cleared by NSC. I do not know if they disagree though they may have some differences. We have simply not been able to discuss it and I do not want to delay this message.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840126–2398. Secret; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, San José, Panama City, and Managua. Drafted by Vaky; cleared in S/S–O and DOD in substance; approved by Christopher.↩
- See Documents 234 and 239.↩
- Telegram 4891 from Panama City, June 28, included an informal English-language translation of the FSLN provisional government plan received on June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790316–0496)↩