244. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
2886. San Jose for Ambassador Bowdler. Subject: (S) Somoza: Second Visit.
1. (S)-Entire text
2. Taking a leaf from Somoza’s book, I took my associates (Barnebey and Martin) with me for my second meeting with him. Once again Quintana was present but Congressman John Murphy was not; he was replaced by Minister of Finance Genie. Somoza was dressed in combat fatigues in contrast to his pinstripe gray suit of yesterday. Since he said he had just returned from visiting troops in the field, I asked his assessment of the conflict. He confirmed what we had already learned, that the FSLN unit in the El Dorado sector of the city had withdrawn. He said the FSLN group had run out of ammunition. The same was true in Matagalpa. He said they were headed for El Tuma, commenting, “I think we are winning.” He also claimed the GN defeated the FSLN in Rivas.
3. Without a bit of hesitation, he then blurted out, “I am prepared to leave.” Three times he referred to the vote in the OAS as indicative [Page 615] of his isolation in the hemisphere and said at one point, “I can’t oppose governments that rule 300 million people.” He went on at some length about his loyalty to the Liberal Party and to the majority of the Nicaraguan public which he said elected him and still supports him. He then reiterated that he had decided to resign, but added petulantly that the U.S. should consider carefully the consequences of his leaving.
4. I stressed our interest in preserving some institutional structure and in preventing an extreme leftist solution. This led us to conclude that his resignation was an essential first step. His mere presence in office would continue to fuel the violence and permit leftist extremists to turn the widespread anti-Somoza feelings to their advantage. He said he understood and believed that most Nicaraguans were not extremists. I suggested that we design a scenario for his resignation. He agreed and suggested we meet tomorrow afternoon to review such a scenario.
5. One unanticipated problem arose when Somoza commented that the conservatives had not attended the congressional session called for today. He said a quorum was not possible. Quintana said some were afraid to attend and others had gone to the U.S. when the FSLN offensive began. At first, Somoza was confident they would eventually be able to round up the required number, especially if the Embassy would encourage the conservatives to attend. He then shifted ground and said if it were not possible to gain a quorum, “we can always do it with a golpe.” He said, “Your plan calls for a golpe anyway.” Quintana agreed, reminding me that he had raised that possibility in Washington.
6. We have come to the crucial phase. I have no doubt that Somoza has decided to resign. The real proof came toward the end of the conversation when he commented gravely that he had one person he wanted to save in this affair; his son, Tachito. I advised him to get him out of the country early. He also asked about the status of his visa. I advised him to send his passport to the Embassy to ensure that all details are in order and not left for the last moment.
7. Tomorrow (Friday) I propose to present the following scenario to Somoza. Department comments should reach me no later than noon Washington time.
—Establish a specific departure date. I suggest Tuesday or Thursday of next week (Wednesday, July 4 seems a bit much). I would argue against extending beyond Thursday for fear that we might see a change of heart.
—Congress should convene early on d-day to accept the resignation, select a Congressman to act as interim President and then take whatever additional action we decide is necessary.
—D-day should also be the date of departure of discredited senior GN Commanders and the announcement of appointment of new com [Page 616] manders who pledge themselves to be loyal to country and duty and to serve the successor government loyally.
—D-day—Somoza’s Swan song. Suggest he picture his resignation as a patriotic action aimed at calming political passions and ending fratricidal conflict.
—Departure of Somoza and other members of family. Arrival in U.S. should be equally statesmanlike to avoid stimulating critical press reaction and thereby prejudicing press treatment of any request for extradition.
Before d-day:
—If congressional quorum impossible, Somoza will have to select another successor (e.g., FonMin Julio Quintana).
—Administrative arrangements completed—visas, travel, etc.
—Agree on public statements.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis; Special Encryption. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Pastor wrote at the top of the page: “Scenario—hands to 1 person—who waits and gives key to FSLN?”↩