242. Telegram From the Embassy in Honduras to the Department of State1
3485. Subj: Somoza’s Meeting with Central American Presidents.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. General Paz tonight (June 20) briefed me on his meetings earlier same day with Presidents Somoza, Lucas and Romero in Guatemala. He stressed confidentiality of information and I ask that this message be appropriately protected and restricted.
3. After meeting privately for two hours and discussing why Somoza must go and why Condeca should not intervene in Nicaragua, Presidents Romero, Lucas and Paz met with Somoza at 11 a.m. Paz said that he had never seen Somoza looking so demoralized, tired and bitter.
4. Somoza gave a military breakdown and said that he could keep fighting for a month but that he could not hold on indefinitely because he is receiving no help. He announced he has decided to go and urged his Central American colleagues to get involved in Nicaragua and to use Condeca after his departure.
5. Lucas told Somoza that Condeca would not intervene, arguing legalistically that Condeca comes under the OAS and it would be illegal to intervene. Lucas warned that the 17 OAS countries which sponsored the last OAS resolution would jump down Condeca’s throat.2 Moreover, there could be internal repurcussions in Guatemala. El Salvador agreed while Paz did not comment.
6. Somoza kept trying to persuade the three Presidents that they should intervene. Nicaraguan then revealed that he met with U.S. Ambassador (presumably Pezzullo) and that latter told him to go but offered no guarantees concerning the Guardia. According to Somoza, U.S. Ambassador said that Somoza should resign in favor of someone from the Congress who would take over, Congress would then be dissolved, then a new broad government would be formed and this government would negotiate with FSLN provisional government.
[Page 611]7. Somoza repeatedly expressed his fears to his colleagues about the Guardia. He was anxious for a way for Guardia’s senior officials to get out. El Salvador and Guatemala offered to accept them. (Paz commented to me that the GN officers have money and would not come to Honduras.)
8. Somoza said that he would be meeting with American Ambassador at 3 p.m. and would resign. This prompted Salvador to ask for advance 24 hour notice. Somoza said such notice is impossible because the GN or his bodyguard might kill him. Romero continued to ask for lead time so that Central Americans could recognize a democratic government. Romero said that “we three are very afraid.” (Paz expressed fear of Venezuela which could strangle Central American countries by cutting off oil.)
9. Somoza departed, reiterating that he would resign.
10. Remaining three Presidents agreed that they would deny that meeting ever took place.
11. Paz told me that Honduras wanted to follow American lead. He asked how can Nicaraguan Government be stabilized and prevented from falling to Communists. He expressed serious worry about GN.
12. Again I ask that foregoing not rpt not be discussed with foreign governments as Paz appears fearful we will leak something to his Central American colleagues.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/29–30/79. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Guatemala City, San Salvador, Managua, San José, and Panama City. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Pastor wrote at the top of the page: “Afraid of art. attack—so won’t get involved.” Pastor also wrote at the bottom of the page: “sent to ZB.”↩
- Pastor underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with “17” and ending with “Condeca’s.”↩