Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

240. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 28, 1979

SUBJECT

• Nicaragua

This memo is being sent instead of the one David mentioned to you on the phone. It is prompted by the cable (attached) which Warren Christopher is sending to the Secretary suggesting that we abandon our present strategy and adopt a modified Torrijos strategy.²

We would prefer to wait to see how the situation evolves before giving unwaivering support to Torrijos. We fear that if we move prematurely towards the Torrijos strategy, we would rule out the possibility of setting up a framework which would enhance the bargaining position of the moderates by providing a balance to the military power of the Sandinista Army. We, therefore, recommend that we permit the situation to evolve and see whether a modified-executive committee strategy is possible. We recommend that Ambassador Pezzullo expand his contacts within Managua among potential candidates (both civilian and National Guard) for a modified executive committee, and Ambassador Bowdler should do the same in San Jose, where there are also many Nicaraguan exiles. We think it may take a day or so before the moderate opposition elements realize what we are up to and reach for an alternative to the junta. In addition, we should continue to encourage Torrijos and the Venezuelans to persuade the junta to take the kinds of steps outlined in Christopher’s cable.

While we believe that it would be useful for the junta to expand its base, we also believe that the military power that rests under the base will be determining, and, therefore, we are reluctant to rely solely on the Torrijos strategy. We have asked State to cable Ambassador Pezzullo to make the contacts with the military people suggested by General Gutierrez.³ We also believe that the strategy recommended in this cable neatly complements the idea of the President meeting with Torrijos and Royo, and the President could conceivably catalyze the strategy in such a meeting.

1. Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 63, Foreign Countries—Nicaragua, 1977–1980. Secret; Eyes Only. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Pastor wrote at the top of the page: “Sent 10 p.m.” The memorandum is unsigned and there is no indication that Brzezinski saw it.
2. An undated draft telegram is attached but not printed. Pastor wrote on the draft: “Christopher sent this to the Secretary—late Thursday evening, June 28, 1979.” For the final version of the telegram as sent, see Document 243.
3. In telegram 167616 to Managua, June 29, the Department informed Pezzullo of the officers named by Gutierrez and noted: “if you think it advisable, you or your DAO may wish to contact them to get their opinion on how they see things and how they think the Guard might be reconstituted.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2063)