Office of the Historian

218. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, June 20, 1979

SUBJECT

  • SCC Meeting on Nicaragua2 (U)

I chaired an SCC meeting on Nicaragua Tuesday3 afternoon which Cy, Harold, Stan, David Jones, and others attended. The situation in Nicaragua is deteriorating very rapidly, and the CIA’s estimate is that Somoza could be defeated in a week. The central question we faced was: Assuming that we can persuade Somoza to leave peacefully before the Sandinistas seize power, what can we do to ensure the evolution of a democratic, non-Communist government? (S)

All of us agreed on the following strategy: The US will propose at the OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting on Thursday (Cy will represent the US) an immediate ceasefire, an end to external shipment of arms to both sides (and we will explicitly mention Cuba), and the establishment of a broad-based government of National Reconciliation in Nicaragua. We will also propose that a Committee of Foreign Ministers from the OAS go to Nicaragua to try to persuade Somoza to resign and promote a moderate transition government. In order to assure that a transition government will last and that the National Guard will not disintegrate, and in order to facilitate Somoza’s decision to leave, we will also urge the creation of an OAS peace-keeping force—or if that’s not possible, an inter-American force, involving several Latin countries. We also intend to ask the OAS countries not to recognize the provisional government recently set up by the Sandinistas. We will try to assure that the Nicaragua issue does not spill over into the UN. (S)4

The SCC also agreed to set up a working group which would follow-up these points and also prepare talking points for your possible use with General Torrijos. We need to effectively answer questions, [Page 558] such as: How can we persuade Somoza to depart? How can we persuade the Latin American governments to support an inter-American military presence in Nicaragua when Somoza departs so as to preclude the exploitation by the Sandinistas of the probable political vacuum? The SCC may meet Wednesday afternoon or Thursday to discuss the group’s recommendations.5 Finally, the SCC suggested I share with you our fear that you may soon face a very difficult decision between two very unattractive alternatives: either a Castroist Sandinista victory, which will have very serious implications for the Panama implementing legislation and SALT and also have serious political ramifications, or US military intervention to prevent a Sandinista victory and try to permit a moderate political outcome. US intervention would unquestionably destroy the credibility of the policies you have developed to Latin America and the Third World and provoke virtually universal condemnation. (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 185, SCC 170 Nicaragua, 01/19/1979. Secret. Sent for information. The date of the document is handwritten. Carter initialed the top of the page. No other substantive record of the June 19 SCC meeting has been found.↩
  2. Pastor sent Brzezinski and Aaron a June 19 memorandum outlining the objectives for the SCC meeting. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 30, Meetings–SCC 170, 6/23/1979)↩
  3. June 19.↩
  4. Carter wrote “All OK” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.↩
  5. See Document 223.↩