Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

217. Memorandum From Robert Pastor and Richard Brown of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 18, 1979

SUBJECT

• Nicaraguan Update (U)

Over the weekend, the FSLN made some impressive military gains by: (a) taking Leon (Nicaragua’s second largest city), (b) virtually stopping all highway traffic northward from Managua, (c) consolidating effective possession of Matagalpa, (d) assuming control over certain parts of Managua, and (e) launching of a strong offensive in the southwestern border area aimed at Rivas. Somoza has apparently decided not to attempt to retake Leon until Managua has been secured and also is concentrating on turning back the offensive in the South. The National Guard is beginning to suffer from the lack of supplies and mobility as well as from an increasing casualty rate. Somoza’s ability to resume control over the areas which he has lost appears increasingly unlikely. (C)

On the diplomatic front, the FSLN benefited from the Andean Pact’s formal declaration of a state of belligerency in Nicaragua, since it now is recognized and can receive aid as a legal “belligerent” under international law. In a separate, but nicely coincidental move, the FSLN named a five-member “provisional governmental council,” which contains a blend of moderates and Sandinistas. (C)

Responses to our demarche on Nicaragua made over the weekend to hemispheric governments are still tentative, in that the various Foreign Ministers wanted to check with their Presidents before giving definitive answers.² In general, however, the replies seem (a) to favor the urgent reconvening of the 17th MFM of the OAS, (b) to view with less enthusiasm the idea of sending a high-level OAS mission to Nicaragua to help shape a peaceful transition solution, and (c) to be skeptical, if not negative, toward the idea of sending an inter-American peace force to Nicaragua. (C)

We had initially intended to have Ambassador McGee provide a general outline of the US position today at the OAS in a meeting on aid to refugees. However, following our demarche to Pallais, the Nicaraguan Vice President who flew here Sunday afternoon,³ we decided to delay our public statement to provide Somoza with the chance to make the first move toward his departure and to sell the package of his departure and the formation of a government of “national reconciliation” to the Nicaraguan National Guard.⁴ We should know his decision by tomorrow afternoon. Our current estimate is that the MFM will be reconvened on Wednesday afternoon.⁵ Although the Andean Pact “State of Belligerency” announcement boosted the FSLN, and thus has complicated our effort somewhat, the most serious complication we face is the rapidly deteriorating position of the Nicaraguan National Guard and the steady military successes of the Sandinista forces. (C)

There are three scenarios that are most likely to transpire at this point:

1) The Sandinistas could seize power in a few days’ time; or,

2) The Sandinistas could set up a provisional government in an “occupied” part of Nicaragua and receive formal recognition and support from various countries (including some OAS members) and thus internationalize the situation even further, or

3) The situation could continue to disintegrate but with victory eluding either side.

What should we do?

We should aim for gaining the support of the OAS:

1) to a plan whereby Somoza would step aside and be replaced by a government of national reconciliation, which would in turn be sustained by an inter-American peace force until elections are held; or

2) a plan in which Somoza agrees to depart and an interim government of national reconciliation is formed which could have the option of inviting in an inter-American peace force.

Time is clearly running out. We must move rapidly to avoid the consequences of being confronted with the realities of either of the first two scenarios. (C)

The best way to obtain optimum results is:

a) to enlist the support of Congressman Charley Wilson to intercede personally with Somoza to convince him to step down and depart Nicaragua;

b) to send high-level emissaries to the major Latin countries to impress upon them the urgency of the situation and the need to get behind a plan to replace Somoza with a non-Sandinista provisional government. More specifically Vaky should go to Colombia and Costa Rica; Pastor and Moss can seek to persuade Torrijos; and Bowdler (who is in Mexico now) could visit Peru, Ecuador and Brazil.

We should do this even though the MFM is scheduled for Wednesday. Since few of the OAS countries are in fact sending their foreign ministers to participate in the meeting, we will have to go to them with our plan. A delegation from Washington is likely to get more attention than our Ambassadors on the scene. The central reason for sending the emissaries is that the Latins’ perceptions of the Nicaraguan situation are at odds with our own, and unless we can influence their thinking, we will be unable to move toward the accomplishment of our objectives.

Pastor has spoken at length with Vaky who seems to have given up hope of persuading the Latins to our point of view. Vaky wants to approach this problem through the Sandinistas because he believes that Panama and the democratic governments of the Hemisphere will move to support the Sandinistas and have decided against supporting “Somocismo” without Somoza.⁶ He may be right. But Pastor thinks that this strategy will lead to a disaster and we need to try one more time to achieve an alternate route.

Pastor returns tomorrow by mid-morning and recommends that we hold an SCC meeting on the Nicaraguan problem either Tuesday a.m. or Wednesday. (C)⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 56, Nicaragua: 12/78–6/79. Confidential. Pastor did not initial the memorandum.
2. See footnote 2, Document 211.
3. June 17.
4. See Document 216. No memorandum of conversation has been found for Pezzullo’s démarche to Pallais. Vaky noted in the Secretary’s evening reading for June 18, that Pezzullo had “stated that only the willingness of Somoza to leave and allow a Government of National Reconciliation to be formed could save the situation.” (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Evening Readings, 1979)
5. June 20.
6. In a June 19 memorandum to Vance, Vaky described “our MFM strategy” noting that “we propose to try to persuade the assembled Foreign Ministers to (1) sponsor or push for a political solution; (2) call for a ceasefire and take action to halt the arms flow; and (3) call for and organize massive humanitarian assistance.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/17–20/79)
7. See Document 218.