241. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
2788. From Bowdler. Subj: Conversation with President Carazo.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. Together with Ambassador Weissman, I spent an hour and a half with President Carazo discussing the Nicaraguan situation. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Calderon. Carazo was in a reflective mood, relaxed and anxious to talk about helping to fashion a transition that would avoid further bloodshed and achieve a more balanced provisional government.
3. I opened the conversation by making my now standard presentation about the changed situation in Nicaragua and Ambassador Pezzullo’s and my mission in Central America. My comment that the solution contemplated in the OAS resolution should facilitate Somoza’s departure and avoid dangerous vacuums led Carazo to set out his thinking on transitional process. I told him that I was very much interested in his ideas because the time has come to think in terms of hard-headed realities as we address the composition of the provisional government and the specific steps to be taken in the transition process in order to avoid further bloodshed or extremism.
4. Making clear that nothing could be set in train until Somoza decided to leave, Carazo said he would be willing to work “fulltime” to help and outlined the following steps:
—Once the USG obtains Somoza’s agreement to leave, we should think of bringing Foreign Minister Zambrano into the act so that the Herrera government is seen to have played a role. He regarded this as important because of Carlos Andres Perez’ involvement. CAP must be used to obtain the FSLN/PG’s acceptance of the necessary conditions. Herrera accepts this but does not want to be left out. Calderon insisted that Zambrono not act alone. He thought Colombian Foreign Minister Uribe or Garcia Bedoya should work in tandem with him.
—Simultaneously, while the US is obtaining Somoza’s commitment, Carazo wants to talk and possibly meet with Torrijos and Carlos Andres Perez about the specific conditions which the FSLN/PG would be asked to accept. I discussed these with him and he agreed they should include amplification of the provisional government, cease fire, [Page 608] stand still, arms embargo, no retribution and procedures for achieving a merger of elements of FSLN and National Guard. He thought them achievable because the FSLN would have no choice but to accept them in the face of strong Carazo-Torrijos-Perez insistence. In this connection, Carazo acknowledged that CAP’s influence with Torrijos was much greater than his own, and that CAP would be the one who would have to bring Torrijos into line, “so that he doesn’t radicalize and screw things up.” Carazo noted that unlike his Panamian friend, he was not a “card-carrying Sandinista.”
—The departure of Somoza would lead to the selection of either Rener or Urcuyo as the successor who in turn would pass the baton to the provisional government after an understanding had been reached on the conditions enumerated in the previous tic. He stressed the importance of orchestrating the change over carefully so that the steps would move in rapid succession without dangerous pauses. He thought it would be too much to expect the provisional government to deal directly with the transitional government in Managua but thought that this obstacle could be overcome by using the Zambrano-Uribe team as a bridge.
—Carazo made a strong point of the need to watch the timing of the above steps, doing everything possible to insure that Somoza does not leave before a provisional government takes over in Managua and the FSLN/GP is brought to agreement on essential commitments.
—Carazo appeared to recognize the need for keeping continuity in public security forces to the extent of blending some elements of the FSLN with GN officials and troops that were not acceptable to the former. He discounted the suitability of the three Guard officials who have defected to Costa Rica and asked me for any suggestions as to who could lead the GN during the transition. I declined to offer any specific [garble—names?], but took it under advisement.
5. Carazo asked whether on the basis of my conversation with Torrijos I thought that he was in a sufficiently “tranquil” mood to accept the foregoing conditions and procedures. I replied that I found his thinking very much along the same lines. I asked Carazo how Carlos Andres Perez would respond to the procedure he had outlined. He replied that Perez has the most influence with the FSLN, much more influence than Torrijos; that he has kept in close touch with him; that the current gov has knowledge of this; and that Perez is truly interested in resolving the problem of Nicaragua and not just getting rid of Somoza.
6. Throughout the conversation Carazo kept coming back to his need for specific people to be added to the junta. I told him we might consider the categories not adequately covered that would give it balance. For example, the universities might have a spokesman; the eco [Page 609] nomic interests should have a person who could inspire confidence among foreign investors and the international lending institutions; and consideration might be given to the conservative party and the church being represented. Carazo went along with those categories but again stressed that the time had arrived to think in terms of specific candidates that could be put up to the junta. He urged that we recognize the value of the junta as a “cushion” between a radical extreme and our shared interests.
7. I told Carazo that I thought his approach was a constructive one that merited close study. I would inform my government tonight and seek instructions on how I should respond to his ideas. In the meantime we would continue efforts toward the first objective of getting a commitment from Somoza to leave.
8. Comment: Carazo clearly has done much reflecting on how he would like to see things proceed, obviously anxious to see a quick out from the current crisis, since as he puts it, “the peace of Costa Rica is in the balance.” He may be more sanguine about his influence with CAP and Torrijos than his track record warrants. Their collective influence on the FSLN/PG may also prove to be less over the medium term than Carazo would like to believe, but that they can influence immediate discussions once Somoza is out is not unlikely. Timing in all this, as Carazo puts it, is crucial. The sense of urgency is evident, and to a lesser extent, awareness on his part that fitting the pieces together will not be easy. This should give us sufficient opportunity to offer guidance and find him receptive, but we need to keep in mind he all to often absorbs influences from other quarters all too readily. Nonetheless, his thinking is running parallel with that of Torrijos. If Department decides to go the expanded FSLN/PG route, it would appear that we would find cooperative allies. Would appreciate instructions on how to proceed in following up with Carazo.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133–2009. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Also sent Immediate to Managua, Panama City, and Caracas.↩