216. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Vienna1
Tosec 50062/156560. For Jack Perry for Secretary Vance from Christopher. Subject: Nicaragua. Vienna for Dr. Brzezinski.
(Secret-Entire text)
1. The situation in Nicaragua continues to deteriorate. While the National Guard has not collapsed, intelligence indicates that it is under heavy pressure and shows signs of fraying. The Sandinistas are being heavily supplied from outside. Fighting is widespread and government control in many areas is tenuous. The military balance, in my view, could shift at any moment. The time is very short if there is to be a transition to a moderate alternative to Somoza.
2. In these circumstances I intend to authorize the following action tomorrow (Monday) morning unless otherwise instructed.
(A) At the meeting of the council of the OAS at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow morning (which was called to consider refugees), the United States (McGee) will go beyond the agenda to call for (1) an immediate ceasefire on humanitarian grounds; (2) cessation of outside support in the strongest terms; and (3) the immediate formation of a government of national unity, as the only available avenue leading to an orderly transition and peaceful elections. With respect to said point (3), the U.S. would make a statement along the following lines: “The U.S. believes that outside humanitarian efforts will be fruitless without a political compromise which satisfies the interests of all significant political groups in Nicaragua. Accordingly, the U.S. urges the immediate formation of a transitional government of national unity consisting of individuals who enjoy the support and the confidence of the widest possible spectrum of Nicaraguans. This government would negotiate a ceasefire and then proceed with free elections and other reform measures. We call upon all Nicaraguan political leaders to recognize this avenue to a lasting peace and take the steps necessary to carry it out.”
(B) Following our telegraphic consultations, we are calling for a meeting of the OAS Foreign Ministers on Thursday, June 21. To pursue and elaborate the points made to the Council.2 Consultations on a [Page 552] possible need for a peacekeeping force would take place in the context of the MFM meeting. While the Council is not likely to take any action tomorrow, I believe the United States should not wait until Thursday to make the statement along the lines set forth above. I am mindful of the Wednesday Panama vote, but think we will be in a stronger position for having made the statement.
(C) Ambassador Pezzullo will meet with Luis Pallais (Vice President of Nicaraguan Senate) who is coming to Washington tonight. He would convey a message to be transmitted to Somoza along the lines of the talking points attached to this telegram. Somoza is sending out a variety of signals (calling Jack Murphy, the Pentagon, et al), but I think we should give him our candid appraisal and Pallais is the best channel available.
(D) We will take any feasible additional steps to cut the flow of arms and supplies to the Sandinistas. Torrijos is a key element here. We have frequently (and again June 15) implored Panama not to lend logistical support, and we will ask Ambler Moss to go in again tomorrow.3 (Frankly, we need an overarching plea and straight from the shoulder talk with Torrijos to be effective. Can you advise whether and when this might be possible.)
(E) Four HH–53 Jolly Green Giant helicopters will move from New Mexico to Panama, to pre-position them for possible evacuation in a semi-permissive environment. Up to this point neither the Government of Nicaragua nor the Sandinistas have interfered with U.S. evacuation by C–130’s. However, I believe it is prudent for us to be prepared for an evacuation in less favorable circumstances, such as the unavailability of airstrips. The Chinook helicopters now in Panama do not give us a satisfactory evacuation option because of their short range. The movement of HH–53 helicopters will probably become known, but I do not think it has any serious disadvantage since they are so plainly related to the evacuation option. The four helicopters will be accompanied by support aircraft and 170 American support personnel. We will take into account the War Powers Act, and do the necessary briefing on the Hill. (It has also been proposed that a helicopter platform ship steam from San Diego (nine days to station) with up to 1300 Marines, but I do not repeat not recommend that step at this time.)
3. The foregoing recommendations have been discussed with the Vice President.
[Page 553]Talking points for demarche to Somoza’s emissary Luis Pallais—begin text.
—I speak to you under instructions of my government to reflect the profound concern of my government over what is taking place in Nicaragua.
—The loss of life, the human suffering, the material damage are deeply troubling. Such a situation cannot continue.
—Without ignoring or condoning the aggravations which have come from abroad, we conclude that the basic source of the problem remains opposition to President Somoza.
—The situation has clearly reached crisis proportions. Nothing less than a bold political stroke has any prospect of achieving a resolution to the present crisis. The time is running out and on its present course the crisis will end up with the extremists in power.
—The call must be an act of statesmanship. It can succeed only if the President would state that he will step aside and permit a constitutional transitional government of national unity to take over and to begin to negotiate political requirements for a new government.
—Short of this, we fear that a more extreme political solution will be dictated, and the broad base of moderate Nicaraguan forces, including the National Guard, will be isolated and perhaps eliminated from any political or security role.
—The United States would support such a call and seek to mobilize as best it could hemispheric support through the OAS.
—You could, in fact, invite OAS participation and expertise, not only to help negotiate but to create the institutional framework for a satisfactory transition.
—We further would commit ourselves to marshal humanitarian relief efforts to heal the wounds of war.
—To sum up, we ask the President to facilitate a negotiated solution to this situation. This may be the last opportunity for him to do so.4 End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840167–2150. Secret; Flash; Cherokee; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Christopher.↩
- Telegram 156554 to multiple posts, June 17, issued a request for the reconvening of the seventeenth meeting of the consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on June 21, “for the purpose of further considering the critical situation in Central America especially the grave political and human developments in Nicaragua which my government believes constitute a problem of an urgent nature and common interest to the nations of the hemisphere.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/17–20/79)↩
- In telegram 4504 from Panama City, June 16, Moss reported his June 16 meeting with Torrijos regarding Nicaragua. Torrijos stressed that “it was important to halt the bloodshed, but at the same time it had to be clear that such a mission would result in a transitional government replacing Somoza.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790273–0470)↩
- In telegram Secto 5016 from Vienna, June 18, Secretary Vance’s delegation noted: “The Secretary read your cable and discussed it with Brzezinski and Aaron. He asked that two changes be made in your package (and Brzezinski concurred in these): first, the government whose formation we will propose should be called a ‛Government of National Reconciliation,’ rather than a ‛Government of National Unity.’ Second, formation of such a government should be coupled with establishment of a peacekeeping or peace-monitoring force. The Secretary said that nothing else could preserve peace, and that the two initiatives would have to go forward together.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 6/17–20/79)↩